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INTRODUCTION

If one accepts the standard ancient definitions of satire, Seneca's De

Ira must be excluded from consideration as an example of the genre.
Quintilian, certainly one of the most severe critics of Senecan style,
mentions Seneca among Rome's philosophers as the author of Dialogi, a
term which has befallen the De Ira and eleven other extant works of
similar structure. 1 Along with the equally comprehensive Moral Essays,
the term remains a convenient heading under which to pigeon-hole the De
Ira. 2 Both titles firmly represent a philosophical and more specifically an
ethical focus whose abiding consequence has been abundant scholarly
enthusiasm for those aspects of the De Ira. The Apocolocyntosis easily
admits association with Seneca the satirist; the De Ira evokes only Seneca
philosophus.
The designation Dialogus or Moral Essay supposedly establishes that
the De Ira contains what the title describes: a philosophical dialogue or a
Stoic moral essay on the vice of anger. If so, there is little to suggest that

1

2

Quintilian Institutio Oratoria 10.1.125ff.

John W. Basore, Seneca: Moral Essays I (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1928), xi.

2
the De Ira could be classified a satire. According to Diomedes, a fourthcentury grammarian, satire must be verse, a conclusion which precludes
the possibility that the De Ira could be satire on structural grounds
alone. 3 A false and twofold inevitability is thus sustained: first, the De Ira
cannot be other than its traditionally received classification; second, its
prose medium disqualifies it as satire ipso facto. Yet Seneca's essay will
prove an exception to perscriptive definitions of class or division for
reasons peculiar to satire as a genre and its historical development-matters whose neglect have hitherto led to conclusions of premature
finality. 4
If avoidance of cut-and-dried opinion is to be achieved and the

possibility of gauging the elements of satire in the De Ira established,
historical debate over the definition of satire and attendant problems must
be taken into consideration. Relatively recent acknowledgement that

3

H. Keil (ed.), Grammatici Latini I, (Leipzig, 1857; repr., Hildesheim
and New York: Georg Olms Verlag, 1981), 485. The definition appears as
follows: Satura dicitur carmen nunc quidem maledicum et ad carpenda
hominum vitia compositum, quale scripserunt Lucilius et Horatius et
Persius.
4The Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1972), s.v. "Satire," by R.C. Elliott. "The
formal verses. as composed by Horace, Persius, and Juvenal is the only
satiric form to have even a remotely determinate structure, and it
furnishes exceptions to every generalization ("qui dit satire latine, dit
melange," writes Lejay)."

3
satire cannot be neatly or conveniently classified is an admission that even
the most widely accepted generalizations about satire from Quintilian or
Suetonius to the present offer only an incomplete description at best, a
difficulty to which other genres are unaccustomed. 5 Questions of genre,
obviated by sharp demarcations of structure and subject-matter, are not
put to tragic drama or lyric poetry. But satire is a late arrival as a genre;
its name as well as efforts to summarize its aims are of still later
provenance, and Horace, looking at his own output, called it not satire but
chats

or

conversations. 6

Both

circumstances

contribute

to

the

disagreement over its nature.
To the extent that definitions agree, both during antiquity and
afterward, accord is generally founded on tone, theme, or use of figurative
language; in short, features related to content. 7 Scholarly dissension is
usual on issues of etymology, orthography, or the genre's origins; there is
a consensus on purpose (viz., censure of vice and folly), topical commentary

5

Ibid., 739. Elliott summarizes the problem well: "But the spirit which
informs them is too mercurial to be confined to exclusive literary
structures; it proliferates everywhere, adapting itself to whatever mode
(verse or prose) seems congenial. Its range is enormous ... "
6
7

Quintilian Institutio Oratoria 10.1.93.

Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics, 738. The definition of
Dr. Johnson offered here, as "a poem in which wickedness or folly is
censured," is but one of many in which the function of satire is continually
observed.

4
on the socio-political milieu, or satirical wit and its accessory stratagems-ridicule, parody, and caricature, when these are the preponderant topics. 8
Yet it is the very question of morphology that definition strives to resolve
which elicits fiercest controversy. But here one must challenge the ipse

dixit of the venerable Quintilian--however esteemed his critical acumen-to whose auctoritas most arguments ultimately appeal, for his is perhaps
the most formidable of tribunals before which to appraise a literary work's
compliance with the lex operis.
Among the assessments of genre formation in Quintilian's synopsis
are the celebrated remarks with respect to satire's origin and forms: a
terse declaration of its Roman genesis, with comments descriptive of the
usual structures. 9 The critic's observations have occasioned prescriptive
consequences: nevertheless, the actual combinations of verse, or mixed
verse and prose, must stand. Despite the modern concession that works
designated satires subsequent to antiquity are exempt from this formula,
there is relative unanimity that Quintilian's formulary stipulations apply

8

Michael Coffey, Roman Satire (London and New York: Methuen,
1976), 3-23. This furnishes perhaps the best recent account. Ulrich
Knoche, Roman Satire, trans. Edwin S. Ramage (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1975), 3-16. Knoche's initial remarks are a worthwhile
introduction to the relevant issues. However, he later hedges his early
insistence upon strict definition by acknowledging (p. 89) the status of
Horace's Epistles as satire.
9

Quintilian Institutio Oratoria 10.1.93.

5
to all satire written during antiquity. 10 In sum, Seneca's De Ira was not
considered satire by the very critic who described the genre's inception and
general features, and who also knew Seneca's writings.
Admittedly, modern allowances for the later transformations of
satire do not negate the testimonia of Seneca's own and immediately
succeeding eras. 11 Indeed, the De Ira's prose framework and abstract
features support the judgment that it is a philosophical work. Modern
criticism, without dismissing the extant examples of Roman satire, draws
our attention to its intrinsic nature and expression, aside from the artifice
of definition prescribed by the critics of a given epoch--even the epoch in
which the definition was first formulated. 12 Acknowledgement of Roman
derivation and conventions, however useful, dismisses a more basic
inquiry: the essential character of the genre and the special problems it
poses.
Modern discussion of satire is instructive. Certainly its recognition
1

°Knoche, 3, is adamant about this: "Anyone attempting a historical
treatment of Roman satire has to free himself right at the start from the
contemporary concept of satire and the satiric."
11

Gilbert Highet, The Anatomy of Satire (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1962), 3-23. Highet, for example, makes reference to
Swift, Voltaire, and others as satirists whose medium was prose. He also
cites the difficulty of determining whether a work is a satire per se or
simply contains occasional flourishes of satire. All subsequent references
to Highet refer to The Anatomy of Satire, unless otherwise specified.
12

Ibid.

6
that satire after antiquity abandons absolute adherence to the definitions
of Roman critics and grammarians discloses a complex, if not curious,
combination of conclusions. Departure from its Roman forms constitutes
an historical stage of development in composition and critical
comprehension which insists on elaboration and reconsideration of the
genre. 13 If divergence of form (an expression of artistic license) tacitly
represents compliance with the inherent character of the genre, the
pertinence of form to the very objectives of satire becomes questionable.
Finally, the phrase lex operis itself leads to a false--and tangled--analogy:
authors or critics (sometimes both) frame the law; deference or violation
become the sole ostensible alternatives; the interests of the former invite
evasions of the law which thereby must appear to comply with it in the
manner of a legal dodge. 14
In this last instance, exacting separations of genre can often assume
a quasi-statutory rigor which artistic innovation mollifies. Clearly the
extension of verse satire to incorporate prose, a method of composition
practiced by Menippus, Varro, and Petronius, intimates that Roman satire

13

Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics, 738-40. The synopsis
offered here neatly describes the variegated development of the genre.
14

Knoche, Roman Satire, 89, offers a leading example by subsuming the
Epistles of Horace under the statutory (as it were) claims of satire.

7
and its ancient definitions, in addition to ascribing a literary type and
epoch, amplify the epoch to the detriment of the genre it qualifies.
However

understandable

the

failure

of

prescience

by

Roman

commentators, the reality of literary development confirms the inability
of scholars to apply the formal or legal dimension of the lex operis to satire
and, consequently, the grounds on which the De Ira can be interpreted to
conform, if not to the precise phraseology of the definition, at least to
occasions or instances where the quasi-legal language of the definition
warrants inclusion. Precluding the prima facie observation that Roman
reviewers and those (such as Quintilian or Diomedes) who deem only
Roman literary edicts applicable deny the De Ira its appeal by virtue of its
peculiarities, the very assemblage of elements which comprise Seneca's De
Ira merits both another appeal and a change of venue.
At issue then is the classification to which the De Ira, predicated on
the evidence of its aggregate features, primarily conforms: philosophical
dialogue or satire. Ancillary but of equal value is the elimination of
previous impediments to a recognition that the De Ira even contains
material which suggests a re-examination of its patterns and figures as a
worthwhile project, despite an abundance of opinion to the contrary. On
inspection, Seneca's arrangement of topics and figures--e.g., the
conversational transitions, the role of the adversarius, placement of

8
epigrams, descriptive portraits and anecdotes, and vivid imagery--to cite
several samples--reveal a genuine problem of misplacement rather than a
specious morphological exercise or evasion of the lex operis by nuance.
But multiple factors justify reconsideration of the De Ira in addition
to those listed in the foregoing discussion. The blurring of genres in
question, satire and the philosophical dialogue, is perhaps only conceivable
granted unequivocal connections native to them, foremost among which is
a pervasive preoccupation with ethical matters or variations on a myriad
of moral themes. Morality is possibly the principal bridge between the two
literary types. Likewise, although the serious intent of an ethical treatise
is unmistakeable, it is a grave oversight to underestimate the function of
wit as a subterfuge for serious interests and purposes. However differently
the two genres may approach their objectives, whether by sequential proofs
or the varieties of wit, moral persuasion is a common end. And irony, one
of the more frequent figures of successful satire, is a device especially
dependent on seriousness as the contrasting element necessary for its
effectiveness. Thus, the failure to apprehend irony and, consequently, the
involvement of humor, is yet another reason why satire may
unintentionally be taken seriously, for the illusion of philosophic sobriety

9
(notwithstanding the Symposium) is central to this misjudgment. 15
Finally, the format of the De Ira, because in several important respects it
so closely resembles the other Dialogi with which it is conventionally
grouped, occasions the assumption of a more complete artistic agreement
than exists between the De Ira and its companion pieces.
The individuality of the work, Seneca's only dialogue which
addresses the destructive consequences and folly of a particular vice,
deserves special comment, not only with respect to the other Dialogi, but
as a feature especially suitable for satire per se. If the orthodox notion
holds that novelty, variation, and departure from precedent are generic to
the literary tradition, this is particularly apt with reference to satire,
including its most universally accepted representative specimens. And
although the extant works of the Roman satirists recognized as
practitioners of the genre adequately possess the common qualities that
eventually sanctioned a distinct nomenclature, the subtler scholars have
noted the individualistic complexion of the genre and its variety of possible
designs. 16 Even prior to Quintilian's official imprimatur, the want of

15

Highet, 15, relates the amusement of Swift, in a letter to Alexander
Pope, at an Irish bishop not believing a word of Gulliver's Travels and,
consequently, misinterpreting its intent.
16

Knoche, Roman Satire, 5, notes the observation of Wilamowitz that
"there really is no Latin satire, but only Lucilius, Horace, Persius, and
Juvenal." See U. von Wilamowitz-Mollendorff, Griechische Verskunst

10
exact models compelled the sort of precis Horace provided as an endeavor
to fix his literary ancestry and role. 17 An author working in a fixed genre
(tragedy or epic, for example) does not need to apologize (sensu stricto) the
way Horace does with a pedigree of his literary ancestry in order to
establish his literary type. Later satire, either to forestall ambiguity
consequent to experimentation or establish a position within the practice
of the genre, often avails a citation of pedigree, overt or otherwise, as a
necessary recourse. 18
Direct or indirect mention of lineage is one of several means by
which the satirist is known as such and his efforts taken for what they
are. 19 Approximate themes and methods are at times as much thinly
camouflaged versions of an express acknowledgement of influence as any
patent attribution of literary stock. As such, Seneca's management of
theme and technique in the De Ira is at least one criterion among many
by which to ascertain the sway of earlier Roman satire, since no display
of literary ancestry is offered. Although unexceptional and inessential
(imitation being a sufficient as well as the best adulation), Seneca's
(Berlin, 1921), 42, note 1.
17

Horace, Sermones, 1.10.48-49, 1.4.1-7, and Epistulae, 2.2.60.

18
1

Highet, 15-16.

9Ibid.

11

reticence compels us to resort to an inductive argument. Cognizance of
affiliation between the De Ira and Roman satire can only proceed, then, by
by a sort of multi-variant analysis and cautious scrutiny of agreements
and resemblances of style vis-a-vis antecedent models, since earlier
prototypes accomodate an authoritative set of criteria with which to
determine the validity of comparison.
The particular devices or elements upon which the satirist relies to
achieve his ends constitute the standards of evaluation absent from the
terse generality provided by even the best definitions.

As with other

genres, technique is the very substance of satire: it equips the research
this study hopes to effect with serviceable norms for estimating whether
kinship between the De Ira and Roman satire is slight, limited, and
accidental, or entirely too regular to be other than deliberate.

In

combination, the synthesis of Seneca's methods exhibit goals which only
detailed attention to specific items can initially expect to discover. The
care Seneca takes, not merely to refute each rationale for indulging wrath,
but to ridicule and reduce it to absurdity, exceeds dispassionate refutation
by enlisting the sundry implements of derision employed originally by the
Greeks in iambics, old comedy, and oratory, and later by his compatriots
in Rome's (apparently) exclusive addition to the catalogue of approved
genres.

12
In addition to a straightforward or more subtle statement of literary
ancestry and analysis of parallels and alliances between the De Ira and
extant Roman satire prior to Seneca's age, other applicable standards are
germane.

Apart from Seneca's choice of prose, the dialogue as he

structures it, addressing it to his brother Novatus and incorporating a
fictitious adversarius, bears closer comparison with the satiric monologues
of Horace than the philosophical dialogues of Plato or Cicero. An apparent
improvisation or spontaneity, while also characteristic of the philosophical
dialogue, lacks the realism provided by figures whose function varies
enormously and in relative proportion to one another in true dialogues. 20
Seneca's interlocutor or adversarius best mimics the simple roles displayed
by the adversarii of Horace or Bion of Borysthenes, whom Horace credits
as an exemplar: they are less dramatis personae than token rivals whose
parts create a facade of opposition in an uncontested triumph.
Subject-matter is yet another measure of the connection between the
De Ira and Roman satire; it is also perhaps the most natural, since the
denunciation of vice or folly is universally found in definitions of satire.

2

°The arguments of Plato's adversaries feature a more elaborate
exposition than is found in the De Ira or any of Seneca's other dialogues
for that matter, an issue that has caught the attention of a number of
scholars and has prompted speculation about Seneca's departure from the
stylistic norm of the genre and the diminished role of the adversarius. See
below, chaps. 4 and 5, passim.

13
Seneca largely exceeds the usual topical progress10n and orderly
gradations of arguments expected in an ethical treatise: he derides,
caricatures, parodies, and renders absurd--strategies which become the wit
but vex the wise for whom solemnity is de rigueur. Departures from the
formality of unmitigated corroboration and refutation by way of artifice
foreign to the standards of the genre, such as insinuations of humor, or via
shifts uncharacteristic of an austere syllogistic dialectic, such as insertions
of anecdote or description, are salient aspects of the De Ira. Such detours
and their recurrence suggest a diversity of purpose, but the irregularities
possess a common aspect: dissuasion defers to denunciation of anger as
folly--perhaps the central folly of Seneca's time.
Discussions of human

weakness

and

error,

especially

so

commonplace a vice as anger, were not without precedent in antiquity;
there were those who defended its value and expression for diverse
reasons, as is evident in the De Ira. 21 Yet the unremarkable occurrence
of specific treatment, or the inclusion of anger in general surveys such as
Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics, advances the impression that anger is
a topic for discussion first and foremost as a general human predilection.
But, as Lucilius and Horace earlier, and Juvenal later, Seneca alters the

21

Basore, xiii and 112. Both Posidonius and Sotion are mentioned here.
Aristotle is cited passim.

14
moral emphasis from the general to the specific: anger achieves the
notoriety of a current event. In Seneca's view, the attested cruelty of the
period originated from the cultivation of rage, a most apropos social and
cultural ill for moral criticism on the one hand, but for topical and satiric
ridicule as well: thus, the unflattering portraits of personages in the recent
or remote past. Caricatures of the living ceased with Horace; Seneca's
hostile figures augur Juvenal's Sejanus, too distant and too dead to be
dangerous.
If the worst years of the early empire in the first century witnessed

a flurry of prosecutions for maiestas, they also bore witness to ubiquitous
accusations of alleged iniuria, a technical Roman legal term of sufficiently
broad scope to encompass the wider sense in which Seneca has been
supposed to employ it: a pretext for ira invoked constantly. 22 If, however,
as with Seneca's use of ira, a narrower meaning than the broad, initial
definitions provided by the standard lexica is intended, the import of

iniuria widens, thus acquiring a dual significance: as a generic term
denoting an unspecified insult, injustice, or instance of personal affront,

22

John W. Thomas III, "Roman Criminal Law and Legal Narrative in
the Neronian Books of the Annals of Tacitus" (Ph.D. diss., Loyola
University of Chicago, 1993), 84, 117-120. Although this recent study
emphasizes litigation specific to the N eronian period, background material
and notes provide a useful introduction to the extent of prosecution for
both maiestas and iniuria under previous emperors.

15
and a precise, definitive reference to a legal statute whose violation was
actionable. The conceivable applicability of the latter furthers the present
thesis: Seneca's interests and purposes are focused on a prevailing
sensibility or Zeitgeist, not solely an enduring flaw, one out of many,
intrinsic to the human condition in the manner of previous explanations.
Ridicule and contemporaneity, then, are traits which betray the
satirist of unacknowledged pedigree; they also divulge the aim of the De
Ira: to render the expression of anger a laughable disgrace. The nature of
Seneca's project entails an attitude very different from philosophic
detachment, one that involves contempt, scorn, or, perhaps, even
amusement--and the endeavor to elicit like sentiments among his readers.
And with verbal touches a subsequent generation would witness in the
satires of Juvenal, Seneca's exempla shock; his models of ira indulged are
disturbing, vivid, and grotesque depictions of a cruelty awarded
approbation, if the intensity and extent of the De Ira are valid indices.
And if the expectation of carefully ordered reasoning disappoints, N ovatus
and posterity have become privy to the more surprising methods of satire
in the De Ira.
While unfavorable responses to Seneca's designs in part explain his
periodic unpopularity, their force betrays an odd effect amounting to a
kind of perverse success: his works produce revulsion or fascination,

16
dissidence or endorsement--and to a degree as radical as Seneca's notion
of anger itself. The De Ira, if it is accurately or otherwise taken as a
philosophical dialogue, fails to meet our hopes for an unadorned series of
proofs, or even the modest expectation of lively debate in a dramatic
setting. Such hope, however, is an inescapable prelude to favor or its
want, and Seneca's failures or inconsistencies may well mask a desired end
nonetheless. His gifts were hardly so meager or merely "temporis eius

auribus accomodatum" as to be insufficient for his objectives. 23 Seneca
directed his attack on anger not only according to the moral deficiencies
and literary tastes of his age, but also according to a Roman tradition
which singled out ira as a vice particularly deserving of opprobrium. 24
Abhorrence at anger, a locus communis by Seneca's time, furnished a
ready topic for satire and also fulfilled a perennial approach demanded of
satire: an appeal to reform for which ridicule and all its forms furnish a
means.
Moreover, if Seneca's desire is reform, satire becomes an acceptable
prototype for considerations of influence, since that too is one of its
expected functions.

2

Reform not only permits an array of strategies

3Tacitus Annals 13.3.

24

Virgil, for example, portrays the human and divine antagonists of
Aeneas as especially driven by ira, and consistently presents this vice as
unbecoming the Roman character.

17
unavailable to philosophy, but relegates the role of strict argument to the
lesser prominence of one variant in a medley.

For the illogical or

obdurate, refutation alone might fail to display vice as unattractive.
Repugnance requires other initiatives, ones familiar to Lucilius and
Horace--but to Seneca as well.

Thus irony, epigram, hyperbole,

colloquialism, parody, and numerous related implements combine as
accompaniments to argument in the service of the skilled satirist. The
conviction that ira is indefensible is certainly one of Seneca's aims in the
De Ira, but reform must enlist conversion; and this compels him to
exorcise the nobility from anger until it appears hideous as well as
irrational.
Finally, a recapitulation of small compass is in order as a
preliminary synopsis of those elements of satire whose analysis might
prove most salutary for evaluating the De Ira from an alternative context.
To summarize: despite Seneca's failure to cite influence or state pedigree,
features of the De Ira bear exceptional resemblance to eminent aspects of
Roman

satire.

This

supports the

need for

additional

study,

notwithstanding enigmatic difficulties of designation or definition whose
very solution might only issue, if but partially, from the sort of analysis
the present enquiry means to afford. Seneca's Dialogus mimics the satiric
monologue in practice more than it resembles antecedent prototypes of the

18
philosphical dialogue. His preferred theme of anger, although addressed
by divers philosophers, stands in liaison with satire; but unlike philosophy,
Seneca's motif suggests a topical or contemporary relevance emblematic
of satire. Finally, Seneca's procedures, recurrently disappointing those
whose expectation is uninterrupted syllogistic elegance or the dramatic
suspense of dialectic moving toward resolution, in effect comprise a medley
of materiel native to satire: argument is abruptly mitigated by the figures
and conventions of a more informal and spontaneous genre. Impressions
and vividly descriptive diatribes attend his conclusions, remarkable
features for a standard ethical teatise, but hardly surprising elements in
a work of satiric design.
Of the figures put to use by the Roman satirists, a host are shared

by other genres. Hyperbole, invective, parody, and other devices, although
important factors for the cumulative effect of the De Ira and quite
significant at critical stages of Seneca's discussion, are minor or secondary
attributes.

Aspects of the De Ira which merit protracted and precise

dissection are those most idiosyncratic to the nature and character of
satire: more specifically, structural techniques and thematic coincidences.
Consequently, several major topics will adequately serve as broad
categories for investigation and convenient points of reference for
associated features.

19
First, the De Ira justifies comparative analysis with previous and
subsequent Roman satire, including Seneca's own Apocolocyntosis, in order
to assess the overall presence of those elements typical of the genre.
Seneca treats anger not only as a universal moral problem, but as an ill
particularly prevalent in his own time; in short, his complaint is topical
in the way that the grievances of Lucilius, Horace, and Juvenal were
directed at habits of the here and now. Furthermore, Seneca dwells on the
legal consequences of anger, and he regularly emphasizes this and related
legal issues throughout the work. Discussion of the use and abuse of the
deli ct of iniuria, which Seneca views as the social instrument of anger,
occupies a large portion of the De Ira. As a result, Seneca's plea is as
much an insistence on judicial reform as on moral improvement.
Finally, the structural anomalies of the work, the irregularities of
composition where Seneca departs from the standard techniques employed
by earlier authors of the philosophical dialogue, might best be explained
by comparison with other genres. The limited role of the adversarius, the
lack of a dramatic setting, and a conspicuous absence of set characters
would suggest a different genre as the model for the De Ira. Elements
present in the work do provide clues, however. Three prominent
features--the abundance of technical legal vocabulary, Seneca's focus on a
particular legal issue such as iniuria, and the intermittent advisory

20
comments relevant primarily to someone who must decide legal guilt or
innocence--urge close intertextual study with what fragmentary portions
of the legal literature as we possess. The combination of satiric technique
and legal emphasis intimates that the De Ira is a more complex and
original work than has been previously thought. Seneca assumes the pose
of both the satirist and jurist. As he ridicules wrathful figures recent and
remote, he also subjects their rationale that iniuria warrants ira to
vigorous legal analysis and criticism. The De Ira can thus be seen as a
censure of those who resort to iniuria in order to satisfy ira in a format
which parodies the very genre used by the jurists to address such issues-the epistolary responsum.

CHAPTER ONE
THE DE IRA AS TOPICAL PROTEST

It is a stock observation among the many students of Roman satire

that the genre criticises the follies of its age, including the invariable
absurdities of the law. 25 Whether the Romans express their censure in
the oblique and subtle guise of parody, or by the more forthright tactic of
open denunciation, law stands in the forefront amid the morals,
conventions, and practices of the day that fail to meet the standards of the
satirist. One of the earliest expressions of satiric dismay over the various
occupations of his contemporaries is the following excursus by Lucili us:
nunc vero a mani ad noctem, festo atque profesto
totus item pariterque die populusque patresque
iactare indu foro se omnes, decedere nusquam,
25

Highet, 16-17, cites topical criticism as one of the hallmarks of the
genre since antiquity. Michael Coffey, 5-10, in one of the more recent
surveys of the genre, remarks generally on this characteristic of Roman
satire, but concentrates more on the varieties of social criticism presented
by each Roman satirist. John Crook, Law and Life of Rome (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1967), introduces comments of the satirists
passim as partial evidence for the influence of law on Roman social and
economic life.
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uni se atque eidem studio omnes dedere et arti,
verba dare ut caute possint, pugnare dolose,
blanditia certare, "bonum" simulare "virum" se,
insidias facere, ut si hostes sint omnibus omnes ....
(1228--34)
(But these days as things are from morning until night,
working day and holiday alike, the whole people and
senate likewise all bustle about in the forum and
do not go off anywhere else. All devote themselves
to one and the same aim and expertise, to be able
to deceive with circumspection, to hit slyly, to push
by using flattery, to pretend to be "a good type"
and to set traps as if everyone were everybody else's
enemy .... 26

Lucilius's complaint, which has been rendered as a dissatisfaction with
Roman political life, also suggests the tumult and frenzy of the courts as
a source of inspiration for topical protest. 27 Horace, writing a century or
more later, seems to have shared his predecessor's displeasure, but
illustrates his annoyance by relating his own happenstance involvement
in the legal arena. 28
2

6The translation here is that of Coffey, 49, with minor changes.

27

Coffey, 49, draws attention to the disdain of Roman political life
obvious in Lucilian satire. More to the point, however, is the satirist's
mention of the forum, where the courts were located and most of the trials
occurred, as Seneca relates at 11.9.4.
28

Horace elsewhere takes a dim view of legal matters, as his tongue-incheek request for the jurist Trebatius' counsel (Sermones 2.1) would
suggest. Cf. also 2.6.20-40 for court time as one of the nuisances of life in
the city.
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Casu venit obvius illi
adversarius, et, "quo tu turpissime?" magna
inclamat voce, et "licet antestari?" ego vero
oppono auriculam. rapit in ius; clamor utrimque,
undique concursus. sic me servavit Apollo.
(1.9.74-78)

(Suddenly this pest met the man who was suing him,
who kept screaming: "Where do you think you're going,
thug," and then asking me "Will you testify?" I
offered my services. He dragged his opponent off to
the courts while a crowd gathered and shouted as it
ran after them. So it was that Apollo had saved me.)
Later still, Juvenal returns to the more distanced Lucilian
perspective of a physically detached witness whose disenchantment betrays
an unmistakable intimacy with corruption and a sensibility at odds with
his circumstances.
quid referam quanta siccum iecur ardeat ira,
cum populum gregibus comitum premit hie spoliator
pupilli prostantis et hie damnatus inani
iudicio? quid enim salvis infamia nummis?
exul ab octava Marius bibit et fruitur dis
iratis, at tu victrix, provincia, ploras.
(1.1.45--50)

(Why tell how my heart shrivels and burns with rage
when I see the people hustled by a mob of retainers
attending on one who has defrauded and debauched
his ward, or on another who has been condemned
by a futile verdict--for what matters infamy if
the cash be kept? The exiled Marius carouses
from the eighth hour of the day and revels in the
wrath of Heaven, while you, poor Province, win

24
your cause and weep!)29
All three satirists in their turn appear to share an amused yet
scornful identification of court proceedings with public spectacles. Horace
could readily speak of the "fallacem Circum" ("deceptive Circus") and
immediately associate it with the "Forum. "30

Juvenal, writing for a

weary age no longer shocked by the glaring disparities between Rome's
present and past, its civic ideals and real incivilities, could add caveat to

consolatio for poor Calvinus, the victim of justice and injustice both. 31 So
even at the outset, Lucilius could establish a precedent of literary censure
to replace an authority the official Censors would abdicate by their own
suspect behavior. 32 The reflexive implication of Juvenal's "quis custodiet

ipsos custodes" ("who will guard the guards themselves?") hints at a novel
honor for satire: the satirist alone could be Rome's true censor. 33
29

The translation, with changes, is based on that of G.G. Ramsay,
Juvenal and Persius (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, rev. ed.,
1940), 7.
30

Horace Sermones 1.6.113-114.

31

Juvenal Saturae XIII.

32

Coffey, 40-49, gives the social and political background of Lucilian
satire, including the satirist's attacks on policies of the censorship or
corrupt censors holding an office instituted to uphold public morals.
33

1n criticizing the censors, Lucilius "marks them too," so to speak, and
thus assumes the role of censor by calling attention to their moral failures.
Horace, Sermones 1.3.24 and 1.4.5, uses the term noto (OLD, entry 3: "to
put a mark of disgrace against the name") to represent his own role, thus
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Nonetheless, this brief survey of satiric sentiment exposes several
remarkable elements. Lucilius, Horace, and Juvenal, despite the radical
differences betokened by the various effects of Roman politics on each,
display sufficient similarity to suppose a general and more universal
protest whose details are simply variations on a theme. As the satires of
Horace demonstrate, there is considerable continuity between the Scipionic
circle and that of Maecenas. However deliberately Horace highlights the
similarities between his own age and that of Lucilius and culls the vices
he prefers to expose, some connection between epochs would prevail given
the constancy and fidelity of humanity to folly. Moral pollution nurtured
Roman satire long after Lucilius and ensured the perpetuity of the genre
until it produced yet the most mordant reviler of Roman manners and
morals--Juvenal. And however infrequent and occasional Rome's legal
milieu served as a locus communis for Lucilius and Horace, the social
changes of the Principate in the legal sphere furnished Juvenal with
material for an entire satire and extended sections of others. 34
Juvenal's added emphasis on legal corruption did not lack precedent.
If satire mirrors the grotesquerie of an era, one must assume a degree of

identifying the function of the censor with his own task.
34

Juvenal Saturae XIII is a consolatio by the author cautioning against
the expectation that justice will be just.
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reality for which satiric exposure and exaggeration are the just
desserts. 35 As a consequence, Juvenal's attention to Roman legal matters
reflects a social climate which deserved the dishonorable mention.
Sketches of corruption and futility in the domain of law were acutely and
interminably detailed earlier by another author whose philosophy and
prose obscure much of his satiric tone and intent. Notwithstanding the
choice of structure, the following passage from book two of Seneca's De Ira
mimics a revulsion not unlike that voiced by Rome's finest verse satirists:
Quod enim momentum erit quo non improbanda
videat? Quotiens processerit domo, per sceleratos
illi avarosque et prodigos et impudentis et ob ista
felices incedendum erit; nusquam oculi eius
flectentur ut non quod indignentur inveniant:
deficiet si totiens a se iram quotiens causa poscet
exegerit. Haec tot milia ad forum prima luce
properantia, quam turpes lites, quanto turpiores
advocatos habent! Ali us i udicia patris accusat,
quae <non> mereri satius fuit, alius cum matre
consistit, alius delator venit eius criminis, cuius
manifestior reus est; et iudex damnaturus quae
fecit eligitur et corona pro mala causa <stat>
bona patroni voce corrupta. Quid singula
persequor? Cum videris forum multitudine
refertum et saepta concursu omnis frequentiae
plena et illum circum in quo maximam sui
35

E. Courtney, A Commentary on the Satires of Juvenal (London: The
Athlone Press, 1980), 96, provides historical background for Juvenal's
disgust at the felicitous fate of Marius Priscus, the exiled Marius
mentioned at 1.1.45-50, including "the luxurious life lived by some exiles"
attested by various authors and the impoverishment of the provinces
formerly managed by governors condemned for extortion (for which Gaius
Verres, propraetor in Sicily, 73-71 B.C, seems to have been the archetype).
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partem populus ostendit, hoc scito, istic
tantundem esse vitiorum quantum hominum.
Inter istos quos togatos vides nulla pax est: alter
in alterius exitium levi compendio ducitur; nulli
nisi ex alterius iniuria quaestus est ....
(IL 7 .2--8.2)36
(For what moment will there be when he will not
see something to disapprove of? Every time he
leaves his house, he will have to walk among
criminals and misers and spendthrifts and
profligates--men who are happy in being such.
Nowhere will he turn his eyes without finding
something to move them to indignation. He will
give out if he forces himself to be angry every
time occasion requires. All these thousands
hurrying to the forum at break of day--how base
their cases, and how much baser are their
advocates! One assails his father's will, from
which it were more fitting that he respect;
another arraigns his mother at the bar; another
comes as an informer of the very crime in which
he is more openly the culprit; the judge, too, is
chosen who will condemn the same deeds that he
himself has committed, and the crowd, misled by
the fine voice of a pleader, shows favour to a
wicked cause.
36

Except where indicated, the text of the De Ira followed throughout is
that of L.D. Reynolds, L. Annaei Senecae: Dialogorum Libri Duodecim
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977). The translation is based on that
of John W. Basore, Seneca's Moral Essays I with modifications noted by
sections underlined. The primary sources of Roman law frequently
referred to are cited as Digest, Justinian, Inst., and Gaius, Inst. The texts
used are as follows: The Digest of Justinian, Latin Text ed. Theodor
Mommsen, with the aid of Paul Kreuger; English trans. ed. Alan Watson
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1985); Justinian's
lntitutes, Latin Text ed. Paul Kreuger; English trans. eds. Peter Birks &
Grant McLeod (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987); The Institutes of
Gaius, Latin Text eds. Seckel and Kuebler; English trans. eds. W. M.
Gordon and 0. F. Robinson (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988).
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But why recount all the different types?
Whenever you see the forum with its thronging
multitude, and the polling-places filled with all
the gathered concourse, and the great Circus
where the largest part of the populace displays
itself, you may be sure that just as many vices
are gathered there as men. Among those whom
you see in civilian garb there is no peace; for a
slight reward any one of them can be led to
compass the destruction of another; no one makes
gain save by another's loss .... )
This tirade on the moral condition of the times foreshadows Juvenal's
harsh strains and is reminiscent of Lucilian rancor. In the very next
chapter, the last of a three chapter diatribe, Seneca's acerbic quip that

"innocentia non rara sed nulla sit" ("innocence is not rare, but nonexistent") presages Juvenal's bitter "probitas laudatur et alget" ("probity
is praised and out in the cold"). 37
The Senecan passage is extraordinary for many other reasons as
well.

The abstraction and sequential reasoning which characterize

philosophy are strangely absent, and a curious set of qualities appears in
their stead. Topical allusions abound: the array of miscreants, the flurry
of the forum, the depravity and all-embracing disgrace of the courts. As
with Horace, mention of the Circus follows that of the Forum in close
succession. 38

The chaos Lucilius portrayed began "a mani" ("from

37

Il.9.1, and Juvenal Saturae I.74.

38

Horace Sermones 1.6.113-14.
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morning"); for Seneca "prima luce" ("at dawn") is an equally suitable
commencement for folly, and he extends the Lucilian "ut si hostes sint

omnibus omnes" ("as if everyone were everybody else's enemy") to
encompass even the closest of human relationships--parents and
children. 39 In short, Seneca never cites Horace or Lucili us by name in
the De Ira, but his devastating indictment of the Rome of his time
implicitly connects him with a tradition and establishes a pedigree for his
undertaking. Despite the prose medium, both motif and execution are
those of the satirist.
Other aspects of this passage are also noteworthy.

Seneca's

prolonged account is unanticipated; it disappoints expectations or startles
a reader who expected the usual pattern of thrust and parry, objection and
refutation between Seneca and his adversarius.

But the generic

inconsistency accomplishes a skillful shift into the real world, despite the
judgment by critics of Seneca's prose that such digressions mark a retreat
to the cheap and shopworn rhetorical displays of the Silver Age
declaimers. 40

But such an unsympathetic conclusion would be

39

See II.7 .3: "Ali us iudicia patris accusat, quae <non> mereri satius
fuit, alius cum matre consistit... "; also II.8.3: "t Hoc uno t ab animalibus
mutis differunt, quod illa mansuescunt alentibus, horum rabies ipsos a
quibus est nutrita depascitur."
40

0ne of the more famous criticisms of Senecan style, as noted by
J.R.G. Wright, "Form and Content in the Moral Essays," in Seneca, ed.
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overlooking the fact that in Horatian satire Seneca's strategy would be
esteemed as an adept variation or a virtuoso control of transitions between
topics; it also neglects the obvious informality or the casual manner in
which Seneca seems to speak extempore, as though spontaneously incited
to improvise from his revulsion at the social ills of his time. 41 Assessed
by the literary standards of each genre, Seneca's digression from a
predictable pattern suggests a deliberate recollection of the methods of
satire: the abrupt break in form jars as effectively as the sudden entrance
into the province of urban life and its heinous doings. 42

This

exaggeration of malice and hypocrisy is a flat-out denunciation, not an
argument, philosophical or otherwise. 43
The destination of Seneca's topical detour is the condition of the
C.D.N. Costa (London and Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974), 39, is
attributed to Caligula in Suetonius Caligula 53.2: "harenam esse sine
calce." Wright, 39, also cites the comment of Justus Lipsius, one of
Seneca's admirers, on the De Ira: Libri in partibus pulchri et eminentes
sunt, in toto parum distincti, & repetitionibus aut digestione confusi.
41

Eduard Fraenkel, Horace (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957), 94,
convincingly justifies the digressions of Horace. Cf. Kirk Freudenburg,
The Walking Muse (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 109-84,
for a more recent discussion of Horace's style.
42

Highet, 16-17, remarks that satire "is always concrete, usually
topical, often personal. It deals with actual cases ...talks of this moment
and this city, and this special, very recent, very fresh deposit of corruption
whose stench is still in the satirist's curling nostrils."
43

lbid.' 17-18.
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courts. Following the adversarial charge that "Virtus... ita turpibus irata

esse debet" ("Virtue ...must be angry with what is base") in chapter six of
book two, Seneca begins a preface to the satiric description of the next
three chapters by considering the notion of righteous indignation or
justifiable anger. The adversarius takes for granted the moral superiority
of the righteously indignant, and the phrase certainly implies this
superiority with its modifying adjective.

Moreover, his automatic

connection between ira and virtus seeks to justify or relativize ira, when
it is all of a kind by Seneca's definition; and anger by whomever or by
whatever rationale is objectionable. 44 Secondly, the link between anger
and righteousness establishes an irony which lies at the very heart of
Seneca's purpose in the subsequent passage.
Alive to both possible and real human inconsistencies and alert to
the myriad ways humanity is prone to self-deception, Seneca stands the
argument of his opponent on its head in order to point out the common
error of designating righteous indignation a mark of moral rectitude.
What, after all, could be the matter with feeling outraged at crime and
44

F .H. Sandbach, The Stoics (London and Indianapolis: Gerald
Duckworth & Co. Ltd. and Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2d. ed.,
1989), 152, comments on Seneca's opposition to the "Peripatetic view that
in moderation it is a useful emotion ... ," the argument made frequently by
his adversary. For example, at II.11.1: "Utilis est," inquit, "ira, quia
contemptum effugit, quia malos terret. " Seneca, however, is unambiguous
at I.9.1: Deinde nihil habet in se utile....
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injustice? Seneca tersely explains: "Et quid indignius quam sapientis

adfectum ex aliena pendere nequitia?" ("And what is more unworthy of the
wise man than that his passion should depend upon the wickedness of
others?"). 45

Seneca recognizes a fundamental irony in his opponent's

argument, and presses on until the moral high ground of those who think
that their anger at injustice is consequently acceptable starts to collapse:

"irasci non est ex dignitate eius, non magis quam maerere" ("it no more
comports with its (virtue) dignity to be angry than to be sad"), he says. 46
The popular association of passion with ethical standing, a morality of
emotion, is both absurd and ironic for Seneca: anger ipso facto shows an
absence of restraint, and righteous anger combines this with selfaggrandizement. Ira implicates the will, whereas righteousness is actually
a false assumption of moral status that depends on the very existence of
vice. Thus not only does Seneca view passion (ira) and moral standing as
unrelated, but he even maintains the opposite: "ira ob alienum peccatum

sordida et angusti pectoris est" ("anger on account of another's sin is mean
and narrow-minded"). 47 He thus draws attention to a twofold problem:

ira is not merely unacknowledged as a vice by the righteously indignant,
4sll.7.1.
46

Il.6.2.

4711.6.1.
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it is positively construed as a sign of rectitude.
The popular affiliation of dignitas (rank, status, standing, esteem)
and ira, which implicitly condemns those without ira to moral inferiority
for their indifference to injustice, is both a failure to separate the
perception of injustice from anger and, more importantly, a false
identification of perception and passion. 48

Seneca recognized the

psychological benefits of this mistaken identification: it created and
maintained an illusion of integrity without effort or practice and
simultaneously disguised infirmity of the will both from the self and from
others. 49

Virtus (virtue), a concept whose very definition implied

persistence and effort, becomes automatic. 50 One need only feel anger in
order to consider oneself upright.

Yet the very absurdity of this

4

8The adversarius suggests the affiliation throughout, and it is one of
the chief arguments which Seneca must counter. In addition to II.6.1,
II.11.1 is a restatement of the same claim, indicating that Seneca's
opponent has yet to be convinced: "Utilis est," inquit, "ira, quia
contemptum effugit, quia malos terret." That absence of ira suggests
indifference to injustice is argued at I.16.1: "Quid ergo? non irascar
latroni? Quid ergo? non irascar venefico?" See below, n. 397, on the
distinction Seneca makes between an agitatio animi (disturbance of the
mind) and an affectus (intent). See especially II.3.4-5.
49

Seneca argues against any positive connection between virtue and
emotion at II.6.1-7.1.
50

At various points in the De Ira, Seneca suggests practices to be
followed toward the end of diminishing anger: devil's advocacy (II.28.4-8),
delay (II.29.1-2), and calm associates (III.8.1-6). On virtus, see OLD, entry

7.
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determination was necessary to provide Seneca with a welcome prelude to
the extended satiric portrait to follow. Righteous anger, facilitated by
injustice, sustains itself on injustice as a constant opportunity for anger as
a surrogate for genuine moral progress exacted by painstaking practice.
Pervasive

injustice

could

purchase

an

.

.

1nexpens1 ve

sanctimoniousness; and both were plentiful in Seneca's Rome. 51

To

repeat his query: "Quod enim momentum erit, quo non improbanda

videat?" ("For what moment will there be when he will not see something
to disapprove of?"). 52 Vice is pandemic, and Seneca's generic list is brief
but all-encompassing: "sceleratos ... avarosqueet prodigos et imprudentis... "
("criminals ... and misers and spendthrifts and profligates ... ").53 His major
interest is much more specific: the judicial setting of the forum. Seneca
settles his attention on the court as the most suitable scene, and predicts
the verdict for those who wish to sate their desires for effortless probity:

"Deficiet, si totiens a se iram quotiens causa poscet exegerit" ("He will give
out if he forces himself to be angry every time occasion requires"). 54 Ira
51

At least some basis in fact must have supported Seneca's observations
at 11.7.2. Suetonius Augustus 29, and Vespasian 10, notes the need for
more courts. Crook, 68-97, presents a comprehensive overview of the
problems.
52

11.7.2.

53

lbid.

54

Ibid.
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always fails from exhaustion (deficiet), since even righteous anger cannot
cope with endless disgrace and corruption: the cases (lites), the attorneys

(advocatos), the litigants (reuslalius ... alius,etc.),the witnesses(delator), and
the judges (iudex). Such is the hyperbole of satire, and it is essential to
Seneca's purpose. Under the circumstances he has provided, the righteous
indignation that supposedly distinguishes wisdom would be continuous-and absurd.
The endeavor of the adversarius to legitimize anger is perhaps the
most succinct and accurate summary of his role. 55 In the total context
of the De Ira, justification or even rationalization are both inaccurate
terms in comparison. Seneca's alleged grievance is with anger, and a
thorough philosophical defense is expected; but his complaint is not the
one-dimensional approach it has been judged; there is another level of
meaning that emerges on analysis. Besides denoting an opponent in an
argument or dispute, the adversarius also refers to the opposing party in
a lawsuit. 56 In addition, the argument that anger sometimes possesses
dignity in someone virtuous (or wise)--prior to a vivid and realistic picture
55

At 1.16.1, Seneca's opponent asks: "Quid ergo? Non irascar latroni?
Quid ergo? Non irascar venefico?" In both instances the adversariuswould
have a valid legal claim. Adolf Berger, Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman
Law (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1953), 538 and 760,
comments on these two crimes.
56

See OLD, entry 1, and entries 3a and b.
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of the Roman forum and its courts--a reason for the reader to hesitate as
to Seneca's intended meaning. Assigning a philosophical function to the

adversarius is appropriate if Seneca is writing a philosophical dialogue
with an ethical program in mind. But if adversarius here denotes an
opponent in the courtroom instead, the apparent philosophical role may
shade into a quasi-legal role, Seneca's adversarius may imitate the
Horatian adversarius of a satiric monologue, and the De Ira itself may
have a sense quite other than has presently been thought.
Seneca's direction and theme as discussed thus far are certainly
germane to these possibilities. The adversarial argument at 2.6 is less a
justification of anger than an attempt to legitimize it. Seneca does not
take us to the forum and the courts in response to this position by
accident. As with much of the De Ira, the vocabulary of chapter seven is
dense with Roman legal terminology. 57

The most prominent term,

however, appears in the subsequent chapter. Seneca states that "nulli nisi

ex alterius iniuria quaestus est" ("no one makes gain save by another's
loss"). 58

His use of iniuria (injury, outrage) here, after a protracted

57

II. 7 .3 is of particular interest here; the section contains several terms
possessing a primary legal sense: e.g., causa (case), lites (lawsuits), advocati
(attorneys), reus (defendant), and iudex Gudge), to cite only the most
striking examples. See chap. 2, passim, for a lengthier discussion of these
terms and their importance in the De Ira.
58

11.8.2.
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expose of the debasement of the judicial system, is a deliberate coda to the
passage itself and to what he has emphatically asserted in the initial
chapter of book two: "!ram quin species oblata iniuriae moveat non est

dubium" ("There can be no doubt that anger is aroused by the direct
impression of an injury"). Ira and iniuria are inextricably combined here
and throughout the De Ira, and Seneca's ample use of legal vocabulary
compels closer examination of the term's precise meaning in the work.
The term itself appears regularly in the De Ira, and although its root
(ius=statute) would suggest a legal meaning, it can be construed more
comprehensively as conveying any wrongful act or malfeasance. 59

If

Seneca's end were abstract and "philosophical," the generic significance
would be sufficient for the maintenance of a Stoic position on anger. Yet
within Seneca's essay, the context of its usage requires an almost
exclusively legal interpretation. "!ram quin speciesoblata iniuriae moveat

non est dubium" ("There can be no doubt that anger is aroused by the
direct impression of an injury") consequently requires a very different
interpretation: to conclude that the species (appearance) of iniuriae
(wrongdoing) causes anger is one matter, that the species (case or specific
legal problem) of an iniuria (legal offense) causes or is a source of anger is
59

Cf. OLD, s.v. ius, entries la and b, 2, and 4a, b, and c.
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another. 60 Seneca's objection to anger, Stoic though it may be, narrows
and suggests a more specialized purpose. 61 His catalogue of corruption
at the bar at 2. 7 as a topical protest is plain, but too abbreviated a sample
from which to judge it one of Seneca's principal goals. We must, however,
understand his frequent and deliberate references to iniuria as a common
pretext for anger in a fundamentally different sense, since iniuria as a
violation of law is what makes possible a satiric diatribe on this category
60

Species in the legal sense (OLD, entry 11) means a "specific legal
situation or case." Ulpian, in Digest 13.6.5.11, provides a typical example
with regard to the admissability of legal action: videndum, in quibus
speciebus commodati actio locum habeat. In legal use (OLD, entry 4)
iniuria refers to any "act, insulting in kind and intention, calculated to
injure a person's reputation or outrage his feelings (ranging from physical
assault to defamation of character)." Gains, Inst. 3.220, supplies a model:
Iniuria autem committitur non solum cum quis pugno puta aut fuste
percussus vel etiam verberatus erit, sed etiam si cui convicium factum fuerit,
sive quis bona alicuius quasi debitoris, sciens eum nihil sibi debere,
proscripserit, sive quis ad infamiam alicuius libellum aut carmen scripserit,
sive quis matrem familias aut praetextatum adsectatus fuerit, et denique
aliis pluribus modis. (Outrage is committed not only by striking someone
with a fist or a stick, or even whipping him, but also by raising a clamor
against him, or if someone, knowing that another owes nothing to him,
advertises his possessions for sale as a debtor's, or if he writes a pamphlet
or song to defame someone, or if he pursues a matron or a youth, and
finally in many other ways.)
61

Sandbach, 59-67, 152, offers an overview of the Stoic conception of
anger and gives a short synopsis of the De Ira. J.M. Rist, Stoic Philosophy
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 22-36, provides a more
detailed discussion, emphasizing the differences in philosophical opinion
on the relationship between human action and emotion within the Stoic
tradition.
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of Roman Law. 62
If the plea of Seneca's adversariusfor righteous anger is an attempt

to legitimize it (so to speak), elements of Roman Law from the Twelve
Tables to the N eronian Age, by sanctioning revenge, promote and
legitimize anger as well. 63 Seneca acknowledges the cause and effect
relationship between ira and ultio (revenge) early in the De Ira and
returns to it repeatedly. The opening arguments of the adversarius in
response to Seneca's introductory comments mark the initial connection
between ira and iniuria, but also presage later discussion of ultio (revenge)
as the principle promoted by iniuria:
"Irascimur" inquit "saepe non illis qui lae62

See chapter two, passim, for further discussion.

63

Barry Nicholas, An Introduction to Roman Law (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1962), 207, summarizes the issue well: "The fossils to be found in
the law of delicts, however, are of a different kind, and affect the character
and substance of the law. But here again the most obvious ... are less
important than the survival of the principle which underlies them all, the
principle of vengeance." Seneca primarily employs vindicare (to exact
reparation, punish, avenge: OLD, entry 5) and ulcisci (to inflict retribution,
take revenge: OLD, entry 1) to convey reliance on litigation for iniuria.
At II.32.1, however, he remarks: Inhumanum verbum est et quidem pro

iusto receptum ultio [et talio]. Non multum differt nisi ordine qui dolorem
regerit: tantum excusatius peccat. This is the only instance of talio
(exaction of compensation in kind: OLD, entry 1) in the De Ira, and is the
term used in the Twelve Tables. E. H. Warmington, ed. and trans.,
Remains of Old Latin III: Lucilius and Laws of the Twelve Tables
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, rev. ed., 1967), 476: "si membrum
rupsit, ni cum eo pacit, talio esto. " Seneca deliberately places ultio
(revenge) in the legal tradition.
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serunt, sed iis qui laesuri sunt; ut scias iram
non ex ini uria nasci."
(1.3.1)

("We often get angry," he says, "not at those
who have hurt us, but at those who intend to hurt
us; you may, therefore, be sure that anger is not
born of injury."
And a sentence later he continues:
"Ut scias" inquit "non esse iram poenae
cupiditatem, infirmissimi saepe potentissimis
irascuntur nee poenam concupiscunt quam non
sperant."
(1.3.2)

("But," he says, "that you may know that anger
is not the desire to exact punishment, the weakest men are often angry at the most powerful, and
if they have no hope of inflicting punishment,
they have not the desire.")
Indeed, the adversarius denies that anger stems from iniuria immediately
upon his appearance in the De Ira, a fact that places iniuria in the
foreground of the discussion. Furthermore, he contends that anger is not
a desire for exacting punishment. As with iniuria, the term poena (penalty
for a particular offence) has a legal in addition to a general meaning. 64
But the adversarial position is also remarkable because it not only
64

0LD, entry la, gives the legal, and entry 2, the general meaning.
OLD, entry le, is also instructive, as is another entry in the XII Tables
(Warmington, ibid): "si iniuriam [alteri] faxsit, XXV [aeris] poenae sunto."
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Seneca's assumed definition, and this provides Seneca the occasion to
respond in agreement, rebuttal, or clarification. He concurs with his

adversarius, but with an important exception.
Primum diximus cupiditatem esse poenae exigendae,
non facultatem; concupiscunt autem homines et quae
possunt.
(1.3.2)

(In the first place, I spoke of the desire to exact
punishment, not of the power to do so; moreover,
men do desire even what they cannot attain.)
The adversariuswas correct in stating Seneca's basic view, but incorrectly
extended it. Desire and the ability to fulfill it had to remain separate.
Nevertheless, Seneca's definition as noted by his interlocutor was
essentially accurate and, as Seneca soon continues, roughly identical to
Aristotle's. 65
Aristotelis finitio non multum a nostra abest,
ait enim iram esse cupiditatem doloris reponendi.
(1.3.2)

(Aristotle's definition differs little from mine;
for he says that anger is the desire to repay
suffering.)
Still Seneca distinguishes his own view markedly. Cupiditatem doloris

reponendi (the desire to repay suffering) and cupiditatem poenae exigendae
65

For Aristotle as a quasi-legal theorist or quasi-jurist, see chapter 5.
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(the desire to exact punishment) differ in an important respect: the latter
also possesses a generally recognized legal meaning in addition to its "lay"
sense. 66 Thus, from the very beginning Seneca furnishes the De Ira a
legal context and, what is most surprising, insists on a definition which,
by contrast with Aristotle's, gets its force from outside--a crucial fact that
has gone unnoticed. 67
So this apparently minor variation of definitions has maJor
consequences: it is a salient piece of evidence added to the steady
accumulation of data in support of a thesis that a satire on Roman Law,
not simply an ethical enquiry, was what Seneca had in mind.

Its

prominence early in the De Ira, its position subsequent to the initial
remonstrance of the adversarius, and the emphasis on terms normally
applied in a legal manner are impossible to dismiss. At the same time, the
legal language and satiric features of the previously examined passages in
the second book advance the case for a satiric purpose even further.
Seneca has employed legal jargon at crucial points where he could have
chosen a more neutral vocabulary in the interests of philosophical clarity
66
67

0LD, entry Sc.

Basore, 112, attributes the origin of Seneca's definition to Posidonius,
as preserved by Lactanti us: "ira est cupiditas ulciscendae iniuriae. "
Nowhere is the legal sense of iniuria mentioned, an interesting oversight
in view of the exempla and other legal terms that Seneca provides, all of
which technically fall within the scope of the delict. See chap. 2, passim.
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and precision; instead, he elects to approach a vice much criticized in
antiquity from an entirely different angle. 68 Seneca's phraseology is both
explicit and explicitly legal: anger is the cupiditatem poenae exigendae
("desire for exacting punishment") and its cause is a species iniuriae (case
of injury/outrage). 69
It becomes more plausible that Seneca is deliberate in his use of

iniuria as a term appropriated from Roman Law once its context is
explored. The application of a single word or expression from the law
would not by itself go to show that Roman Law is a conspicuous theme;
but Seneca very nearly compiles a legal lexicon in the course of the De Ira,
as the terminology which qualifies iniuria will indicate. 70 Two especially
telling examples illustrate this.
(1)

.. .iram ipsam castigandam habet, quae nihilo
melior est, saepe etiam peior is delictis quibus irascitur. Gaudere laetarique proprium et

68

Malum(evil-doing, wickedness: OLD, entry 3), improbitas(outrageous
or immoderate behavior: OLD, entry 2), or iniustitia (unjust behavior:
OLD, entry 1), to give just three examples, are generic terms which Seneca
might have chosen for his definition of anger. At 11.26.4 and Il.27.1,
Seneca uses the verb nocere (to harm) in contradistinction to iniuriam
facere (to commit an injury) in order to distinguish the generic sense from
the legal. See chap. 2 two, passim, for a detailed discussion of Seneca's
treatment of iniuria in the De Ira.
69

1.3.2 and 11.1.3.

70

See Appendix of Senecan legal vocabulary for a list of legal terms
used in the De Ira and citations from the work in which the legal sense is
plain.
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naturale virtutis est: irasci non est ex dignitate eius, non magis quam maerere ....
(11.6.2)
(... anger in itself (virtue) considers reprehensible, for it is no way better, often even worse
than those delicts which provoke anger. The distinctive and natural property of virtue is to rejoice and be glad; it no more comports with dignity
to be angry than to be sad....)
(2)

... nusquam oculi eius flectentur ut non quod indignentur inveniant: deficiet, si totiens a se iram
quotiens causa poscet exegerit.
(11.7.2)
(... nowhere will (the wise man's) eyes be turned without finding something to move them to indignation.
he will lose, if he requires himself to be angry
every time he has a case.)

Several terms in the two passages merit analysis in connection with

iniuria: delictis (delicts) and dignitate (rank, status, standing, esteem) in
the first section; indignentur (become indignant), deficiet (will lose his
case), and causa (case) in the second.

Dignitas (rank, status, standing, esteem) and its cognate indignor
(become indignant) are particularly germane to our examination of iniuria
as a legal term.

In the first passage Seneca takes issue with a

commonplace of Roman culture and law, that violation of dignitas, one's
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personal standing or repute, is just cause for anger. 71 As defined, the
important and usual connotations of dignitas are status, rank, position,
esteem, and importance, or, a condition in which one enjoys one's own and
others' esteem. 72

But Seneca's disagreement is also, by implication,

dissent from standard Roman legal theory and practice: according to the
legal tradition, citizens with full rights, especially citizens enjoying
distinctive rank or honor--tribunes, praetors, or senators, for example-could take action based on assault to their person or an affront to their
reputation: that is, their dignitas. 73 The category of Roman Law under
which actions of this class applied was known as the law of delicts, and the
delict under which these actions could be pursued was titled iniuria. 74
Seneca not only associates anger and Roman Law, he boldly places

ira on a par with those "delictis quibus irascitur" (delicts at which one is
71

Berger, 502: "Specifically iniuria embraces ... offenses against the good
reputation of a person, as defined in the Twelve Tables, in the praetorian
edict, in the lex Cornelia de iniuriis, and later in imperial constitutions."
See n. 107 for additional discussion of the lex Cornelia.
72

0LD, entries 3 and 4.

73

lbid.

74

See Nicholas, 207-27, or W. W. Buckland, A Textbook of Roman Law:
From Augustus to Justinian, 3d ed., rev. Peter Stein (London: Cambridge
University Press, 1971), 576-604, for the more recent surveys of the law of
delicts.
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angered) as "sa,epe etiam peior" ("sometimes even worse"). 75

As with

iniuria, delictum (delict) possesses both a general and a technical legal
sense. 76 It recurs in the De Ira with some frequency, but unlike iniuria,
which often has a neutral meaning, delictum normally denotes a
prescribed legal category. 77 For an author versed in the law in a work
nominally addressed to a brother equally familiar with Roman
jurisprudence, proximate use of two terms so closely associated in the legal
literature can hardly be coincidental. 78 Nonetheless, the text must and
does provide a better case. Delictum (delict) refers to a broad classification
75

11.6.2.

76

0LD, entry 1, gives the general sense: an act which falls short of an
approved standard of conduct; a misdeed, offence, or fault. Berger, 430,
provides the legal meaning: "A wrongdoing prosecuted through a private
action of the injured individual and punished by a pecuniary penalty paid
to the plaintiff." And more specifically: "Delictum is the source of one
group of obligations (obligationes ex delicto) which in the fundamental
division of obligations is opposed to the contractual ones (obligationes ex
contractu").
77

R. Busa, S.J. and A. Zampolli, eds., Concordantia,e Senecana,e, 2 vols.
(Hildesheim and New York: Georg Olms Verlag, 1975), 264, cite five
instances of the word in the De Ira, and all are used in the legal sense.
78

Miriam Griffin, Seneca: A Philosopher in Politics (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1976), 36 ff., 43ff., surveys the education and career of Seneca, and,
45-48, 83-84, 245, periodically refers to Seneca's brother and addressee,
later adopted by L. Junius Gallio, and cites his magistracies, particularly
the proconsulship of Achaea in 51-2 A.D., during which he refused to
entertain the charges against the apostle Paul as described in Acts: 12-17.
Cf. Rene Waltz, Vie de Seneque (Paris: Librairie Academique, 1909), 21-37,
the standard biography of Seneca, for an account of Seneca's education.
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of Roman law which includes offences grouped under the term iniuria. 79
Seneca's intentional citation of this legal category is reinforced in the
same passage.
Modus enim esse non potest, si pro facto cui usque irascendum est; nam aut iniquus erit, si
aequaliter irascetur delictis inaequalibus, aut
aut iracundissimus, si totiens excanduerit quotiens iram scelera meruerint.
(Il.6.4)
(No limit, surely, can be set if the degree of his
anger is to be determined by each man's deed.
For either he will be unjust if he has equal
anger toward unequal delicts, or he will be habitually angry if he blazes up every time crimes
give him warrant.) 80
As an extension of his rebuttal to the adversarius' contention that it is a
mark of virtue to be angered by turpibus (disgraceful or base actions),
Seneca substitutes the more unequivocal delictis(delicts) twice; he thereby
confines or narrows his reply: it is the law of delicts which entitles the
pursuit of legal action based on iniuria, and it is iniuria which includes
the scelera (crimes) regarded as offensive to dignitas (rank, status,
standing, esteem). 81
7

9For violations encompassed by the delict, see chap. 2.

8

°Rist, 81-91, devotes an entire chapter to this paradox, but without
citing this passage from the De Ira.
81

Il.6.l: 'Virtus,' inquit, 'ut honestis rebus propitia est, ita turpibus

irata esse debet. '
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Seneca transfers attention from the more comprehensive turpibus
(disgraceful or base actions) to the legally definitive delictis (delicts) as a
prelude to his unflattering appraisal of the courts. 82 As he had earlier
carefully distinguished his definition and his terms from the neutral
terminology of the adversarius and Aristotle, Seneca repeats the pattern:
his disagreement effectively superimposes a legal shape on the discussion
of ira. 83 To a Roman magistrate such as N ovatus, there would have been
no question that nusquam oculi eius fiectentur, ut non quod indignentur

inveniant (nowhere will his eyes be turned without finding something to
move them to indignation) meant the delict iniuria, for indignentur
(become indignant) implied the assault on dignitas (rank, status, standing,
esteem) which justified an action based on iniuria. But Seneca finishes
where his adversarius began by returning to turpibus (disgraceful or base
actions) in a stricter sense: the litigation and the attorneys who promote
it. 84 In so doing, he reverses his opponent's emphasis by referring to lites
(lawsuits) as turpes (disgraceful) and their advocatos (attorneys) as

turpiores (more disgraceful). 85 Thus, instead of attributing disgrace to
82

For Seneca's diatribe on the courts, see 11.7-9.

83

For these definitions of ira, see 1.3.1-3.

84

See especially II. 7 .3

85

For lites (OLD, entry 1): a dispute at law, a lawsuit. For advocatus
(OLD, entry 1): one who supports or advises a party to a lawsuit.
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crimes, which often produce those disturbances of the mind which precede

ira, Seneca purposely transfers the object of disgrace (and the topic at
hand) to the legal process and its practitioners. 86
The nee vitia nostra nee remedia pati possumus ("we can endure
neither our vices nor their cures") of Livy's preface suggests Seneca's focus
here, and is an earlier and more general statement of the problem Seneca
speaks of in the De Ira. 87

For Livy, the remedies for Rome's moral

decline seemed as difficult for the state to bear as the moral decadence
itself, and he prescribes examples for imitation or avoidance from Rome's
past as a palliative for the social ills of his time. In a similar vein, Seneca
not only decries the vice of anger, but is also critical of the delict iniuria,
since this provides anger a legitimate and socially acceptable instrument
of expression. Yet his method in doing so frequently abandons argument
for the sake of paradox--or satiric irony, figures much more amenable to
86

At 11.3.1-5, one of the key chapters in the De Ira, Seneca
differentiates between ira and the motus animi (disturbance of the mind)
which comes before it, but not without eventually introducing legal
connections. Thus, at 11.3.5: Ergo prima illa agitatio animi quam species

iniuriae incussit non magis ira est quam ipsa iniuriae species; ille sequens
impetus, qui speciem iniuriae non tantum accepit sed adprobavit, ira est,
concitatio animi ad ultionem voluntate et iudicio pergentis. Seneca includes
here the conditions under which iniuria can be legally applied. See chap.
2.
87

B. 0. Foster, trans., Liyy I: Books I and II (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1919), praef., 7.
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h1s purpose.

In point of fact, Seneca's dominant theme becomes

comprehensible only as an outgrowth of satiric irony: the law itself
services anger in a paradoxical collaboration and alliance. If anger is

cupiditatem poenae exigendae (the desire for exacting punishment), the
iniuria that one suffers becomes the accepted means of satisfying it. 89
Seneca must have seen this eagerness to cause pain as a major social ill
of his time, much as Livy had observed a general moral collapse earlier.
His denunciation of anger would require the censure of iniuria because the
delict was both permissive and promotional, furnishing ira all the benefits
of a social value. 90 Justice ironically becomes the very crime it was set
up to punish.
For Seneca to conclude that ira is caused by a species iniuriae (case
of injury/outrage) was a daring appraisal. 91 It implied that the delict--or
law itself--was responsible for the perpetration of ira.

Seneca's

extravagant condemnation of the courts displays the result of ira and

iniuria in response to the claim that "Virtus... ita turpibus irata esse debet
88

See chap. 5 on Seneca's use of paradox and irony as they apply to the
De Ira as parody of an epistolary legal responsum.
891.3.2.

~or the range of the delict and its social consequences, see chap. 2.
91

For the legal sense of species, see OLD, entry 11, but especially
Ulpian, Digest 4.3.7.3: Labeo... adfert talem speciem; also 4.4.19.1: post

speciem in auditorio eorum finitam.
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("Virtue ought to be angered at what is base"). 92

But pr10r to his

diatribe, in what might well serve as a summary of his view as well as a
satiric reduction to absurdity, Seneca had offered this remark: "deficiet, si

totiens a se iram quotiens causa poscet exegerit" ("He will lose his case if
he forces himself to be angry every time the case requires").

In the

context of what precedes and follows, causa can only mean legal case or
trial, not the more general cause, reason, or occasion. 93 At the same
time, deficiet (he will lose his case) becomes less a suggestion of Stoic
resignation in the face of injustice than an example of hyperbole: no one
confronted with grounds for action Seneca presents as commonplace could
pursue them all or be victorious. 94 Seneca's point is twofold: first, the
connection between ira and causa (case), but secondly, the exaggerated
importance of causae (cases) which practically demand ira in order to be
pursued.

Injustice is so rife as to entail obligatory outrage on an

outrageous scale. And as he observes: "Numquam irasci desinet sapiens,

si semel coeperit" ("Never will the wise man cease to be angry if once he
92II.6.1.
93

0LD, entries 1and2, provide the legal significance; OLD, entries 9,
7, and 5b provide the more general meanings.
94

Deficiet has a double significance here: to fail to make a legal claim
(OLD, entry 9d), and to succumb to tiredness or moral weakness (OLD,
entry 5b).
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begins"). 95 But Seneca notes thereafter that "Omnia sceleribus ac vitiis

plena sunt" ("Every place is full of crime and vice"), and "plus committitur
quam quod possit coercitione sanari" ("too many crimes are committed to
be cured by any possible restraint"). 96
Satiric hyperbole continues throughout the chapter in the same
fashion, adding layer upon layer of protest in a manner the satires of
Juvenal would later recall, as the following should demonstrate. 97
Maior cottidie peccandi cupiditas, minor verecundia est; expulso melioris aequiorisque respectu
quocumque visum est libido se impingit, nee furtiva iam scelera sunt: praeter oculos eunt, adeoque in publicum missa nequitia est et in omnium
pecatoribus eval uit ut innocentia non rara sed
nulla sit. Numquid enim singuli aut pauci rupere
legem? undique velut signo dato ad fas nefasque
miscendum coorti sunt ....
(II.9.1-2)
(Every day the desire for wrongdoing is greater,
the dread of it less; all regard for what is better and more just is banished, lust hurls itself
wherever it likes, and crimes are now no longer
secret. They pass before our very eyes, and
wickedness has come to such a public state, has
gained such power over the hearts of all, that
innocence is not rare--it is non-existent. For
is it only the individual or the few who break
the law? Everywhere, as if at a given signal,
9sll.9.1.
96

Ibid.

97

Cf. Juvenal Saturae 3.41-57.
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men rise to level all the barriers of right and
wrong.)
After this more general conspectus of iniquity, Seneca enlarges his
scope and remarks that what he has previously described is but "pars

scelerum est" ("only a portion of the crimes"). 98 He lengthens the list
with a relentless tally of Roman social and political calamities, yet returns
to the courts and the righteous ira which his adversarius had
recommended as a solution to the violated dignitas (rank, status, standing,
esteem) which warrants an actio iniuriarum (action for outrage). 99
Adde nunc publica periuria gentium et rupta foedera et in praedam validioris quidquid non resistebat abductum, circumscriptiones furta fraudes
infitiationes quibus trina non sufficiunt fora.
Si tantum irasci vis sapientem quantum scelerum
indignitas exigit, non irascendum illi sed insaniendum est.
(11.9.4)
(Add now to these, public acts of perjury between
nations, broken treaties, and all the booty seized
when resistance could not save it from the stronger,
the double-dealings, the thefts and frauds and debts
disowned--for such crimes all three forums supply
not courts enough! If you expect the wise man to
be as the indignity of crimes compels, he must not
be angry merely, but go mad.)
98

11.9.3.

9

9Berger, Encyclopedia, 502: "It was in particular the praetorian law
which ... defended the honor of a Roman citizen against defamation by
according a special action, actio iniuriarum."
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Seneca thus ends a prolonged rebuttal of his opponent before advancing to
a different interpretation of ira and a plea for reform which is typical of
. . sch eme. 100
a sat inc

However, Seneca has contributed much to an

understanding of his design in a brief stretch at nearly the center of his
essay: chapter six begins with an attempt by Seneca's adversarius to
sanction anger as an appropriate reaction to injustice; chapter nine starts
and concludes with an emphatic appeal to the absurdity of this view.
Even more significantly, the fundamental themes of the De Ira are
presented in this span, and the means employed to convey them are not
conventional

philosophic

methods,

but

the

more

subtle figures

characteristic of satire, such as irony and hyperbole. 101 Most obvious in
this regard is Seneca's conscious accentuation of Roman law and the court
milieu. His legal landscape offers a grim panorama of corruption: the fora
teem with business from daybreak, are insufficient for the caseloads, and
all the participants manifest their guilt or exhibit some form of disgraceful
behavior.

Criminality is ubiquitous according to Seneca, and so is

hypocrisy: those entrusted with the execution of justice transgress the laws
themselves and commit the same offenses over which they sit in judgment
100

See Horace Sermones 1.92-100 and Juvenal Saturae 10.346-66.

101

Highet, 18, lists "the typical weapons of satire--irony, paradox,
antithesis, parody, colloquialism, anticlimax, topicality, obscenity, violence,
vividness, exaggeration .... "
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or for which they provide evidence. Seneca has unremittingly depicted a
judicial climate so bleak as to suggest a total absence of right. Reasoned
proof is in abeyance here, supplanted by the extremes of hyperbole, the
tactic so familiar to the satirist in his quest for reform, but utterly foreign
to the philosopher in his insistence on sequential reasoning.
The improprieties of Seneca's forum loom so immense they obscure
the topic which originally prompted his exaggerated depiction of Roman
crime and corruption--ira. Seneca has identified his reader, snatched him
from the expectation of impunity, hauled him to one of the trina fora (three
forums), and compelled him to endure interminable turpitude--much as the
adverarial molestus (pest) in Horace--and all in reply to the simple and
apparently sensible objection, presumably founded on received wisdom,
that the virtuous are obligated to be angered at injustice. 102 Yet what
may be prematurely judged as unnecessary rhetorical display or an
unforgiveable detour from a sequence of proofs becomes perfectly
understandable if Seneca's purpose is satire. In that case, not only does
his long hyperbole make sense, but, outside a philosophical context, his
technique ceases to appear flawed from a philosophical perspective and
takes on a more acceptable--andcreditable--appearance. Seneca's harangue
seems to be a casual, spontaneous, improvisation without relevance to the
102

See Horace Sermones 1.9.
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central problem of anger. But this also is a conventional satiric device: a
deliberate and quite purposeful digression whose end must be more
carefully pursue d.

103

Seneca's tirade leads to two conclusions in reaction to the opinion
proffered by his adversarius on righteous anger: first, that the sapiens
(wise

man) will never cease from anger, since anger must become the

hallmark of wisdom; secondly, the extent of iniquity will provoke
madness. 104

Both conclusions, extreme as they are, hinge on the

exaggeration which allows them credence.

The divergence by which

Seneca comes to the point is essential to his plan. Only an overwhelming
survey of contemporary evil, such as Seneca provides, can convincingly
reduce the possibility of righteous anger to absurdity; and only a polemic
103

Griffin, 16, cites Horace's Sermones as a literary model for Seneca,
and the digressions in the De Ira possess the approximate spirit and tone
observed in the satires. Cf. Henricus Weber, "De Senecae Philosophi
Dicendi Genere Bioneo" (Ph.D. diss., Marburg, 1895), 1-6. Fraenkel, 94,
notes the following about this technique: "...the formula and the device of
the digression whose end it marks are also a means of loosening what
otherwise might become too tight and systematic an arrangement.
Throughout his Sermones Horace ... wants to talk, as a gentleman will walk
in congenial company. In a talk it is perfectly proper to wander, or seem
to wander, from the subject under discussion and elaborate some side
issues ... " Cf. Freudenburg, 109-84.
104

Seneca mentions the connection between ira and insania quite early
in the De Ira, at 1.1.2: Quidam itaque e sapientibus viris iram dixerunt
brevem insaniam.
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on the legal condition of Roman society can call judicial recourse to delicts
into question as a valid remedy by which to redress iniuria. The symbiosis
between anger and the law of delicts comes into high relief in these
passages. Seneca begins chapter six of the second book with ira and ends
the ninth chapter with it, but the dominant and recurrent theme is Roman
law, and this commands the center of his attention.
But finally, in addition to hyperbole and apparent spontaneity, these
passages reveal a third ingredient of satire. Seneca's insinuation of law
into an essay on anger establishes the basis for an underlying tension
which, although most obvious in the middle of his discussion, in fact
pervades the entire work. As he remarks prior to mention of the delicta
(delicts) with which one becomes angered:
Nee umquam committet virtus ut vitia dum
compescit imitetur ....
(11.6.2)
(And virtue will never be guilty of simulating
vice in the act of repressing it .... )
Righteous anger in the common view was virtuous, and the Roman law of
delicts, more explicitly the delict of iniuria, facilitated its expression. And
herein lies the irony: the actiones iniuriarum, instigated as a consequence
of outraged dignitas (rank, status, standing, esteem), became tantamount
to an expression of ira. In the guise of probity and under the aegis of
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Roman statutes, anger was granted unlimited license. As the only vice he
thought worthy of such lengthy and exclusive treatment in any of his
philosophical works, Seneca must have estimated anger the principal ill
of his time. But in order to expose it fully and recommend a genuine
remedy, Seneca would have to challenge the law which made its
manifestation an acceptable social and moral pestilence.

CHAPTER TWO
INIURIA

By Seneca's time the Roman law of delict and iniuria as a legal term
had an extensive tradition and history; both originate in the earliest
source of Roman law, the Twelve Tables. 105 The special character of the
delict iniuria appears in seminal form there, and it would remain the basis
on which succeeding eras could rely as a precedent for interpretation or
amplification. Although the most comprehensive meaning of the term
signifies unlawful conduct generally or the absence of a right, iniuria as
a specific delict possesses two prominent features. 106 As a recent author
105

Warmington, 475-77, provides text, translation, and commentary on
the sources and testimonia for Table VIII, where violations encompassed
by iniuria are cited. Nicholas, 207-11, and Bruce Frier, A Casebook on the
Roman Law of Delict (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1989), 1-2, 177, present
brief synopses of the history and tradition.
106

See OLD, entry 1, and Nicholas, 215. Of special importance here is
the confusion which may arise concerning the legal use of the word.
Although it can refer to the delict iniuria, the word itself may also indicate
the cause of an action when it occurs, as it often does, in the ablative case.
Thus Frier, passim, standardly translates its frequent occurrence in the lex
Aquilia as "wrongfully." In the De Ira, Seneca's discussion pertains to the
delict, as examples to follow will clearly show. Justinian, Inst. 4.3 and 4.4
highlight the distinction.
59
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briefly summarizes, iniuria "included not merely physical assaults and
oral or written insults and abuse, but any affront to another's dignity or
reputation and any disregard of another's public or private rights, provided
always that the act was done wilfully and with contumelious intent. "107
Thus, physical assault and personal affront or insult were the central
offenses which the framers of the Twelve Tables intended to address; these
at least were the broad categories under which the various violations of
the delict fell. 108
These two rather expansive divisions eventually subsumed an ever
wider range of behaviors to which iniuria could apply .109 Aside from the
practical difficulties produced by the crowdedswollen fora to which Seneca
testifies, the extended scope of the delict obscures a more basic issue
regarding the law of delicts and iniuria in particular .110

Modern

107

Nicholas, 216.

108

1

Warmington, 4 75-77.

~rier, 177, and Nicholas, 216-17, refer briefly to this historical

development, whose course, as noted by Berger, 502, was shaped by the
praetorian edict, the lex Cornelia de iniuriis of 81 B.C., and the imperial
constitutions. Of these, the praetorian edict was perhaps the most
influential factor in determining what could be considered a violation of
the delict. Nicholas, 216, carefully examines the expanded role of the
praetor--established by the lex Aebutia during the second century B.C.--to
decide actionable offenses. As a force and influence on the prevailing legal
view on iniuria in Seneca's time, the latitude of interpretation granted the
praetor cannot be underestimated.
110

See 11.9.4 on Seneca's view of the courts.
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scholars have noted that the Roman law of delict possessed aspects
common to both modern criminal law and tort law; the sanctions imposed
were of a punitive as well as a compensatory nature. 111 Although both
aspects are of interest, the punitive element is more relevant and
remarkable for legal historians, since it represents the survival of a
primitive means and ultimately a

system or method of redressing

grievances; the penal nature of delictal actions preserves the principle of
self-help or vengeance.11 2

Seneca was himself well aware of the

vindictive quality of actions for delict, especially iniuria, and he recognized
a vital connection between the vice of anger and its legitimization or
encouragement through the most socially acceptable of means--the courts.
From the very beginning of the De Ira, the legal terms employed are
unmistakable evidence that Seneca's endeavor is not merely a treatment
of anger, but of the delict iniuria as well. The legal sense of his definition
of anger as "cupiditatem...poenae exigendae" (the desire for exacting
punishment)

(I.3.2) has already been noted, yet this is one instance of

many where Seneca's expression gains point once given a definite legal
111

Nicholas, 207-8, and Alan Watson, Roman Law and Comparative
Law (Athens and London: University of Georgia Press, 1991), 69-74 and
166-81.
112

Nicholas, 209.
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interpretation rather than an indefinite or general

meaning. 113

Variations of this phrase regularly occur in the De Ira, all of which convey
the notion of penalty as phrased by the Roman jurists. 114 Seneca thus
connects anger to the punitive or vindictive character of the law of delicts,
as is clear in the first section of the first book:
... armorum, sanguinis suppliciorum minime humana
furens cupiditate, dum alteri noceat sui neglegens,
in ipsa irruens tela et ultionis secum ultorem
tracturae avidus.
(1.1.1)

(... raging with a most inhuman desire for weapons,
blood, and punishments, indifferent to itself provided it can injure another, hurling itself even at
weapons and avid for revenge even at the cost of
self as avenger.) 115

Supplicium (punishment), ultio (revenge), and ultor (avenger) are
prominent in the passage. As the final element of Seneca's asyndeton,

supplicium (punishment) is highlighted and serves as the genus under
which armorum (weapons) and sanguinis (blood) are to be included as

species. Although supplicium denotes punishment in the lexica, it is
113

See Chap. 1, 40-42.

114
115

0LD, entries la and 2.

Cf. the relentless call for revenge by the furies at the opening of
Seneca's Thyestes.
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typically applied as a stronger form of poena. 116 Both its inclusion and
position in the series indicate this. Supplicium often specifies retribution
of a physical nature, especially execution, which accounts for its placement
subsequent to armorum (weapons) and sanguinis (blood). 117 But Seneca's
reference to ultio (revenge) is no less consequential, for it associates the
ideas of punishment exacted by law with revenge as a motive. 118
More significant, however, is the progression of thought whereby
Seneca introduces these terms. Instead of responding immediately to his
brother's query, he shifts to a denunciation of anger which concludes with
an exaggerated and grotesque portrait:
... nam ut furentium certa indicia sunt audax et
minax vultus, tristis frons, torva facies, citatus gradus, inquietae manus, color versus, crebra
et vehementius acta suspiria, ita irascentium eadem signa sunt: flagrant ac micant oculi, multus
ore toto rubor ex aestuante ab imis praecordiis
sanguine, labra quatiuntur, dentes comprimuntur,
horrent ac surriguntur capilli, spiritus coactus
ac stridens, articulorum se ipsos torquentium sonus, gemitus mugitusque et parum explanatis vocibus sermo praeruptus et conplosae saepius manus
et pulsata humus pedibus et totum concitum corpus ....
116

0LD, entries 3a and b.

117

Ibid.

118

Berger, 633, highlights this, as does Nicholas, 207.
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(1.1.3-4)119

(... for as the marks of the mad are certain--a bold
and threatening mien, a gloomy brow, a fierce expression, a hurried step, restless hands, an altered complexion, a quick and more violent breathing-so likewise are the marks of the angry man; his
eyes blaze and sparkle, his whole face is crimson
with the blood that surges from the lowest depths
of the heart, his lips quiver, his teeth are clenched,
his hair bristles and stands on end, his breathing is
forced and harsh, his joints crack from writhing, he
groans and bellows, bursts out into speech with scarcely intelligible words, strikes his hands together continually, and stamps the ground with his feet; his
whole body is excited.... )
Such an elaborate display at bottom evades the problem N ovatus has
raised: "quemadmodum posset ira leniri" (in what way anger can be
diminished).

Seneca's digression is not essential to formulating a

philosophical position, but quite material to a satiric programme. 120
Although he will ultimately answer the question, Seneca must first
119Dorothy May Paschall, "The Vocabulary of Mental Aberration in

Roman Comedy and Petronius," Language 15, supplement (Jan.- March,
1939): 39-45, discusses furere and its derivatives as the terms of choice in
the law books and the jurists to describe violence in feelings and actions.
Seneca's list as much resembles a collection of diagnostic signs or
symptoms as a description of the physiological manifestations of anger.
Busa and Zampolli, 511-12, list twenty-one cases of furere and its cognates
in the De Ira. Seneca often employs the term in the same sense in the
plays. Cf. Phaedra 711 and 937, or Medea 673.
120

Seneca artfully weaves a tapestry depicting the ugliness of ira in
order to graphically represent its undesirability. Highet, 242, refers to
this feature of satire as the satirist's paradoxical "aesthetic." See above,
Chap. 1, 29, on digression as a satiric technique.
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achieve other ends; anger must appear indefensible and its relationship to
the delict iniuria must be elucidated.
In the opening chapter he begins both projects; the hideous vision of
the angry man renders anger too repulsive to defend, whereas the
introduction of supplicium (punishment) and ultio (revenge) are indications
to Novatus that Roman law will be indispensable to Seneca's plan.
References to the legal underpinnings of ira, however, do not cease with
mere mention of these two terms; the chapter also contains an extensive
estimation of the personal consequences of anger, which implies a legal
background and significance not immediately noticeable .
... aeque enim impotens sui est, decoris oblita,
necessitudinum immemor, in quod coepit pertinax
et intenta, rationi consiliisque praeclusa, vanis agitata causis, ad dispectum aequi verique
inhabilis, ruinis simillima quae super id quod
oppressere franguntur.
(1.1.2)
(... for it is equally devoid of self-control, forgetful of decency, unmindful of ties, persistent
and diligent in whatever it begins, closed to reason and counsel, excited by groundless cases, unfit to discern the equitable and true, most akin
to ruins which themselves break on what they crush.)
All of these effects in themselves possess a superficially universal
applicability; they could conceivably pertain to anyone overtaken by ira.
Seneca's addressee, however, was known to have been a Roman
magistrate, to have presided over the courts, and, given the legal emphasis
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of Roman education among the upper stratum of society, to have had
exceptional legal expertise. 121 The opening request of N ovatus may have
been an artistic convention; in any case, his official capacity enjoys
historical evidence. 122 As such, the importance of N ovatus as addressee
is paramount with respect to the above passage and others in the De
lra.123
If the results of ira which Seneca lists are broadly pertinent, their

presence in a state or judicial functionary is yet more noteworthy, as are
its consequences. More to the point, the vocabulary Seneca has chosen
suggests that judicial conduct is precisely his interest; in the context of
ordinary usage his terms will not bear close inspection. Seneca's brief
catalogue is of minimal relevance for the slave or freedman, although the
Stoic moral stance toward ira it represents would be no less personally
beneficial. 124 Civic neglect perhaps best summarizes the sequence. "Sui
121See above, Chap. 1, n. 78, on the career of Novatus.
1221bid.
123Griffin, 9, remarks on Seneca's "frequent emphasis on aspects of
behaviour that are not strictly private," such as "anger in a judge or a
princeps," and she notes also that Seneca "chose to address these
discussions to men engaged in public affairs," including Novatus.
124Sandbach, 43, surveys various of the Stoic paradoxes, particularly
the kingship enjoyed by the slave who is master of his own thoughts.
Strictly speaking, the passage conforms closely with Stoic ethics, as the
emphasis on self-mastery and reason indicates. For more detailed
discussion of these two principles within the Stoic system, see Sandbach,
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impotens" (powerless over oneself) and its opposite, sui potens (selfcontrolled), recall the legal phrase sui iuris (in one's own power), which
meant

possession of the full

rights and

privileges of Roman

citizenship. 125 To be sure, decor (propriety) and necessitudo (obligation),
although civic ideals, are hardly expected of the general populace in any
age. 126

Yet the insertion of "rationi consiliisque praeclusa" (closed to

reason and counsel) and "vanis agitata causis" (excited by groundless cases)
reveals Seneca's intent as well as his intended audience.

Despite the

generic "reason" and "counsel" afforded the terms, neither ratio nor

consilium have an integral function in the daily routine of the potter, the
weaver, the baker, or cook. 127 Nor is it debilitating that such folk are
28-68.
125

As Seneca uses sui impotens, it is synonomous with the "brevem
insaniam" (temporary madness) he has just mentioned. OLD, entry 2b,
gives "out of one's mind, deranged" as the sense, whereas sui potens (OLD,
entry 2) means "one's own master." Sui iuris describes the legal authority
or potestas of the Roman paterfamilias. See Nicholas, 67-8.
126

For the respective meanings of decor and necessitudo, see OLD, entry
3, and OLD, entries 1 and 3.
127

Although ratio has a broad range of possible meanings, OLD, entry
7a, gives the most comprehensive sense. Generally speaking, however,
Seneca seems to be using it as an "umbrella" term to denote the entire
range of mental activities which the word can describe, such as any
calculation (OLD, entry 1), estimate of proportion (OLD, entry 3), or
scheme of action (OLD, entry 10). Consilium, whose prefix alone would
point to a collective undertaking, often refers to a deliberative or advisory
body (OLD, entry 3a). Even more specifically, consilium refers to an
official group, such as a council of state, a senate, or jury (OLD, entries 3b
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"ad dispectum aequi verique inhabilis" (incapable of discerning the just and
true). In fact "vanis agitata causis" is perfectly straightforward legalese
for "excited by groundless cases" no less than "excited by trifling causes."
Thus, the legal bias of the entire sequence becomes conspicuous, and
Seneca's choice of ira as motif emerges as a specialized and individually
tailored legal reply to a Roman magistrate. Restraint, propriety, a sense
of obligation, flexibility, amenability to counsel, resistance to frivolous
suits, and recognition of what is fair and factual all comprise a set of ideal
criteria of little significance unless for someone entrusted with judicial
authority. 128 Seneca's brother and addressee was unmistakably such a
figure.
Seneca becomes much more legally explicit in the following chapter,
a prolonged and rhetorically intricate survey of the civic as well as the
general consequences of ira which foreshadows his later diatribe on the
courts and fuses the language of the law with satiric hyperbole. 129
and c). If Seneca uses consilium to qualify ratio, he hardly had the slave
or freedman in mind.
128

James Kelly, Roman Litigation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), 3168 and 102-117, surveys a number of improper influences in the conduct
of litigation and the problem of "the misbehaving judge." As a suggested
ideal, Kelly quotes Cicero Pro Caecina, 71 ff.: "Quod enim est ius civile?
quod neque inflecti gratia neque perfringi potentia neque adulterari pecunia
poss it... " In the context of the present study, Seneca adds ira to the list.
129

II. 7-9 covers the diatribe.
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lam vero si effectus ei us damnague intueri velis,
nulla pestis humano generi pluris stetit. Videbis caedes et venena et reorum mutuas sordes et
urbium clades et totarum exitia gentium et principum sub civili hasta capita venalia et subiectas tectis faces nee intra moenia coercitos ignes
sed ingentia spatia regiorum hostili flamma relucentia. Aspice nobilissimarum civitatum fundamenta vix notabilia: has ira deiecit. Aspice solitudines per multa milia sine habitatore desertas:
has ira exhausit. Aspice tot memoriae proditos
duces mali exempla fati: alium ira in cubili suo
confodit, alium intra sacra mensae iura percussit,
alium intra leges celebrisque spectaculum fori
lancinavit, alium filii parricidio dare sanguinem
iussit, alium servili manu regalem aperire iugulum, alium in cruce membra diffindere. Et adhuc
singulorum supplicia narro....
(1.2.1-3)
(... moreover, if you choose to inspect its results
and legal penalties, no plague has cost the human race
more. You will see murder and poisoning, the vile
countercharges of defendants, the downfall of cities
and whole nations given to destruction, heads of
state sold at public auction, houses put to the
torch, and conflagration that halts not within the
city-walls, but makes great stretches of the country glow with hostile flame. Behold the most glorious cities whose foundations can scarcely be
traced--anger cast them down. Behold solitudes
stretching for many miles without a single dweller-anger laid them waste. Behold all the leaders who
have been handed down to posterity as instances of
an evil fate--anger stabbed this one in his bed,
struck down this one amid the sanctities of the
feast, tore this one to pieces in the very home of
the law and in full view of the crowded forum,
forced this one to have his blood spilled by the
murderous act of his son, another to have his royal
throat cut by the hand of a slave, another to have
his limbs stretched upon the cross. And hitherto I
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have mentioned the sufferings of individual persons
only .... )
After a lengthy display of the physiological manifestations of ira, Seneca
reverts to this equally satiric account of its toll in as acerbic a panorama
as can be found later in Juvenal. 130

The damages caused by anger

narrow from the miscellaneous "effectus" (results) to the more exclusive

"damna," a term which, along with its frequently found causative
damnare, denotes personal or financial loss as a sequel to unlawfulness,
or the restitution levied as compensation for loss. 131 In either case, the
legal sense is evident; the subject of the section is the extreme criminal
extent to which ira can proceed, and is conveyed in legal terms N ovatus
would instantly recognize.
Seneca begins with caedes, the comprehensive term for murder, then
proceeds to a litany of specific types whose cumulative effect is enhanced
by the lengthy polysyndeton and then, in contrast, the anaphoric use of

aspice, has, and alium. 132 The rhetorical result is that of a relentless
climax of innumerable examples of homicide and general destruction. But
130

Juvenal Saturae X, 54-73 closely echoes the tone of the passage.
William S. Anderson, Essays on Roman Satire (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1982), 293-314, provides lengthy treatment of the
similarities of spirit between the De Ira and sections of Juvenal's satires.
131

See OLD, entries 1and4, s.v. damnum. Berger, 424, supplies some
detail, and Nicholas, 218-22, still more.
132

For caedes, see OLD, entry 1.
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Seneca reduces the focus further; murder in its various manifestations
requires mention of person and place, since Roman law distinguishes the
degree and severity of many offenses, including murder, on this basis. 133
Thus, the location advances from the private sphere to the public domain,
from the cubile (bedroom) to the mensa (dinner table) to the forum (court);
family murder progresses to the assassination of royalty by a slave, from

parricidium to servili manu regalem.

In a brief survey Seneca has

recounted the direst outcomes of ira in terms consistent with the specifics
of Roman statute. 134

The chapter concludes, however, by Seneca

reverting to his first association between ira and iniuria.
Unfortunately, our manuscripts are defective at this point, and a
section of the text is missing; when it resumes, Seneca has shifted from
diatribe to dialogue (or satiric monologue) prior to the initial objection of
the adversarius that ira does not issue from iniuria. 135 But Seneca must
first introduce the concept of iniuria into the argument.
133

Seneca's use of percutere (OLD, entries 1 and 2: "to land a blow;
deliver a mortal blow") and his mention of spectaculum fori in a similar
context would automatically imply violations of iniuria and atrox
(aggravated) iniuria. See Gaius, Inst. 3.220 and 3.224-5. Digest 48.8, on
the Lex Cornelia de Sicariis et Veneficiis, provides an overview of the
distinctions made as to degree and severity with regard to murder.
134

Ibid.

135

Reynolds, 41, offers a brief commentary on the MSS. problem and a
survey of scholarly conjecture on the content of a missing portion of the
text. Basore, 110, estimates the loss as a leaf or more of the MS.
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Quid? Gladiatoribus guare populus irascitur et
tam inigue, ut iniuriam putet, quod non libenter pereunt? Contemni se iudicat et vultu,
gestu, ardore a spectatore in adversari um vertitur.
(1.2.4)
(Why? Why are the people angered with gladiators,
and so unjustly as to deem it an offence that
they are not glad to die? They consider themselves affronted, and from mere spectators transform themselves into enemies, in looks, in gesture, and in violence.)
This earliest reference to iniuria, although not made in the context of an
official judicial setting, mirrors a court proceeding complete with jury

(populus) and two adversaries (gladiatoribus). 136

At the same time

"contemni se iudicat" (The people consider themselves affronted)
establishes that the judge and jury are identical, since iudicat is cognate
with iudex (judge). Seneca might have used a non-legal vocabulary in
describing the games, but he chooses a number of standard legal terms
which culminate with adversarium, the term which completes the extended
legal metaphor .137 The point, however, is clear; anger assumes every
136

Seneca's use of legal metaphor here to suggest a trial setting is by
no means idiosyncratic to this passage. For additional examples, see
below, Chap. 3, passim.
137

The blurring of roles between plaintiff (populus) and judge (iudex) is
common in Seneca's exempla, and points to a corrupt process he closely
identifies with the dynamics of ira at 11.1. For the legal sense of
adversarius, see OLD, entry 3.
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judicial role but that of defendant; plaintiff, judge, and jury are selfappointed. Likewise, contemni (affronted) possesses a sense which typifies
the very substance of the delict iniuria: contempt in word or action, scorn,

.
It .13s
or insu
Anger, then, creates its own court, a phenomenon which Seneca will
attend to in greater detail later in the De Ira. 139

In the preceeding

passage Seneca plainly examines ira within the framework of legal
metaphor in the aftermath of two sections in which Roman law has been
either directly cited or at least suggested by his selection of terms.
However the first citation of iniuria as opposed to ira occurs during the
description of an ordinary Roman social event--the games. The reluctance
of a gladiator to die did not constitute iniuria by law, but the inference of
effrontery by the spectators does disclose a principal feature of ira: the
presumption that its occasion necessarily conveys a willful and intentional
insult or attack. 140 The gladiators no more mock the crowd than the
ground insults a child who has fallen on it. Nonetheless, Seneca says,
... sed tantum irascuntur, sine causa et sine ini uria, non tamen sine aliqua ini uriae specie nee
sine aliqua poenae cupiditate. Del uduntur itaque
imitatione plagarum et simulatis deprecantium la138

See Chap. 1, 42-45.

13

9III.14-21 are of special relevance here.

140

Digest 47.10.3. Cf. 11.26. in the De Ira.
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crimis placantur et falsa ultione falsus dolor
tollitur.
(I.2.5)
(... but they are merely angry, without any case
and without being injured, though not without
some appearance of injury and not without some
desire of exacting punishment. And so they are
deceived by imaginary blows and are pacified by
the pretended tears of those who beg forgiveness,
and mock resentment is removed by mock revenge.
Seneca stresses the absence of any causa (case) given the absence of

iniuria; ira, however, is present, as are "poena,e cupiditate" (desire for
punishment) and "ultio" (revenge), concepts already discussed in relation
to anger. 141 More important still, he clearly demonstrates the lack of a
necessary connection between anger on the one hand and an iniuria,e causa
(case of injury) on the other, a lack which he repeatedly emphasizes. 142
Furthermore, Seneca links the poor sense of restraint inherent in the
anger of children and of devotees of gladiatorial combat, figures whose
judgment, situation, and reliability are questionable at best. 143
141

See Chap. 1.

142

See especially 11.22-28.

14

3The element of play is prominent for both children and spectators at
games. At best there is confusion between what ought or ought not to be
taken seriously or considered offensive; at worst there is a truly pernicious
inability to distinguish between a disappointment and an affront or injury.
Most of Seneca's examples of irate rulers in book three are models of
childishness, and he belabors the importance of restraint in childhood at
II. 19-21.
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Whereas Seneca explicitly mentions iniuria with regularity in the
De Ira, implicit references to the delict are more common, and
understandably so--the terminology as well as the facts itemized in various

exempla, although unfamiliar to the reader unacquainted with Roman
legal vocabulary and practice, would be eminently recognizable to N ovatus
or any other educated Roman. 144 Here percussit (to land a blow, strike,
or hit), for example, would ipso facto imply the delict iniuria, as would

plagarum, denoting the blows or wounds of which the verb percussit
implies. 145 But these are only two such terms; many more occur in the
course of the work which convey Seneca's deliberate effort to sustain

iniuria as a fixed and recurrent element of the discussion. 146 Yet finally,
Seneca's appeal for personal restraint and, conversely, his criticism of its
absence in the unrestrained, require persuasive illustrations if the
exposure and reform of wrongdoing--two of the most important features of
satire--are to succeed. The various anecdotes which Seneca supplies are
forceful examples of how a man who avoids ira can avoid suffering iniuria
144

H.I. Marrou, A History of Education in Antiquity, trans. George
Lamb (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1982), 287-91, examines
the status and importance of law in Roman education. In light of this
alone, there would be no need for Seneca to explain common legal
references; particularly in the case of his brother. See Chap. 1, n. 78.
145
146

For both terms, see OLD, entry 1, and Gaius, Inst. 3.220.

See Appendix.

76

as well. Both the vice and the delict are undesireable, and the elimination
of one largely eliminates the other. As the title would indicate, anger is
the stated subject; yet Seneca's preoccupation with iniuria provides
compelling evidence that this is too simple or partial a conclusion. Two
other explanations are possible, however: perhaps the Roman law of delict
is a hidden agenda of Seneca's; or perhaps, too, the long obsolescence of
Roman legal vocabulary has obscured characteristics of the De Ira that
would have been obvious in their own day.
The language of actions for delict consists of a limited number of key
terms which encompass the behaviors recognized as offensive to either the
person or personality. 147

And just as with Seneca's catalogue of

examples for caedes (murder), the severity of iniuria was dependent not
only on the fact (ex facto), but the status of the person violated (ex persona),
as well as the location of the violation (ex loco). 148

In addition to

percutere(to land a blow) andplagae (blows), contumelia(insult), convicium
(public abuse), infamare (to bring into ill repute), carmen malum (malicious
song or poem), libellus famosus (defamatory pamphlet), os fractum (broken
bone), membrum ruptum (severed limb), occentare (to cast a spell),
147

Berger, 502, gives a basic list drawn from the primary sources, the
most important of which are Digest 47.10, Gaius, Inst. 3.220-25, and
Justinian, Inst. 4.4.
148

Ibid.
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theatrum (abuse at a public event), and atrox (aggravated) or atrocitas
(severity) are some of the principal terms or phrases which accompany the
occurrence of iniuria; they appear formally as such throughout, or Seneca's

exempla imply their legal applicability .149

Once Seneca demonstrates

the relationship between Roman law, delict, iniuria and ira, he can then
proceed to answer Novatus' question, "quemadmodum posset ira leniri"
(how anger may be allayed), but only in the course of providing
illustrations where instances of ira and iniuria are practically
equivalent. 150
At nearly the midpoint of the second book Seneca's interlocutor asks:
Quid ergo? Non incidunt causae quae iram
lacessant?
11.14.2
(What then? Don't cases occur which provoke anger?)

Causae (cases), were it not for Seneca's efforts to emphasize its legal
associations, would apparently possess a general meaning, such as the
149

The anecdote about Cato being struck in the public bath at 11.32 is
perhaps the model case. Seneca uses both percutere (to land a blow) and
iniuria to describe the incident, yet implies the atrocitas (severity) which
also results because of the status of the victim. The list is taken from
Berger, 502.
150

Seneca concentrates a number of such examples at 111.14-21.
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usual "causes" or "grounds." 151

Yet after a brief analogy in which

Seneca suggests that anger must be opposed as an athlete would skillfully
approach an opponent, he begins a segment which leaves no doubt that

causae signifies legal cases, and that ira and iniuria are closely
intertwined.
Saepe itaque ratio patientiam suadet, ira
vindictam, et qui primis defungi malis potuimus, in maiora devolvimur. Quosdam unius
verbi contumelia non aequo animo lata in exilium proiecit, et qui levem iniuriam silentio
ferre noluerant gravissimis malis obruti sunt,
indignatique aliquid ex plenissima libertate
deminui servile in sese adtraxerunt iugum.
(11.14.3-4)
(Often, therefore, reason counsels patience,
but anger revenge, and when we have been able
to escape our first misfortunes, we are plunged
into greater ones. Some have been cast into
exile because they could not bear calmly one
insulting word, and those who had refused to
bear in silence a slight injury have been crushed with the severest misfortunes, and, indignant
at any diminution of the fullest liberty, have
brought upon themselves the yoke of slavery.)
The passage combines five notable terms: ira (anger), vindictam (revenge),

contumelia (insult), iniuriam (injury), and indignati (affronted or
indignant).
151

Whatever the circumstances, Seneca bluntly asserts the

See OLD, entries 5, 6, and 14. A preference for the less common
meaning is a surprising feature of the standard translation and
commentaries, since the initial entry in the OLD and the most obvious
sense of the word indicates "judicial proceedings, a legal case, trial."
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potential misfortune, including exile, which may result from the
presumption of insult. But the arrangement of the terms is yet more
noteworthy; ira leads to vindictam (revenge), then contumelia, which in
turn implies iniuria and indignati (affronted). 152 Seneca has mapped a
psychological process: anger insists on revenge, having assumed a verbal
affront which is legally actionable as a consequence of the indignity. At
the same time a new term appears. Contumelia, which normally denotes
insulting language or behavior, is a species of the delict iniuria. 153 A
stronger case can now be made that Seneca's proposed use of iniuria is
unequivocally legal.
The topic of insult arises again in the De Ira several chapters later,
but this time with reference to the original query of N ovatus, which
Seneca finally undertakes to answer. As he says,
Quoniam quae de ira quaeruntur tractavimus,
accedamus ad remedia eius. Duo autem, ut
opinor, sunt: ne incidamus in iram et ne in
ira peccemus.
(11.18.1)
(Having dealt with the questions that arise
concerning anger, let us now pass to the consideration of its remedies. In my opinion,
however, there are but two rules--not to fall
152

For the significance of dignitas, see above, Chap. 1, 44-48.

153

Justinian, Inst. 4.4.
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into anger, and in anger to do no wrong.) 154
Seneca's first precept ultimately requires him to discuss in full detail the
origins of habitual anger and the role of early education in the extirpation
of ira.

He thus proceeds from the unbridled expression of anger in

children to its most likely manifestation in adult society: among the
wealthy, the nobility, and, most especially, the magistrates.
Non resistet offensis cui nihil umquam negatum est, cuius lacrimas sollicita semper
mater abstersit, cui paedagogo satisfactum
est. Non vi des ut maiorem quamquam fortunam
maior ira comitetur? In divitibus et nobilibus et magistratibus praecipue apparet, cum
quidquid leve et inane in animo erat secunda
se aura sustulit. Felicitas iracundiam nutrit,
ubi aures superbas adsentorum turba circumstetit: "Tibi enim ille respondeat? non pro
fastigio te tuo metiris; ipse te proicis .... "
(11.21.6-7)
(He will not withstand rebuffs who has never
been denied anything, whose tears have always
been wiped away by an anxious mother, who has
been allowed to have his own way with his
tutor. Do you not observe that with each advancing grade of fortune there goes the greater
tendency to anger? It is especially apparent
in the rich, in nobles, and in magistrates when
all that was light and trivial in their mind
soars aloft upon the breeze of good fortune.
Prosperity fosters wrath when the crowd of
flatterers, gathered round, whispers to the
proud ear: "What, should that man answer you
back? Your estimate of yourself does not cor154

For the legal sense of remedium, see Digest 12.6.23.1.
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respond with your importance; you demean yourself.")
Seneca here supplies as concise a formula for the care and maintenance of
an uncontrolled temper as can be found in the De Ira: indulge the child
and you must cajole the adult. Yet the deterrence of ira is implicit in the
passage as well; thwarted whims and fair criticism are the correctives for
indulgence and flattery. The passage is remarkable for other reasons also;
the nature of iniuria is implied by the "offensis" (offenses or affronts)
which neither the pampered child nor the scions of wealth and position can
tolerate, with an intimation that the latter are merely variations of the
former.1 155

The "adsentorum turba" (crowd of sycophants) simply

perpetuates the roles of permissive "mater" (mother) and "paedagogus"
(guardian); an enfant terrible is father of the man who, as noble or
magistrate, will interpret his own ira as evidence that he has actually
suffered an iniuria.
Seneca's polysyndeton--"divitibus et nobilibus et magistratibus" (the
wealthy, the nobility, and the magistrates)--aptly concludes with those for
155

0ffensum is generally synonomous with terms more commonly used
in the legal sense to denote actions which constitute iniuria. Thus, offendo
(OLD, entry ld) means "to deal (someone) a blow, strike," and is often
equivalent to percutere (Gaius, Inst. 3.220); but it also has the general
sense of giving offense (OLD, entry 7). The noun offensum (OLD, entry 4a)
signifies an "offense committed against a person, injury, wrong." Both
words occur regularly in the De Ira. See Busa and Zampolli, 916.
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whom it was crucial to distinguish actionable offenses from diffuse and
opaque expressions of personal pique.

That judicial conduct is the

centerpiece of the discussion becomes plain in the very next chapter, which
is reminiscent of the initial chapter of the De Ira. 156 Anger in the face
of iniuria has a twofold significance for judicial conduct; the Roman
magistrate must not only be able to differentiate between delict and
personal sentiment, but must also contend with a difficult separation
between his own passions at times at odds with legal precedent or
impartial judgment. 157 Seneca fully realized these potential conflicts and
in the following passages subscribes to an ideal of jurisprudence in the
fullest sense of the term.
Contra primas itaque causas pugnare debemus.
Causa autem iracundiae opinio iniuriae est,
cui non facile credendum est. Ne apertis quidem manifestisque statim accedendum; quaedam
enim falsa veri speciem ferunt.
(11.22.2)
(We ought, therefore, to take our stand at the
156

At 11.22 Seneca clearly proposesjudicial restraint and appeals to the
need for vigilance when passing judgment or exacting penalties. See
below, Chap. 3, for a detailed examination of this passage.
157

Kelly, 102-103, elaborates on what Berger, 502, lists as iniuria
iudicis, and refers to Ul pi an' s definition (Digest 4 7 .10.1.1): "iniquitas... cum
quis inique vel iniuste sententiam dixit, iniuriam ex eo dictam, quod iure
et iustitia caret." A significant portion of the De Ira is devoted to the
problem of anger as it relates to judicial conduct. See below, Chap. 3,
passim.
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start of the case. Now the judgment of injury
is a cause of anger, and to this we should not
easily give credence. We ought not agree to it
quickly even by open and evident acts; for some
things are false that have the appearance of
truth.)
Ne sint aures criminantibus faciles; hoc humanae
naturae vitium suspectum notumgue nobis sit,
quod, quae inviti audimus, libenter credimus et,
anteguam iudicemus, irascimur. Quid, quod non
criminantibus tantum, sed suspicionibus impellimur et ex vultu risuque alieno peiora interpretati innocentibus irascimur? Itaque agenda est
contra se causa absentis et in suspenso ira retinenda; potest enim poena dilata exigi, non
potest exacta revocari.
(11.22.3-4)

(Let us not give ready ear to accusers; this
weakness of human nature we ought to note and
mistrust--we are glad to believe what we unwillingly hear, and we become angry before we
pass judgment. And what is to be said when we
are compelled, not merely by charges, but by
bare suspicions, and having put the worse interpretation on another's look or smile, become
angry at innocent men? Therefore we should
plead the case of the absent person against ourselves, and anger should be held in abeyance;
for punishment postponed can still be exacted,
but once exacted it cannot be recalled.)
However much these passages hold true in general, the legal tenor
focusses their point: the recommendation of principles appropriate to a
Roman magistrate entrusted with dispensing justice.

Opinio (legal

opinion), iniuriae (injuries), manifestis (plain or clear cut), criminantibus
(those who make accusations), iudicemus (we judge), agere causam (to plead

84

a case), and poena exigi (punishment or a penalty enforced or exacted)
patently suggest a trial setting and, more precisely, the delict iniuria.
None of the above terms would have been germane to the ordinary Roman
with no occasion to evaluate the legitimacy of cases, act as judge, or
postpone a penalty; all require familiarity with the technical vocabulary
of the law .158
Nonetheless, the principal terms which signify delictal action and
the exempla which illustrate causae iniuriae continue to appear in the De
Ira; their presence passes unnoticed by commentators and their possible
importance to Seneca's design escapes detection. The legal expertise of
Novatus could easily allow Seneca to admit legal terms into his own
vocabulary, as is apparent in the following passage, a censure of anger at
the most trivial and commonplace of daily events.
Quid est enim cur tussis alicuius aut sternutamentum aut musca parum curiose fugata in
rabiem agat aut observatus canis aut clavis
neglegentis servi manibus elapsa? Feret iste
aequo animo civile convicium et ingesta in
contione curiave maledicta cuius aures tracti
subselli stridor offendit?
(11.25.3-4)

(For why is it that we are thrown into a rage
by somebody's cough or sneeze, by negligence
15

8The opening of Paul's Epistle to the Romans appears, however, to
assume a general acquaintance with law on the part of his first century
audience.
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in chasing a fly away, by a dog's hanging
around, or by the dropping of a key that has
slipped from the hands of a careless servant?
The poor wretch whose ears are hurt by the
grating of a bench dragged across the floor-will he be able to bear public insult and the
verbal abuse incurred in the assembly or in the
senate house with equanimity?
Several cardinal features of satire characterize this passage. Seneca's
mockery of impatience works largely by exaggerating the sensitivity of the
impatient man in the face of even the most minor of annoyances;
conversely, restraint is attractive by comparison, although Seneca only
suggests by implication here what he explicitly urges elsewhere--the effort
to curb ira.
While recommending legal restraint, however, Seneca also continues
to sustain the connection between ira and iniuria in the passage. The
abrupt contrast between trivialities and public insults is a curious strategy
which performs a twofold purpose. Certainly petty disturbances--dogs,
coughs, and sneezes--are no match for the real wounds inflicted publicly by
verbal or physical assault.

Seneca's apparent intent is to note this

disparity; yet convicium (public insult) and maledicta (general verbal
abuse) distantly resemble the irritants among which they are included.
Whatever the apparent differences, all the instances listed belong to the
same category: they are occasions conducive to ira. The contrast Seneca
provides serves merely to mark degrees of difference within a single
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category. But regardless of severity, Seneca advises personal restraint.
Another distinction is present in the passage, however; convicium and

maledicta observe a legal sense both overlooked and lost in translation;
and both are varieties of iniuria. The future tense of feret (endure) which
introduces the question beginning the passage suggests convicium and

maledicta can and should be endured, a position consistent with Seneca's
attitude toward other cases of the delict cited in the De Ira. 159 If only
because they contribute to the denunciation of iniuria as a legitimized
pretext for anger, each term warrants more detailed analysis.
In summarizing the circumstances which may contribute to anger,
Seneca highlights extremes; the pesky fly or fallen key are as venial as

convicium (public insult) or maledicta (insults) are serious and legally
relevant. 160

However, another contrast is plain: the latter represent

159

See especially III. 22-29, where Seneca holds up Antigonus, Philip,
and Augustus as models for emulation.
160

Seneca plainly implies that there is a difference between slaves
dropping keys and members of the assembly dropping insults. As at 11.6.4,
where Seneca comments that all delicts are not equal, the thought runs
counter to the Stoic paradox that all sins are equal. Furthermore, Seneca
seems to shun the absolutism (or reductionism) of Stoic predecessors here
in favor of the satirist Horace, whose remarks at Sermones 1.3.76-83
become all the more significant in that they refer to ira:
Denique, quatenus excidi penitus vitium irae,
cetera item nequeunt stultis haerentia, cur non
ponderibus modulisque suis ratio utitur, ac res
ut quaeque est, ita suppliciis delicta coercet?
si quis eum servum, patinam qui tollere iussus
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deliberate expressions of contempt, the former merely involuntary
occurrences or acc1"dent s. 161

Whereas contumelia denotes unspecified

insult or outrage, maledicta broadly implies all delictal violations of a
verbal nature, however severe, and is often cited in conjunction with

contumelia in the lexica. 162 The modern equivalents for various types
of maledicta such as carmen malum, infamare, or libellus famosus, would
be libel, defamation of character, or slander. 163 Yet, just as Roman law
differentiated between physical and verbal iniuriae, in the course of
development it separated private abuse from the public disgrace for which

convicium is the appropriate category within the more expansive scope of
maledicta. 164 In antiquity as in the modern world simple assault or
contumelia entailed loss of face or wounded feelings; public abuse
endangered a most esteemed possession in Roman society, one's dignitas-semesos piscis tepidumque ligurrierit ius, in
in cruce suffigat, Labeone insanior inter
sanos dicatur.
161

See 11.1 and 11.26 on the importance of intentionality and the will.
His view is consistent with Ulpian's at Digest 47.10.3. pr.-3
162

For both terms, see OLD, entry 1.

163

See Berger, 381, 606, 500, and 562.

164

Convicium as a species of iniuria seems to have been included
following the expanded authority of the praetor. See Digest 47.10.15.2-3,
8, 11-12.
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personal reputation and status.

165

In other words, the greater

consequences of convicium prompted its gravity: personal regard survived
private affront; it perished with publication of the insult.
Such exempla reveal a subtlety and sophistication of legal acumen
which could easily be taken as philosophical unless there is a recognition
of the language as that of delictal action throughout; at the same time
Seneca often presents textbook cases without labels to mark his direction,
a detail not to be overlooked, since overt mention of much legal material
would be an unnecessary encumbrance for an exchange between men of
elevated stature and conversant in Roman law. 166 The disparity between
the intentional and accidental in the previous passage is but one instance
where familiarity with technical stipulations of the law is a prerequisite
for their interpretation; only the presence of convicium (public abuse) and

maledicta (insults), the realization of their legal nuance, and analysis
based on these fortuitous connections let us appreciate Seneca's purpose.
Were it not for the frequent occurrence of iniuria in the De Ira, it would
be easy to miss the prominence given both law and satire in the work. Its
165

/nfamia is the social consequence of the loss of dignitas. See Gaius,
Inst. 3.220; for a brief survey, see Berger, 437.
166

Seneca's historical anecdotes most often double as illustrations of
iniuria, including the ordinary legal terms associated with the delict. See
especially ll.32 and III. 14-23. For additional discussion, see below, Chap.
3.
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prevalence, however, suggests its importance and forces us to reexamine
portions of the text for legal connotations hitherto disregarded.
Since criticism of ira also serves as a criticism of iniuria, Seneca
delimits occasions of delictal violation, such as conuicium (public abuse),
from instances where either no technical offense has taken place (a cough,
sneeze, or dropped key), or from occurrences where some loss has occurred
which, although conducive to ira, fails to constitute iniuria as an
actionable offense. As he remarks in a particularly notable chapter,
Irascimur aut iis a quibus ne accipere potuimus
iniuriam, aut iis a quibus accipere iniuriam
potuimus.
(11.26.1)
(Our anger is stirred either by those from whom we
could not have received any injury at all, or by
those from whom we might have received one.)
And in what amounts to a broad delineation based on this assertion,
Seneca proceeds to emphasize a series of unequivocally legal distinctions
which follow the objection of his opponent that those who have angered us
have affronted us as well. 167 This furnishes Seneca the opportunity for
a detailed response.
167

11.26-27 chiefly contain differences applicable to legal interpretation
but can also be understood as philosophical distinctions. Seneca's
conclusions parallel those in the primary legal sources. See Justinian,
Ins.t. 4.4 and Digest 47.10.3 pr.-3. The aduersarius places his assertion
within a legal context at 11.26.3, introducing the word "offendunt," whose
legal importance has been noted. See above, n. 155.
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Primum saepe antequam hoc apud nos distinguamus
irascimur. Deinde fortasse ipsi quoque artifices
excusationes iustas adferent: alius non potuit
melius facere quam fecit, nee ad tuam contumeliam
parum didicit; alius non in hoc ut te offenderet
fecit. Ad ultimum quid est dementius quam bilem
in homines collectam in res effundere? Atqui ut
his irasci dementis est quae anima carent, sic
mutis animalibus, quae nullam iniuriam nobis faci unt, quia velle non possunt; non est enim ini uria
nisi a consilio profecta. Nocere itaque nobis
possunt ut ferrum aut lapis, iniuriam quidem facere
non possunt. Atqui contemni se quidam putant, ubi
idem equi obsequentes alteri equiti, alteri contumaces sunt, tamquam indicio, non consuetudine et arte
tractandi quaedam quibusdam subiectiora sint.
(II.26.2-5)
(But, in the first place, we often get angry before
we make this distinction clear to our minds; in the
second place, perhaps also the doers themselves will
have reasonable excuses to offer: this one could not
do better [work] than he did, and it was not an insult to you that he did not sufficiently learn; another
did not aim to affront you by what he did. In the end
what can be more mindless than to accumulate spleen against
men and then vent it upon things? But as it is the
act of a madman to become angry at things without life,
it is not less mad to be angry at dumb animals, which
do us no injury because they cannot will to do so; for
there can be no injury unless it arises from design.
Therefore they can harm us just as the sword or stone
may do, but they cannot injure us. But some people
think that a man is insulted when the same horses which
are submissive to one rider are rebellious toward another,
just as if it were due to the animal's choice and not
rather to the rider's practised skill in management that
certain animals prove more tractable to certain men.)
Seneca raises a number of issues in this chapter which seem unnecessary
in a strict assessment of anger.

To begin with, a general conclusion
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emerges that whatever incites ira cannot be automatically assigned to

iniuria. This distinction is itself an indication that Seneca's continued
emphasis is a critical evaluation of the relation between the two concepts.
Not only does iniuria figure four times in the passage, but other legal

terms--contumelia (insult), contemni (to be affronted), consilium (legal
counsel or advice), and iudicium (legal judgment)--also occur. 168

And

although the special sense of contumelia has already been shown to denote
a species of iniuria, its repeated use simply emphasizes the legal
framework of the De Ira. Furthermore, closer inspection of the chapter
shows that iniuria is at the center of Seneca's attention, with ira the allpervasive psychological setting.
Seneca's initial comment originates with anger, but only as a
reference point from which to examine iniuria, the presence or absence of
which constitutes the actual problem in need of resolution. An additional
question also arises; namely, whether or not iniuria is even a possibility
in many instances. The intrusion of the modal potuimus (we could have)
extends discussion beyond the realm of fact, or, more concretely, received
injury, to the region of the possible. But Seneca presumably deems this
168

What does or doesn't constitute iniuria is the obvious theme of the
passage. Seneca's efforts to establish the legitimacy of accusations based
on contumelia or offensum underscore this, as does his endeavor to
distinguish nocere (to cause harm) from iniuriam facere (to commit iniuria).
The language is that of the delict. Cf. Justinian, Inst. 4.4.
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an essential consideration, since he must refute the idea that anger
inevitably results from iniuria, or that they are even usually coincidental.

Jniuria requires offensum, an offense or wrong, but this no more ensures
a clear-cut case of iniuria than ira does. Seneca thus corrects the assumed
affiliation of offendunt (they affront) and fecerunt (they have done it)
offered by his interlocutor; the act which produces an offensum is not
identical

with

effrontery . 169

The

adamant

reply

that

"antequam... distinguamus irascimur" (we become angry before we
distinguish) underscores a double error: the failure to differentiate acts
which produce insult from those which intend it, and a mistaken
perception that ira implies that some kind of iniuria has been
committed. 170
The misconception or inaccuracy which ultimately seems to disturb
Seneca involves the misappropriation of iniuria, despite the omnipresent
reference to ira or its cognates. The idea of potentiality or possibility
reappears in the chapter, again with iniuria as the object of possibility.
Seneca thrice employs possunt (they are able) toward a careful end: a
precise definition of iniuria as delict.

Included among the various

provocations to anger are inanimate objects (nee sentiunt or sine sensu)
1698

ee

17

n·igest 47.10.3.pr.-3.

°Ibid. Also see Nicholas, 216.
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(they do not feel or are without feeling), animals (mutis animalibus: "dumb
animals", and other people (homines); but all three categories possess
attributes which either cancel (non possunt: "they are not able") or
mitigate (non a consilio: "not from deliberation") even the possibility of
delictal violation. Seneca readily elucidates the problem, as well as the
solution, with a significant juxtaposition of terms or phrases. A sword

(ferrum) or stone (lapis) can cause harm (nocere), but cannot (non possunt)
cause injury (iniuriam facere); this alone eliminates harm-as-such as the
purposed sense of iniuria, since nocere sufficiently supplies this
meaning. 171

But iniuria as delict is also evident from Seneca's

treatment of the two remaining classes--animals and people.
In his effort to clarify the interlocutor's identification of offendunt
(they offend) and fecerunt (they have committed), Seneca suggests three

excusationes iustas (reasonable justifications) which diminish a necessary
connection between action and offense: the personal incompetence of the
agent (non potuit melius facere: "he could not have done better"), a lack of
association between incompetence and insult (nee ad tuam contumeliam

parum didicit: "he did not sufficiently learn to insult you"), and an absence
of the intention to offend (non in hoc ut te offenderet: "he did not intend to
111

Nocere (OLD, entry 1) provides the general sense of physical damage
or hurt. It has a legal sense as well (OLD, entry 2b), but this is restricted
to damage of a case or claim.
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affront you in this"). Although each extenuation is valid, the last is most
remarkable; it summarizes the argument and unequivocally asserts what
is only implied by the two previous justifications. 172

The simple

conjunction ut conveys an indispensible condition for any sound action
based on iniuria: purpose or intent. 173 Seneca likewise reinforces the
necessity of this proviso when he examines whether animals furnish
grounds for iniuria; they possess neither will nor deliberative power (velle

non possunt: they are not able to will) and are thus incapable of any
delictal violation, since iniuria does not exist (non est) unless executed by
design (a consilio). 174

Similarly, Seneca chides those who reckon

themselves outraged (contemni) by uncompliant horses, as if horses enjoyed
opportunity of choice (tamquam iudicio).

Thus, after Seneca's careful

dissection of the attendant complexities, the motif of the chapter becomes
clear: the causes of ira are many, the grounds for iniuria few.
172

Seneca continues this line of reasoning at II.27, where he discusses
the inability of the gods or natural forces to be considered technically
liable for iniuria. Under Roman law such acts were classified as vis maior
(a greater force), and Seneca's choice to include some mention of this
points even more emphatically to the legal nature of his analysis. See
Digest 44.7.1.4, and Berger, 769.
173

See above, n. 168, and Digest 47.10 3 pr.-3.

174

See Frier, 137-48, for detailed examination of liability for animals
under the Lex Aquilia. Seneca's remark is certainly in keeping with
precedent. Digest 9.1.1.3 is noteworthy: "Ait Praetor ''pauperiem fecisse."
pauperies est damnum sine iniuria facientis datum: nee enim potest animal
iniuriam fecisse, quod sensu caret. "
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Finally, Seneca ceases oblique or partial discouragement of delictal
action toward the end of the second book. Having surveyed elements of
both ira and iniuria, he can at last address the latter directly as a
manifest, yet largely unrecognized social ill.

His rejoinder to a weak

appeal by a desperate opponent whose previous arguments have miscarried
is notable.
"At enim ira habet aliquam voluptatem et dulce
est dolorem redere." Minime; non enim ut in
beneficiis honestum est merita meritis repensare, ita iniurias iniuriis. Illic vinci turpe
est, hie vincere. Inhumanum verbum est et quidem pro iusto receptum ultio [et talio]. Non multum differt nisi ordine; qui dolorem regerit
tantum excusati us peccat.
(II.32.1)
("But of course there is some pleasure in anger,"
you say, "and it is sweet to return a smart."
Not at all; for it is not honorable, as in acts
of kindness to requite benefits with benefits,
so to requite injuries with injuries. In the one
case it is shameful to be outdone, in the other
not to be outdone. "Revenge" is an inhuman word
and yet one accepted as legitimate, and "retaliation"
is not much different except in rank; the man who
returns a smart commits merely the more pardonable
sin.)
The polyptoton iniurias iniuriis (injuries for injuries) expresses more than
rhetorical polish for its own sake; two cases of the same noun represent
separate cases of the same delict.

Seneca succinctly collapses his

viewpoint on both ira and iniuria into a terse figure of speech. Although
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delictal violation generates delictal action, the latter is a variation of the
former. Seneca uses turpe (base), a word usually chosen to disparage insult
or outrage, to demean legal recourse itself, adding irony to a second
polyptoton: vinci vincere (to lose one's case rather than win). 175 The very
specific opinion Seneca has developed about iniuria renders the
epigrammatic point a point well taken, but he refuses to brake; iniuria
results in a disgraceful and successful verdict which achieves ultio
(revenge), a principle he has labored to condemn. 176 Yet ultio is pro iusto

receptum (accepted as legitimate or just), as he finally remarks in a
progression of thought which advances from elusive irony to definitive and
unmistakable denunciation. And, as if to punctuate an already emphatic
position, Seneca concludes with an archaic term from the Twelve Tables--

talio (punishment in kind)--to return his interlocutor and N ovatus to the
source of iniuria in Roman jurisprudence. 177
As occurs regularly in a satiric monologue, denunciation or censure
175

Cf. II.7.3 with regard to Seneca's choice of turpe (base or shameful)
to describe the debasement of the courts.
176

Seneca's pejorative view of revenge begins at I.1.1 and is persistent
throughout the De Ira. See Busa and Zampolli, 1386, for the frequency of
ultio and its derivative forms.
177

Warmington, 476: "Si membrum rupsit, ni cum eo pacit, talio esto."
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of iniquity or folly proceeds to an invocation of the opposite. 178 Seneca's
anecdote about Marcus Cato furnishes both a transition to the lengthy
treatment of exemplary actions and figures in the final book and a model
of wisdom and propriety with respect to iniuria.
M. Catonem ignorans in balineo quidam percussit
imprudens; quis enim illi sciens faceret iniuriam?
Postea satis facienti Cato, "Non memini" inquit
"me percussum." Melius putavit non agnoscere quam
vindicare. "Nihil" inquis "illi post tantum petulantiam mali factum est?" Immo multum boni;
coepit Catonem nosse. Magni animi est iniurias
despicere; ultionis contumeliosissimum genus est
non esse visum dignum, ex quo peteretur ultio.
Multi leves iniurias altius sibi demisere, dum
vindicant: ille magnus et nobilis qui more magnae ferae latratus minutorum canum securus exaudit.
(Il.32.2-3)
(Once when Marcus Cato was in the public bath, a
certain man, not knowing him, struck him unwittingly; for who would knowingly have done injury to
that great man? Later, when the man was making an
apology, Cato said, "I do not recall that I received a blow." It was better, he thought, to ignore the incident than to resent it. "The poor
fellow," you ask, "got no punishment for such an
act of rudeness?" No, but much good--he began to
know Cato. Only a great soul can be superior to
injury; the most humiliating kind of revenge is to
have it appear that the man was not worth taking
revenge upon. Many have taken slight injuries too
deeply to heart in the act of revenging them. He
is a great and noble man who acts as does the lordly
17

8This is a common practice for Horace. Sermones 1.1.106-07, is a plea
for moderation ("est modus in rebus") following a diatribe on avarice.
Juvenal, Saturae 10.346-66, is also typical of this pattern in satire.
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wild beast that listens unconcernedly to the baying
of tiny dogs.)
In the aftermath of a trenchant critique of iniuria in which even the
laudable "social justice" of a successful suit receives disapprobation,
Seneca contravenes with an exemplum which not only disparages iniuria
as a legally and socially proper principle and procedure, but also
effectively promotes a response to injury and insult which defies
convention. Cato retaliates neither in kind nor by law; his reaction seems
extreme and unattainable--even undesireable.

However, this locus

communis of a Stoic sapiens impervious to humiliation is in several ways
a piece de resistance which achieves more than its standard interpretation
as an ethical model: it neatly encapsulates Seneca's discussion and
finalizes his progressive condemnation of iniuria as the legal instrument
of ira in Book Two. 179
Although much of the terminology of Roman law which Seneca
inserts in his anecdote is by now familiar, the signal feature of the Cato
sketch is not.
179

Whereas prior mention of iniuria and its multiform

Cf. III.5.7-8. Sandbach, 142-43, briefly discusses Cato the Younger
as the prototype of the Stoic sapiens. Seneca refers to Cato repeatedly in
De Constantia Sapientis and, in fact, in many of his other works as well.
The Oxford Classical Dictionary, 2d ed., s. v. "Cato Uticensis, Marcus
Porcius," outlines the career and family background of Cato, both of which
would have entitled him to vindicate the assault on the grounds of atrox
iniuria.
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representations have been of the common sort, the passage in question
describes an especially grave category of the delict: atrox (aggravated)

iniuria. The physical assault (percussit) on Cato in public (balineo: the
bath) constitutes a flagrant violation of iniuria exacerbated by the location
of the attack. 180

Another element, however, compounds an already

severe offense: an act of aggression directed against the person of a Roman
magistrate. 181

Seneca plainly outlines details necessary for legal

analysis of the incident: physical assault, a public setting, and a Roman
official. The manifest occurrence of atrox iniuria (aggravated injury) would
require no special explanation for an addressee with legal expertise; nor
would Cato's reaction (or failure to react) surprise Novatus on ethical
grounds. Yet Cato's Stoic apatheia, the commonly recognized object of the
anecdote, is likewise a refusal to litigate. This is a previously unobserved
item of consequence which, when understood as a satiric insistence on
reform and a model case of iniuria, alters the sense of the account as
180

See Gaius, Inst. 3.224-225.

181

Although it can't be known for certain that Cato held a magistracy
at the time of the reported incident, the context offers two clues that this
was probably the case. First, Seneca uses illi (OLD, entry 4b: "that
famous, the well-known") to describe Cato, which could refer to his renown
at the time of the incident, his subsequent renown, or both. Second,
Seneca describes Cato's attacker as not knowing (ignorans) who Cato was
and returning to apologize, implying a subsequent recognition of the
severity of his offence.
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merely a standard example of the Stoic sapiens in control of his passions
and able to refrain from anger. 182 The application of vindicare (to exact
reparation, punish, or avenge an offense) specifies the legal position to be
inferred from Cato's restraint. 183

Moreover, the subsequent remarks

with which Seneca concludes the episode secure the legal context and
provide an opinion: iniuria is to be disdained and revenge avoided as an
even greater indignity.
If the endless adversarial exchange of iniurias for iniuriis is to

abate, ultio (revenge), the motive which ultimately justifies iniuria, must
no longer appear pro iusto receptum (accepted as legitimate). The Cato
anecdote attempts this project and marks a significant juncture in the De
Ira for several reasons. The status of the offense is the climax of Seneca's
recurrent references to iniuria and its categories. The exemplum and the
chapter which frames it supercede prior discussion of the deli ct in function,
since they provide a more complete sense of Seneca's purpose.

The

components--Roman law, satiric rebuke, and proposed reform--combine to
displace the conventional opinion that a Stoic position toward anger is the
primary intention of the De Ira. 184 Cato's refusal even to acknowledge
18

2Rist, 1-21, provides an informative discussion of Stoic apathy.

183
184

0LD, entry 5. See below, n. 317.

See above, Introduction.
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an occasion of iniuria furnishes a model for reform, but also underscores
the inadequacy of law as the social implement of moral change. That law

per se operates as a subterfuge for ira requires more explicit censure of its
role in Roman society. If iniuria poses a problem which masquerades as
a solution, the very rule of law which permits the disguise compels the
straightforward satiric recognition of a problem as a problem.

CHAPTER THREE
REFORM
With an indignation which has not gone unnoticed, Seneca depicts
the tragic personal, social, and legal consequences of ira and iniuria in the
numerous digressions which have in part contributed to the judgment that
the plan of the work is flawed. 185 Seneca's purpose is not merely critical,
however, but corrective as well, since this too is an important function of
satire. 186

At the same time, suggested remedies are necessary for

Seneca to address the problem allegedly posed by N ovatus at the
beginning of the work: the reduction of anger. 187 He approaches the task
of reform, first of all, by way of practical directives, and finally, through
presenting historical exempla as models for avoidance or emulation.
185

William S. Anderson, Essays on Roman Satire (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1982), 315-16, has pointed out a resemblance between
the indignation of Juvenal in the early satires and that of Seneca in the
De Ira. The Oxford Companion to Ancient Literature, ed. Sir Paul Harvey
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), 133, in what might be considered the
scholarly consensusofthe time, concludes a brief description of the De Ira
thus: "The plan of the work is defective."
186

Highet, 241.

187

See I.1.1. The sections where Seneca actually replies to Novatus'
question ( "quemadmodum posset ira leniri '') do not comprise the bulk of
the complete work, but appear unexpectedly and casually.
102
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In the third and final book of the De Ira, Seneca offers a remedy for
anger, having already demonstrated its undesirability, by combining both
of the approaches just mentioned. But, as before, ira serves as the useful
pretext for another digression. Ethical and psychological considerations
of anger lead him toward the topics of law, the courts, and, above all,

iniuria. The now-familiar vocabulary of delict reappears. Contumelia
(insult), iniuria (injury), lis (lawsuit), ultio (revenge), litigare (to litigate),

convicium (clamor), poena (penalty), supplicium (capital punishment),
percutere (to strike a blow), causa (legal case), all continue to appear
frequently at pivotal stages of an often irregular and unpredictable
arrangement of topics and approaches. 188

Yet despite the apparent

absence of a uniform progression, at first glance, there are still observable
patterns of which the previously cited and obvious transition from ira to

iniuria is only one; the long anticipated treatment of anger here which
returns to added refutation, derisive censure, and admonition are other
such hidden patterns. 189

Nonetheless, iniuria remains the constant

188

Seneca's prolonged description of the physical and social
manifestations of ira (1.1.3-2.3), his diatribe on the courts and the folly of
ira (II. 7-9), and his long series of anecdotes about rulers moved by ira
(111.14-21) present three cases in point. J.R.G. Wright, 39, speaks of
Seneca's compositions as "fragmenting into a myriad of separate parts,"
and credits Caligula (Suetonius Caligula 53.2) with insight for remarking
that Seneca "harenam esse sine calce."
189

See especially II.1, 3.4-5, 26-28, and 32-33.
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which recurs to provide a predictable legal format. The effort to dissuade
or discourage litigation in the final book justifies the extensive attention
which Seneca had given iniuria in book two, and the climax of book three
places the earlier diatribe on the courts in high relief. 190 Here Seneca
criticizes the fundamental infirmity of the rule of law as a moral standard
in the following impassioned sequence:
Quis est iste qui se profitetur omnibus legibus innocentem? Ut hoc ita sit, quam angusta innocentia
est ad legem bonum esse! Quanto latius officiorum
patet quam iuris regula! Quam multa pietas humanitas liberalitas iustitia fides exigunt, quae
omnia extra publicas tabulas sunt! Sed ne ad illam
quidem artissimam innocentiae formulam praestare
nos possumus: alia fecimus, alia cogitavimus, alia
optavimus, aliis favimus; in quibusdam innocentes
sumus, quia non successit. Hoc cogitantes aeguiores
simus delinguentibus, credamus obiurgantibus ....
(II.28.2-4)
(What man is there who can claim that in the eyes of
every law he is innocent? But assuming that this
may be, how crabbed is the innocence whose standard
of virtue is the law! How much more comprehensive
is the principle of duty than that of law! How many
are the demands laid upon us by the sense of duty,
humanity, generosity, justice, integrity--all of which
lie outside the statute books! But even under that
other exceedingly narrow definition of innocence we
cannot vouch for our claim. Some sins we have committed, some we have contemplated, some we have desired,
some we have encouraged; in the case of some we are
innocent only because we did not succeed. Bearing this
in mind, let us be more fair to those who commit de190

See II.6-9.
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licts, and let us trust those who censure us .... )
Earlier in the second book Seneca cleverly devaluated the apparent
merits of righteous anger by three satiric devices--hyperbole, irony, and a

reductio ad absurdum--which effectively redirect the focus of discussion
from ira to the court milieu and, at the same time, produce a diatribe on
legal corruption. 191

The passage just quoted represents a somewhat

similar digression in that the preceeding emphasis on ira (11.25)
metamorphoses into a minute analysis of conditions essential for legal
action based on iniuria (11.26-27), followed by a spirited objection to setting
up law by itself as the standard of appropriate conduct (11.28). 192 The
rhetorical question with which Seneca begins (Quis est iste qui profitetur

omnibus legibus innocentem: What man is there who can claim that in the
eyes of every law he is innocent?) functions more to introduce the
juxtaposition of moral ideals with the minimal requirements of the law
than to supply a satisfactory answer. Juris regula (the principle of law)
and publicae tabulae (the statute books) are only the most basic
requirements of moral behavior; pietas (duty), humanitas (humanity),

liberalitas (generosity), iustitia (justice), and fides (integrity) are loftier
goals. Seneca consequently pronounces his claim that ethical ideals, not
191Jbid.
192See 11.25-28.
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legal statutes, are the preferred models. As his initial question implies,
since total compliance with law is rarely attained, forbearance toward
others ought to serve as a desireable and necessary goal. The restraint for
which Seneca calls, however, demands equanimity toward the technical
illegalities implied by delinquentes (those who commit delicts) and

obiurgantes (those who censure others for their delicts). 193

Not

surprisingly, the deli ct about which Seneca expostulates for the duration
of the chapter is iniuria.
The transition from ira to iniuria reappears in the third book as
well. As in the prefatory remarks of the first book, Seneca proposes to
address the problem of ira--a promise only partially fulfilled.

The

inextricable association between the vitium (ira) and the delictum (iniuria)
continues with civilization itself as an occasion of ira.
... quibus incultus mos agrestisque vita est,
circumscriptio ignota est et fraus et quodcumque
in foro malum nascitur ....
(llI.2.1)
(...the uncivilized state of some and their rustic
mode of life keep them strangers to trickery and
deception and all the evil that the forum breeds .... )

193

Seneca uses obiurgatio (OLD, entry la: "to reprove, reprimand,
rebuke, upbraid," and entry 2a: "to chastise, punish (with blows,etc.)") as
~early synonomous with contumelia or percussus. Busa and Zampolli, 906,
hst seven occurrences of the word and its cognates in the De Ira. Cf.
1.16.2, 11.24.2, 11.28.4, 111.1.2, 111.12.6, 111.13.3, and 111.14.2.
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No gens (nation) is immune from ira for Seneca, but a peculiar opportunity
to indulge it is afforded by the forum, a precinct of Rome whose avoidance
he advises.
Forum advocationes iudicia fugere debere et
omnia quae exulcerant vitium, aeque cavere lassitudinem corporis; consumit enim quidquid in
nobis mite placidumque est et acria concitat.
(111.9.3)
(We should shun the courts, court-appearances,
and trials, and everything that aggravates our
weakness, and we should equally guard against
physical exhaustion; for this destroys whatever
gentleness and mildness we have and engenders
sharpness.) 194
The Senecan prescription for eliminating ira clearly involves the shunning
of situations likely to provoke it, most especially the courts, and, more to
the point, events or situations furnishing the grounds for iniuria. Despite
his [earlier] elaborate condemnation of both ira and iniuria throughout the
two previous books, Seneca prolongs his criticism. And where ira receives
attention,

discussion

circumstances. 195

shifts

If the

to

the

delict

and

its

attendant

forum (the courts), advocationes (court

194

Cf. 11.6-9. Seneca returns to the connection between the judicial
process and ira, a motif which is by now apparent. 111.43.5, the final
section of the De Ira, concludes this theme.
195

The transition from ira to iniuria may give the appearance of
tangentiality when in fact there is none. 11.7-9, for example, is an
unnecessary and irrelevant stretch if the legal context and satiric purpose
go unrecognized.
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appearances), and iudicia (trials) signify malefic occasions in general,
Seneca leaves no doubt as to the particulars in the chapter.
Fugere itaque debebit omnis quos irritaturos iracundiam sciet. "Qui sunt" inquis "isti?" Multi
ex variis causis idem facturi: offendet te superbus
contemptu, dicax contumelia, petulans iniuria, lividus malignitate, pugnax contentione, ventosus et
mendax vanitate; non feres a suspicioso timeri, a
pertinace vinci, a delicato fastidiri.
(111.8.3-4)
(It will, therefore, be a man's duty to avoid all

those who he knows will provoke his anger. "Just
whom do you mean?" you ask. There are many who
because of various cases will produce the same result. The proud man will offend you by his scorn,
the caustic man by an insult, the forward man by
an affront, the envious man by his malice, the contentious by his wrangling, the windy liar by his
hollowness; you will not endure to be feared by a
suspicious man, to be outdone by a stubborn one, or
to be despised by a coxcomb.)
The proud, the caustic, the petulant, the spiteful, and the combative
offer easy justification for ira, but they also initiate the circumstances
which beget grounds for litigation under Roman law. Seneca's choice of

causis, usually translated "causes," more convincingly suggests the legal
sense; judicial proceedings, the interests of one side in a dispute, legal
grounds, or a legal position are more fitting and possible renderings. 196
The series which follow pairs off personal agency--so, for example, superbus
196

See OLD, entries 1, 2, 6, and 14b respectively.
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(arrogant), dicax (sarcastic),petulans (forward), pugnax (contentious)--with
subsequent result--with contemptu (scorn), contumelia (insult), iniuria
(affront), contentione (wrangling)--in a manner which only supports the idea
that a legal sense is intended. 197 Psychological and legal processes again
coalesce in an inevitable sequence of associations; scorn implies the
effrontery which compels a dual conclusion: subjective recognition of

iniuria and the assumption of an actionable case. The sets that follow are
not legally significant to the same degree; still, timeri (to be feared), vinci
(to be defeated), and fastidiri (to be despised) are equally pejorative in a
psychological sense: they disturb the animi tranquillitas (peace of mind)
characteristic of the Stoic spiritual ideal. 198

Each of the given

consequences proceed from offendet (will offend), the principal verb from
which the juxtapositions follow grammatically in a neat balance of rhetoric
and meaning.

The particulars of iniuria emanate from the universal

principle of law under which they are subsumed: any serious species of
offense--physical (pugnax) or verbal (dicax).

The question raised by

N ovatus requires a resolution which covers all the problems of law raised
197

Seneca unmistakably lists the steps toward litigation.
The
progression is noteworthy: the attitude of scorn (contemptus: OLD, entry
1) proceeds to insult (contumelia), a violation of the delict (iniuria), and
finally, litigation (contendo: OLD, entry 8c).
19

8Rist, 1-36, discusses the Stoic ideal or "good" at considerable length.
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by deli ct, and, more exactly, iniuria. When Seneca recommends a retreat
from ira and iniuria in the passage, he is thus providing the background
for a prescription that the forum (courts), advocationes (court appearances),
and iudicia (trials) be avoided.
Although Seneca keeps up the parallel treatment of delict and vice,

iniuria and ira, at different stages of book three, aspects of his approach
vary as in the earlier books. 199 Ira nevertheless persists as a subterfuge
for his criticism of iniuria at each important phase of the discussion; less
by diatribe, a conspicuous feature of the second book, than by the open
recommendation of personal reform, a strategy he now employs with much
emphasis. 200 A prudent man, in Seneca's view of things, would do well
to endure assault and insult, or percussus and contumelia, and Seneca
employs two methods of promoting an ethic of tolerance and discretion.
Seneca's order of presentation resembles the reformative passages of
previous and subsequent satiric monologues; in particular, those of Horace
and Juvenal. 201 One approach is the direct statement and imposition of
a viewpoint which overshadows the artificial objections of an adversarius,
19

9111.10.4-11.3, for example, offer the practical suggestions which the
reader is initially led to assume will be offered. Even in these sections,
however, Seneca's emphasis is as much concerned with overlooking iniuria
as with curtailing ira.
200

Ibid.

201

See above, Chap. 1, 21-26.
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the tack Seneca takes throughout the De Ira and no less significantly in
the final book. 202 Condemnation and ridicule of specific vices yield to
admonition and advice, satiric elements also prominent in the
diatribe. 203 In book three Seneca unites these features of the diatribe
with suggestions for reform in a prolonged succession of exempla to avoid,
which constitute a second approach common to satire.
The majority of exempla consist of sordid accounts of the extreme
cruelty which results from unrestrained ira and absence of all
accountability. In each case exalted sovereigns endure a perceived affront,
insult, or indignity and react with excessive and arbitrary retribution.
The first historical figure Seneca portrays is Cambyses, who reacts to the
salutary advice of his minister, Praexaspes, with unjustified retaliation.
Cambysen regem nimis deditum vino Praexaspes
unus ex carissimis monebat ut parcius biberet,
turpem esse dicens ebrietatem in rege, quern
omnium oculi auresque sequerentur. Ad haec ille:
"Ut scias" inquit "quemadmodum numquam excidam
mihi, adprobabo iam et oculos post vinum in officio esse et man us." Bibit deinde liberalius
quam alias capacioribus scyphis et iam gravis ac
violentus obiurgatoris sui filium procedere ultra
202

Horace's Sermones offer the best parallel. R. Hirzel, Der Dialog, vol.
2 (Leipzig, 1895; repr. Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1963), 24-27, surveys
Seneca's "aehnlichkeit mit Horaz" and the Sermones as models for the
Dialogi.
203

Highet, 24-35, discusses these techniques, and Griffin, 13-16,
mentions them as prominent in the Dialogi.
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limen iubet adlevataque super caput sinistra manu
stare. Tune intendit arcum et ipsum cor adulescentis (id enim petere se dixerat) figit rescissoque pectore haerens in ipso corde spiculum ostendit
ac respiciens patrem interrogavit satisne certam
haberet manum. At ille negavit Apollinem potuisse
certius mittere. Di illum male perdant animo
magis quam condicione mancipium! Eius rei laudator
fuit cuius nimis erat spectatorem fuisse. Occasionem blanditiarum putavit pectus filii in duas partes
diductum et cor sub vulnere palpitans: controversiam illi facere de gloria debuit et revocare
iactum, ut regi liberet in ipso patre certiorem
manum ostendere. o regem cruentum! o dignum in
quern omni um suorum arcus verterentur! Cum exsecrati
fuerimus illum convivia suppliciis funeribus solventem, tamen sceleratius telum illud laudatum est
quam missum. Videbimus quomodo se pater gerere
debuerit stans super cadaver fili sui caedemque
illam, cuius et testis fuerat et causa: id de quo
nunc agitur apparet, iram supprimi posse. Non male
dixit regi, nullum emisit ne calamitosi quidem
verbum, cum aeque cor suum quam fili transfixum
videret. Potest dici merito devorasse verba; nam
si quid tamquam iratus dixisset, nihil tamquam
pater facere potuisset. Potest, inquam, videri
sapientius se in illo casu gessisse, quam cum de
potandi modo praeciperet < ei > quern satius erat vinum
quam sanguinem bibere, cuius manus poculis occupari
pax erat. Accessit itaque ad numerum eorum, qui
magnis cladibus ostenderunt, quanti constarent
regum amicis bona consilia.
(111.14.1-6)
(Since Cambyses was too much addicted to wine, Praexaspes, one of his dearest friends, urged him to
drink more sparingly, declaring that drunkenness
is disgraceful for a king, toward whom all eyes and
ears are turned. To this Cambyses replied: "To convince you that I never lose command of myself, I
shall proceed to prove to you that my eyes and my
hands perform their duty in spite of wine." There-
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upon taking larger cups he drank more recklessly
than ever, and when at length he was heavy and besotted with wine, he ordered the son of his critic
to proceed beyond the threshold and stand there with
his left hand lifted above his head. Then he drew
his bow and shot the youth through the very heart-had said that this was his target--and cutting open
the breast of the victim he showed the arrow-head
sticking in the heart itself, and then turning
toward the father he inquired whether he had a
sufficiently steady hand. But he replied that
Apollo himself could not have made a more unerring
shot. Heaven curse such a man, a bondslave in
spirit even more than in station! He praised a
deed, which it were too much even to have witnessed.
The breast of his son that had been torn asunder,
his heart quivering from its wound, he counted a
fitting pretext for flattery. He ought to have provoked a dispute with him about his boast and called
for another shot, that the king might have the
pleasure of displaying upon the person of the father
himself an even steadier hand! What a bloodthirsty
king! What a worthy mark for the bows of all his
followers! Though we may execrate him for terminating
a banquet with punishment and death, yet it was more
accursed to praise that shot than to make it. We
shall see later how the father should have borne himself as he stood over the corpse of his son, viewing
that murder of which he was both the witness and the
cause. The point now under discussion is clear,
namely, that it is possible to suppress anger. He
did not curse the king, he let slip no word even of
anguish, though he saw his own heart pierced as well
as his son's. It may be said that he was right to
choke back words; for even if he had spoken as an
angry man, he could have accomplished nothing as a
father. He may, I say, be thought to have acted
more wisely in that misfortune than he had done in
recommending moderation in drinking to a man who
would have much better drunk wine than blood, with
whom peace meant that his hands were busy with the
wine-cup. He, therefore, added one more to the
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number of those who have shown by bitter misfortune
the price a king's friends pay for giving good advice.)
Not a few details of this episode are worthy of discussion and are no
less remarkable than the tale itself.

Elements of satire and law

dramatically emerge from what would otherwise be a typical piece of
pseudo-historical melodrama. 204 In a grisly narration of king Cambyses'
demonstration of regal poise for Praexaspes, the latter exhibits a nearly
inhuman and unimaginable, yet heroic, refusal to succumb to even an
utterance of protest as involuntary witness to the callous murder of his
son.

Along with Seneca's later exempla, the passage represents a

seemingly impossible suppression of ira, as well as a tasteless and
deliberately abhorrent choice of historical incidents to recount; more
extreme, perhaps, than was necessary for a project purporting to advise
restraint on anger. 205

Having earlier shown a careful attention to

particulars and a not haphazard arrangement of legal terms and rhetorical
devices, Seneca's exemplum suggests an agenda less obvious to the legally
204

Cf. Justin, Epitome of the Philippic History of Pompeius Trogus,
American Philological Association, Classical Resource Series, trans. J. C.
Yardley, no. 3 (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1994).
205

Generally speaking, Seneca's exempla are exaggerated and not
representative of the ordinary instances of iniuria which he protests.
Seneca's hyperbole suggests the triviality or insignificance of legally
defined iniuria by contrast with the extreme circumstances he describes
in his anecdotes.
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uninformed or aesthetically repelled. The degree of barbarism Cambyses
displays is matched by Praexaspes' forbearance. Dismissal of this and
similar anecdotes as vulgar and Praexaspes' as insensible is a premature
appraisal. 206 The passage warrants a second look.
Seneca prefaces such exempla with a brief summary statement that
he will emphasize ira among supreme rulers and its restraint or
suppression among their subjects. The explicit declaration of purpose,
however, once again fails to say it all.

The story of Cambyses and

Praexaspes on first impression is loathsome; its gruesome facts disgust and
shock in a manner unbecoming his philosophic attempt to discourage the
expression of ira.

The horrific details he presents, however, are not

completely unexpected or atypical given the horrors present in Senecan
tragedy, a genre where exaggerated and pejorative portrayals of royal ira
are far from intrusive or unusual and are embellishments of the myths on
which the tragedies of Seneca are based. 207

Mention of exemplary

206

This and other exempla, "Silver Age" as they may seem in spirit and
tone, merely retell in sequence tales told at intervals in the narrative of
Herodotus. The Cambyses anecdote, for example, is taken from book three
of the Histories, and the Harpagus incident which follows at Ill.15
originally appears in book one of the Histories, as noted by Justus Li psi us
apud Joh. Fred. Gronovius, L. Annaei Senecae: Opera Quae Exstant
(Amsterdam: Daniel Elsevir, 1672), 116-119.
207

D. and E. Henry, The Mask of Power: Seneca's Tragedies and
Imperial Rome (Warminster, Wilshire and Chicago: Aris and Phillip Ltd.
and Bolchazi-Carducci, 1985), 56-74, and 157-176, provide a worthwhile
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figures--Antigonus, Philip, and Augustus--would seem to suffice for
Seneca's originally stated goal of dispelling ira, but he nonetheless
furnishes two sets of exempla for contrast and comparison. An imbalance
clearly exists, however, and instances of behavior to be avoided far
outweigh those meant for imitation. 208

Censure of angry rulers

predominates in the succession of tales, whereas approval of peaceful
sovereigns receives less attention; but a quasi-quantitative evaluation of
these passages misses the mark.
The outrageous and cruel conduct of Cambyses, Harpagus, Dari us,
and others form a curious counterpoint to the equanimity of an Antigonus
or Augustus.

At the same time a second set of oppositions is most

apparent; rulers of either gentle or harsh persuasion are set up in contrast
with candid underlings whose candid truth-telling is a constant throughout
the anecdotes. Unspeakable acts and unfathomable reactions eclipse ira
by the sheer cumulative effect of the horrors catalogued.

The

discouragement of vice sinks into a role subordinate to the shock inspired
by the events--an effect atypical of the philosophical dialogue but
recent study of this theme in the tragedies.
20

8The examples of unrestrained anger extend from III.14-21; 111.22-24,
a more limited selection, offer models of self-control. The imbalance itself
suggests the disproportion in actual occurrence.
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commonplace in satire. 209 Where one citation of princely atrocity would
fulfill a remedial purpose, a succession of grotesque portrayals accumulate
to offer an interminable hyperbole from which each anecdote itself
contains a pair of exaggerated examples of tyranny and submission. This
strategy of presenting odious behavior followed by models for emulation
forms a pattern recognizable in some of the most memorable satires of
Juvenal and Horace. 210 Both ample use of hyperbole and an inclusion
of antithetical models indicate Seneca's satiric intent and his
accompanying insistence on reform.
In the same vein, if exaggeration effectively overshadows any
dispassionate analysis of ira in Seneca's exempla, doubt is cast on the
actual role of ira in the narratives. Upon closer analysis iniuria once
again looms as an object of concern beneath Seneca's lurid depiction of
anger.

Cambyses plainly over-reacts to the frank suggestion of

Praexaspes, whose response to the king's verdict is equally drastic. Yet
this mutual extravagance easily obscures the issues at hand. Praexaspes'
assessment of Cambyses' intemperance as "turpem" (base) is construed as
209
210

See above, Chap. 1, passim.

Horace Sermones I.3.38-56 offers models for minimizing the flaws of
others after presenting examples of faultfinding. At I.1.117-119, Horace
extols the satisfied dinner guest in contrast to the list of malcontents
mentioned at I.3-14.
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contumelious affront; all the more so for its public utterance at a banquet,
a condition which would classify Praexaspes' offense as convicium under
211
Roman 1aw.

Indeed, the foreign setting and time frame of this

traditional account would hardly have obscured a decidedly Roman
interpretation for N ovatus or other Romans familiar with the law of
delict. 212 In addition, a Roman appreciation of the tale as a legal case
could only construe Cambyses' cruel retaliation as his willful and
capricious misinterpretation of bona consilia (good advice) as being atrox

iniuria or maiestas (treason). The king infers an offense (ex facto) in public
(ex loco) against his person (ex persona) by someone of lesser status. 213
Other aspects of the incident are also noteworthy, however. Seneca's
addressee, whose judicial expertise is well documented, could hardly have
disregarded the obvious trial format of the exemplum, nor could he have
passed over certain idiosyncratic features of the judicial process recounted.
211

See Gaius, Inst. 3.220 and Digest 47.10.15.4. A Roman of Seneca's
time no doubt would have also understood the offense as maiestas
(treason). See below, n. 214.
212

Seneca explicitly inserts the legal terms obiurgator (detractor),
mancipium (slave), and supplicium (execution) into the Herodotean tale.
213

W.W. Buckland, A Textbook of Roman Law: From Augustus to
Justinian, 3d ed., rev. Peter Stein (London: Cambridge University Press,
1963), 592, discusses these particulars, as does Berger, 502. Digest
47.10.7.8. cites the authority ofLabeo for determining the conditions which
constitute atrox iniuria. This would predate Seneca and place recognition
of aggravated iniuria early in the classical period of Roman law.
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The highlights of the story are, in fact, less germane to ira than to
procedural anomalies readily obvious to a Roman legal expert. Cambyses
assumes the roles of adversarius (plaintiff), advocatus (attorney), iudex
(judge), and carnifex (executioner), an exceptional circumstance in itself
which departs from common practice. 214 In addition to there being no
effort at establishing intent, as well as neither anyone to plead
Praexaspes' case nor any petition in his own behalf, Cambyses metes out
214

Fritz Schulz, Classical Roman Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951),
13-27, discusses common judicial procedure and the roles of the
participants; in the same work, 593-600, Schulz examines the actio
iniuriarum and refers to a monetary fine as the customary penalty. The
anecdote points to something more, however, than atrox iniuria. Both
Crook, 252-53, and A. H. M. Jones, The Criminal Courts of the Roman
Republic and Principate (Totown, New Jersey: Rowan and Littlefield,
1972), 106-107, refer to the disturbing development cited by Tacitus
(Annals I, 72) whereby forms of iniuria (particularly defamation) began to
be considered within the scope of the criminal law of treason, or maiestas,
during the reign of Augustus, and whereby criticism of the emperor or
those associated with him counted as such. The Cambyses tale provided
an historic--and barbaric--parallel for the increasingly common
correspondence between maiestas and iniuria during the principates of
later emperors. Wolfgang Kunkel, An Introduction to Roman Legal and
Constitutional History, trans. J.M. Kelly (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966),
63, n.1, mentions the ever farther-reaching application of maiestas in the
course of the first century of the Empire. This change marks a departure
from the happy separation of iniuria from maiestas implied by the sermo
between the jurist Trebatius and Horace at Sermones 11.1.79-86. Finally,
at Apocolocyntosis 10, Seneca charges Claudius with the same brutal
caprice for which he had earlier found Cambyses responsible: Die mihi,
dive Claudi, quare quemquam ex his, quos quasque occidisti, antequam de
causa cognosceres, antequam audires, damnasti. His comments are as
critical of maiestas and the circumvention of normal due process as of atrox
iniuria.
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a supplicium (execution) of the most dire sort where poena would suffice
as a penalty commensurate with what Cambyses has assumed are the
facts. 215 Finally, and perhaps the most egregious feature of the story
other than the novel and utterly brutal character of Cambyses' retribution,
remains what a Roman would term a crimen in the case of anyone but a
tyrant. 216 Heinous as it is that Cambyses retaliates against Praexaspes'
son, someone innocent of the effrontery which he presumes and at which
he has taken offense, he commits murder as well: on all counts a
capr1c10us exercise of political authority, but foremost for Seneca's
215Jbid.
216

Crimen (OLD, entry 4: "A misdeed, crime") is technically an
antonym of delictum according to Berger, 418, and the two terms generally
serve to distinguish public from private wrongs. The same author
maintains that in "postclassical language the two terms are used
interchangeably since public prosecution absorbed the wrongdoings
previously classified as delicta." The De Ira, it should be noted, was
written still somewhat early in the classical period, when the distinction
between crimen and delictum held true. For present purposes, murder in
retaliation for iniuria would itself have been a crimen. The rules change
dramatically, however, if the victim of an insult is the emperor. At this
point, iniuria becomes the crimen maiestatis (treason), and a public rather
than a private wrong. The Twelve Tables permitted retribution in kind
(talio) for iniuria which involved harm to the body of another, but only
monetary penalties for harm to reputation. Cf. Warmington, 474-79.
Seneca finds talio reprehensible at 11.32.1. See Digest 48.8 on the Lex
Cornelia de Sicariis et Veneficiis for the relevant background on Roman
legal considerations of murder.
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purposes, an abuse of judicial authority. 217
A short summary and appraisal of Seneca's exemplum and its
relative significance is in order. Although Seneca pledges to list exempla
which illustrate ira and its suppression among rulers and subjects
respectively, in effect he is providing much else besides. 218

Legal

nuances and satiric devices are most noticeable, considerably surpassing

ira as the immediate object of interest. 219 The very term ira is in fact
understated as a description of Cambyses' cold-blooded tour de force; a
demonstration of skill so perverse that disgust and revulsion are the
primary effects of its report. The exaggerated quality of the incident
Seneca has chosen thus becomes a defining element. The account contains
a legal in addition to an ethical purview. Several outstanding details of
the ancient legend possess an altered importance for the imperial reader
conversant with Roman legal tradition. The conceivable interpretation of
Praexaspes' bona consilia (good advice) as contumelious and suggestive of
both convicium (clamor) and atrox iniuria (aggravated iniuria), the judicial
217

The exempla not only provide cases where anger is expressed or
controlled, they also demonstrate how personal and official judgment
effectively coincide in the person of a ruler. Private ira thus assumes a
much larger significance. Cf. I.16.5-7 and II.29.3-4.
218

See the brief preface to the anecdotes at III.13.7.

219

The insertion of a short narrative into a diatribe or monologue
occurs, for example, in Horace, Sermones II.6.77-117.
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layout of the tale, and procedural abnormalities implied by Cambyses'
actions are all elements peculiar to a Roman exegesis of the story, but
irrelevant to its initial Greek audience. 220 Despite minimal use of legal
diction, that the anecdote was set as an example of delictum and crimen
could hardly have eluded a trained legal perspective such as that of
Novatus.
Similar effects permeate the remainder of Seneca's exempla. The
tales of Harpagus' banquet (III.15.1), Darius and the sons of Oeobazus
(111.16.3), Xerxes and the son of Pythius (III.16.4), Alexander and Clitus
(III.17.1),

Alexander

and Lysimachus (III.17.1),

Lysimachus and

Telesphorus (III.17 .2-3), represent Greek and barbarian types, whereas the
stories of Marius and Sulla (III.18.1) and Gaius Caesar's nobles, Betilienus
Bassus and Sextus Papinius (III.18.3), provide Roman counterparts. 221
Acts or statements perceived as examples of iniuria, judicial caprice, and
220

Schulz, Classical Roman Law, 598, offers a noteworthy commentary:
"The law of iniuria is genuinely Roman law. The whole development-primitive rules of the Twelve Tables, praetorian reform, liberal
interpretation of the Edict by the lawyers--is typically Roman. The rules
of the Edict show the true Roman feeling for decency, privacy, and good
repute and are closely connected with Roman customs and manners.
Greek influence, which has been alleged by some, is neither proven nor
probable." Given Seneca's era, maiestas (treason) would have been
immediately recognizable in the stories.
221

Joh. Frid. Gronovius, L. Annaei Senecae: Opera Quae Exstant, vol.
1 (Amsterdam: Daniel Elsevir, 1672), 118-125, cites the sources from which
Seneca draws.
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unjustified executions abound in a manner peculiar to a legally informed
Roman audience.

In a real sense, lex (law) or ius (statute) can be

considered as wholly Roman as satura (which is "tota nostra''), an irony
which imbues the De Ira and shapes its appeal to both legal and satiric
sensibilities. 222

Seneca's illustrations, reminiscent of passages from

Lucilius and Horace, censure, denounce, exaggerate, and even disgust. 223
The exempla themselves, however, aside from the prose framework
demanded by the work, emphasize a feature less prevalent or necessary to
Lucilius or Horace, who lived in times more congenial to libertas as a
comprehensive and vital political reality: Seneca's exempla from the past
are distant enough to be safe models for criticism. 224 Since elements of
222

To Quintilian's Roman claim for the origin of satire (Instiutio
Oratoria, X.1.93) must be added a Roman claim for the development of the
science of law. Marrou, 289, puts it thus: "The one really great feature of
Latin education was in fact the opportunity it provided of a legal
career.Jaw was the great creation achieved by the genius of Rome ... "
223

In this, at least, Lucilius is the more appropriate model, if only
because he seeks to shock. Cf. XVII. 567-73, XXIX. 885, or XXIX. 907.
Horace's denunciations are less mordant, and images which might revolt
his audience are absent.
224

M. L. Clarke, The Roman Mind (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1956), 103-105, offers a brief discussion of the loss of libertas during
the early empire, or "the funeral of the Free State" as Ronald Syme, The
Roman Revolution (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1939), 1, phrases it. Coffey,
136-37, mentions the dangers of attacks on contemporaries in Juvenal's
time, and Gilbert Highet, Juvenal The Satirist (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1954), 9, notes that exempla from the distant past are a characteristic of
Juvenal's work. Although Seneca chose figures from the past for
consideration, his denunciation of past procedures which resembled
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his satiric diatribe refer to a generic present in the De Ira, Seneca names
no names; perhaps a telling indication of the extent of iniuria in practice
no less than the need to devalue it.
These trends persist as well in the exempla Seneca provides for
emulation, of which the anecdotes about Antigonus have the same point
as the subsequent anecdotes about Philip and Augustus.
Quid enim facilius fuit Antigono quam duos
manipulares duci iubere, qui incumbentes regis
tabernaculo faciebant quod homines et periculosissime et libentissime faci unt, de rege
suo male existimabant? Audierat omnia Antigonus,
utpote cum inter dicentes et audientem palla
interesset; quam ille leviter commovit et:
"Longius" inquit "discedite, ne vos rex
audiat." Idem quadam nocte, cum quosdam ex
militibus suis exaudisset omnia mala imprecantis regi, qui ipsos in illud iter et inextricabile l utum deduxisset, accessit ad eos qui
maxime laborabant et cum ignorantis a quo adi uvarentur explicuisset, "nunc" inquit "male
dicite Antigono, cuius vitio in has miseras
incidistis; ei autem bene optate qui vos ex
hac voragine eduxit." Idem tam miti animo
hostium suorum male dicta quam civium tulit.
ltaque cum in parvulo quodam castello Graeci
obsiderentur et fiducia loci contemnentes hostem multa in deformitatem Antigoni iocarentur
et nunc staturam humilem, nunc conlisum nasum
deriderent, "gaudeo" inquit "et aliquid boni
spero, si in castris meis Sil enum habeo." Cum
hos dicaces fame domuisset, captis sic usus est
ut eos qui militiae utiles erant in cohortes
discriberet, ceteros praeconi subiceret, idque

maiestas must have involved some risk.
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se negavit facturum fuisse, nisi expediret iis
dominum habere qui tam malam haberent linguam.
(llI.22.1-5)
(What indeed would have been easier than for
Antigonus to order the execution of the two
common soldiers, who, while they leaned against
the royal tent, expressed--as men will do with
equally great danger and delight--their ill
opinion of their king? Antigonus heard everything, only a canvas intervening between the
speakers and the listener; this he gently shook
and said, "Move a little further off, for the
king might hear you." Again, one night, when
he overheard some of his soldiers invoking all
kinds of curses upon the king for having led
them into such a road and inextricable mud, he
went up to those who were struggling most, and
when he had got them out, without revealing who
their helper was, he said, "Now curse Antigonus,
by whose fault you have fallen upon this mishap,
but bless him who has led you out of this swamp."
He also bore the abuse of his enemies as calmly
as that of his countrymen. And so, when he was
besieging some Greeks in a small fort, and they,
confident in their position, showed open contempt
for the enemy, and cracking many jokes upon the
ugliness of Antigonus scoffed now at his diminutive stature, now at his flattened nose, he merely
said, "If I have a Silenus in my camp, I am fortunate and hope for good 1uck." When he had subdued
these wags by hunger, he disposed of his captives
as follows: those who were fit for military service
he assigned to regiments; the rest he put up at
auction, saying that he would not have done so had
it not seemed good for men who had such an evil
tongue to find a master.)
Although far less expansive than his collection of tales which recall
tyrannical caprice and cruelty, the anecdotes chosen for their value as
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models for imitation required less embellishment, if only because the two
sets of stories serve markedly different functions. In proportion to the
entire length of book three, both groups of exempla taken together seem
unwieldy or unnecessary, and a refutation based on Stoic moral principles
does not require the obvious exaggeration of incidents and revolting
conduct reported on the one hand, or the promotion of ideals and virtuous
responses suggested on the other. 225

Yet hyperbole is justified by a

satiric end, as is the exhortation to reform implied by exempla depicting
moral exemplars of which Antigonus is the earliest, although not perhaps
the most eminent. Philip and Augustus are no less admirable, but the
account of Antigonus and his restrained attitude toward the common
soldier contain features common to the other narratives as well. As a
group they combine elements which curiously link them to the preceeding

exempla that had illustrated the connection between ira and iniuria.
Subsequent to the earlier exempla and immediately prior to those
225

This is perhaps what Justus Lipsius, as cited by J. R. G. Wright, 39,
meant by his comment about the De Ira: "in toto parum distincti, &
repetitionibus aut digestione confusi." It would seem that one example to
be avoided and one to be copied would have been sufficient for Seneca to
make his point. Fritz Schulz, History of Roman Legal Science (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1946), 226, mentions the post-classical abridgement of the
judicial literature of the age and the pruning of statements of the facts of
cases. In addition to satiric exaggeration, the number of anecdotes would
not seem unusual in a parody of legal writing which would contain several
cases to illustrate a legal point. See below, Chap. 4.
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whose first figure is Antigonus, Seneca adds a legal consideration to his
prefatory commonplace on models for avoidance and emulation. 226
Et haec cogitanda sunt exempla quae vites,
et illa ex contrario quae sequaris, moderata, lenia, quibus nee ad irascendum causa
defuit nee ad ulciscendum potestas.
(lll.22.1)
(These should be regarded as examples to be
avoided; the following, on the other hand,
are to be imitated, being instances of restrained and gentle men, who lacked neither
a case conducive to anger nor the power of
requital.)
In addition to the clear division of exempla, however, Seneca's choice of
terms continues the legal emphasis and sustains continuity with previous
definitions of crucial terms. 227

The legal significance of both causa

("case," and the reason or cause for bringing one) and potestas (complete
or full citizen rights) could hardly elude the notice of the educated Roman,
226

Cf. Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, praefatio 10: "Hoc illud est praecipue in
cognitione rerum salubre ac frugiferum, omnis te exempli documenta in
inlustri posita monumento intueri; inde tibi tuaeque rei publicae quod
imitere capias, inde foedum inceptu, foedum exitu, quod vites."
227

For causa, see OLD, entry 1: "judicial proceedings, a legal case,
trial." Potestas (OLD, entries la and c) meant power in a "legal or quasilegal context." Cf. Gaius, Inst. I.48-49: "nam quaedam personae sui iuris

sunt, quaedam alieno iuri sunt subiectae. Sed rursus earum personarum,
quae alieno iuri subiectae sunt, aliae in potestate, aliae in manu, aliae in
mancipio." Seneca refers to Praexaspes as mancipium (slave) at III.14.3.
It is noteworthy that both causa and potestas are Seneca's terms of choice
in the short preface to exempla for emulation.
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much less Novatus, especially given the substance of the exempla which
follow. Both words nevertheless suggest a legal sense by the accounts
which they preface, all of which entail varieties or degrees of iniuria upon
which the personalities in the anecdotes declined to pursue--a circumstance
germane to Seneca's objective: the deterrence and refusal of legal action
based on the delict.
Seneca cites three separate occasions on which Antigonus, according
to the story, endures contumelious disregard by his own soldiers or by his
enemies; indignities to which he reacts with an ingenuity and
magnanimity Seneca praises. The incidents stand in stark opposition to
the foregoing exempla. The cruel and ingenious supplicia (punishments)
inflicted by sovereigns on their subjects in the earlier accounts often
accompany only the slightest pretext or justification. 228

Whereas

Praexaspes' advisory comments are accounted effrontery by an intimate
Cambyses, the subordinates of Antigonus lack any such ties with their
leader and his enemies are ipso facto inimical; their derision is hardly
unexpected or surprising.
22

In sum, Seneca's examples exhaust the

8The story of Cambyses and Praexaspes, for example, hinges on a
remark intended as beneficial and in the best interests of Cambyses.
Seneca uses bona consilia (good advice) to describe the comments of
Praexaspes (111.14.6) and refers to his relationship with Cambyses as
carissimus at the start of the tale (111.14.1) and amicus at the conclusion
(111.14.6).
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possibilities, and he establishes far more than the straightforward
presentation of sets of anecdotes whose design is a simple opposition
between indulgence in ira and Stoic discipline. The contrasts extend much
further, and reveal considerable legal detail. Seneca's villains dispense an
inclement judgment on the most tenuous grounds; his ideal rulers overlook
genuine causes for grievance.
The recognizable categories of iniuria pervade the Antigonus

exemplum and its companion pieces, the narrative passages extolling
Philip and Augustus (111.23). The offensive speech in public against the
highest of officials is flagrant in each case, and in every instance the
affront to dignitas differs radically from the ostensibly objectionable
conduct of the various underlings in the first set of exempla. Technical
violations of iniuria in the second series of tales are patent and cannot be
compared to the actions of a Praexaspes, for example, whose advisory
intent requires distortion to be understood as abusive or outrageous. As
a consequence, the sets of exempla disclose undercurrents in addition to
the manifest opposition between hyperbole and shock at one extreme, and
reformative models at the other. Seneca's tyrants (be they barbarian,
Greek, or Roman) represent an extreme in almost every detail from offense
to judgment and execution, whereas his enlightened rulers express an
exceptional restraint and curbing of autocratic imperium (authority) or
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potestas (power) in the face of open variations of iniuria. This is clear both
in the selection of legal vocabulary and a survey of the facts included in
the cases Seneca presents. 229

He describes Philip as possessing

"contumeliarum patientia" (an endurance for insults) and Augustus as
content "a conviciatore suo secedere" (to withdraw from his maligner),
phrases which plainly indicate that retaliation would have been the
expected response: in other words, Seneca is explicit about the legally
actionable nature of the offenses outlined. 230
If the earlier exempla contain illustrations of speech injurious to

dignitas on dubious grounds at best, the contumely vented on Antigonus,
Philip, and Augustus is unquestionable, and renders Seneca's introductory

"nec... causa defuit" (nor was a case lacking) accurate.

Just as exact,

however, is the phrase "nee ad ulciscendum potestas" (nor the ability to
avenge) as an additional condition to be observed in the following
narratives. Dissimilarities in the use of potestas (authority/power) form
22

9From Seneca's account--a true one at least in terms of its fidelity to
the spirit of the Herodotean original--the grounds for iniuria or maiestas
are ambiguous in the case of Praexaspes' remarks. Digest 47.10.3.1-2
emphasizes intent as a necessary criterion, one which Seneca suggests was
absent by describing Praexaspes' objections as bona consilia (llI.14.6).
23

°R.emarkably, Seneca does not refrain from using legal language that
denotes iniuria when describing the conduct which goes unavenged or
unpunished. The specific vocabulary used to designate legal offenses is
present in the exempla showcasing restrained rulers. The contrast
between clear-cut and doubtful cases of iniuria is marked.
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perhaps the most striking feature differentiating the two sets of exempla.
For satiric as well as legal purposes, the reactions of Seneca's prototypes
of cruelty or clemency furnish abundant material for comparison. 231 As
previously noted at length, the legally distinctive element characterizing
the responses of Cambyses, Alexander, Gaius Caesar and others concerns
the gross debasement of ordinary judicial procedure: the abandonment of
an expected series of phases and a normal separation of roles. 232
Antigonus, Philip, and Augustus are equally autocratic, despite the more
apparent violations of iniuria recounted. The absence of an appropriate
trial is a central fact which characterizes all the exempla, but an important
difference is conspicuous: Seneca's tyrants display an abjuratory rejection
of legal recourse despite clear entitlement to such recourse. 233 Seneca's
models of restraint refrain from ira, but from iniuria as well, dispensing
neither poena (punishment or monetary penalty) nor supplicium (more
extreme punishment; torture or execution); his villains on the other hand
231

The stark opposition between vice and virtue, or folly and wisdom,
is one of the hallmarks of satiric technique. Horace Sermones I.1 offers a
ready model. Avarice and miserliness are offset by the ideal of
contentment with what is at hand. Highet, Anatomy of Satire, passim,
discusses this characteristic of satire at considerable length.
232
233

See above, 129-130.

Jones, 90-95, and Crook, 250-55, lay out the details of due process in
cases of maiestas or iniuria. The praetor normally presided over cases of
iniuria, and the senate tried cases of maiestas.
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exact a supplicium subsequent to a travesty of the legal process which
effectively overwhelms and is a distraction from the expressed theme-•

ira.

234

Seneca's point in juxtaposing these exempla becomes increasingly
evident and merits a brief summary.

Although on the face of it an

endeavor to differentiate approaches to ira and promote the Stoic ideal, the
narratives themselves include much else that distracts from these ends.
Furthermore, the appropriateness of the anecdotes to a strict philosophical
discussion is itself questionable, not to mention the disproportionate scope
Seneca assigns them. 235 Yet the exempla readily offer the clues needed
to resolve these issues, if one is prepared to accept a satiric purpose and
forego

the

tempting

conclusion that they

represent

one

more

demonstration that the De Ira is only a disorganized mass of arguments,
colorful digressions, and anecdotes. 236 The incorporation of contrasting

exempla as models for avoidance or emulation is a familiar technique in
234

For Seneca's addressee and for a Roman audience in general, the
legal nuances present in the anecdotes and the number of anecdotes--far
from being a distraction--wouldmost likely have been an expected addition
to his criticism of anger; especially so, considering the form he seems to
have been parodying. See below, Chaps. 4 and 5, for parallels between the
De Ira and the judicial responsum.
235
2

Ibid.

~he latter view--or variations of it--has been a common one among

scholars. See Wright, 39, and 65 n.7.
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Roman satire, and an effort to discourage vice and advance virtue requires
the least flattering portrayal of the former accompanied by the most
plausible presentation of the latter. 237

Seneca certainly accomplishes

these ends in the ten chapters that he devotes this project. Ira, however,
is less the focus of the narratives than iniuria, whether alleged or
established by the facts as given. As a consequence, the exempla are not
simply a survey of provocations and responses to ira, but a display of types
of actual or assumed iniuria and remedies for it. The narratives thus
become concrete causae (cases), traced from the initial offenses (delicta) to
eventual penalties (poenae/supplicia) or grants of clemency (clementia), and
Seneca concludes the exempla with a plea for legal restraint which
altogether omits ira.
... pro quocumque illud nobis respondeamus, sapientissimos quoque viros multa delinguere, neminem esse
tam circumspectum cuius non diligentia aliquando
sibi ipsa excidat, neminem tam maturum cuius non
gravitatem in aliquod fervidius factum casus impingat,
neminem tam timidum offensarum qui non in illas dum
vitat incidat.
(111.24.4)
(. .. whoever it may be, let us say this to ourselves in
237

The satires of Horace offer numerous examples; in particular, the
diatribes of Book 1(1.1,1.2, 1.3) and Book 2 (2.2, 2.3, and 2.7). Rudd, 1-35,
and 160-201, carefully examines Horace's treatment of virtue and vice in
these satires. Horace even personalizes his examples, and recalls his own
father using this very method of presenting models for avoidance and
emulation (Cf. Sermones 1.4).
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his behalf that even the wisest men have committed
many delicts, that no man is so guarded that he does
not sometimes let his diligence lapse, none so seasoned that accident does not drive his composure into
some hot-headed action, none so fearful of giving offence that he does not stumble into it while seeking
to avoid it.)
Having given adequate illustration to iniuria, and to quite opposite
methods of redress, Seneca resumes his previous course for the remainder
of the De Ira, giving cursory attention to the mitigation of anger so as to
satisfy his initial pretext for the work. No sooner does he begin to discuss

ira, however, than his theme once again reverts to iniuria, the courts, and
an admonitory recommendation to abstain from litigation. Most of the
legal vocabulary associated with the delict reappears as Seneca moves
toward a finale much resembling the close of a satiric monologue. 238 The

adversarius implicit in the ubiquitous "inquis," has admirably and in
timely fashion afforded him the justification for a diatribe on the courts
and iniuria, for numerous exempla which contrast alternative reactions to

iniuria, and for a sustained advocacy of reform. This last characteristic,
a chief aim of satire and a hallmark of the spirit of satire, clearly takes
the form of a plea for legal restraint in the concluding chapters of the final
238

Cf. Horace Sermones 1.1.108-119, where the satirist returns to his
central complaint and suggests a more appropriate attitude. Seneca's
hortatory illud nobis respondeamus (let us say this to ourselves) begins a
similar advisory statement to conclude the preceding exempla.
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book of the De Ira. 239 It now becomes plain that iniuria, the delict about
which Seneca has complained and offered anecdotal evidence, is the
disease for which ira (the apparent cause) is, in fact, only a symptom. And
in keeping with the medical metaphor he freely employs throughout,
Seneca carefully begins a chapter with this telling comment:
Quanto satius est sanare iniuriam quam ulcisci!
Multum temporis ultio absumit, multis se iniuriis
obicit dum una dolet.
(111.27.1)
(How much better it is to heal than to avenge an
injury! Vengeance consumes much time, and it exposes the doer to many injuries while he smarts
from one.)
The object of "sanare," so accurately indicative of Seneca's effort as well,
is not iram here, but iniuriam.
Despite recurrent mention of ira for the balance of the work, equal
if not greater attention is paid to iniuria and its judicial consequences. As
in earlier sections of the De Ira, the two notions appear in tandem, and it
will be worthwhile to give a brief selection of citations where they either
coincide or a connection is implied.
I.

23

... sic animo aequiore fert ab aliquo laedi, ab
aliquo contemni, cuicumque venit in mentem nullam

9Reform has long been considered one of the motives of the satirist.
Highet, 241, notes the observation of Dryden that the "true end of satire
is the amendment of vices by correction," a view in keeping with
Diomedes' definition. See above, Introduction, 2.
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esse tantam potentiam in quam non occurat ini uria.
(IIl.25.1)
(... so a man is more content to be injured by one,
to be scorned by another, if he takes thought that
no power is so great as to be beyond the reach of
injury.)
II. ... propri um est magnitudinis verae non sentire percuss um .... Qui non irascitur, inconcussus iniuria perstitit, qui irascitur, motus est.
(III.25.3)
(The mark of true greatness is not to notice that
you have received a blow... The man who does not
get angry stands firm, unshaken by iniuria; he who
gets angry is overthrown.)
III. "Plus mihi nocitura est ira quam iniuria. Quidni
pl us? illi us modus cert us est, ista quo usque me
latura sit dubium est."
"Non possum" inquis "pati; grave est iniuriam sustinere." Mentiris; quis enim iniuriam non
potest ferre qui potest iram?
(III.25.4-26.1)
("My anger is likely to do me more harm than iniuria.
And why not more? The limit of the injury is fixed,
but how far the anger will sweep me no man knows."
"I cannot," you say, "be forbearing; it is difficult to submit to iniuria." That is not true; for
who that can tolerate anger will yet be unable to
tolerate iniuria?)
IV.

... maxima est enim factae iniuriae poena fecisse,
nee quisquam gravius adficitur quam qui ad supplicium paenitentiae traditur.
(III.26.2)

(...for the greatest punishment for iniuria is having
done it, and no man is more heavily punished tha
he who is consigned to the torture of remorse.)
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In a short span following his exempla, Seneca refers repeatedly to

iniuria, and his deliberate mention of "laedi" (to be injured), "contemni"
(to be scorned), and "percussum" (blow) leaves no doubt that his intended
request for forbearance pertains to actionable offenses covered by the
deli ct. 240

At the same time a return to persuasion or reasonable

argument, so often interrupted by literary figures and conventions, once
again becomes the chief means of appeal. 241 Yet this too, although the
mainstay of a philosophical endeavor, is a necessary but not exclusive
ingredient of the satiric design to reproach vice and encourage its
elimination. 242

Seneca now builds layer upon layer of argument, but

240

See above, Chap. 2, 68, n. 133, on the association between percussus
and iniuria. Laedo (OLD, entries 1-4) and contemno (OLD, entry 1) both
signify contumelious words or actions.
241

Seneca's physiological description of the angry man and wild beasts
(1.1.3-7), his diatribe on the courts (II. 7-9), and the anecdotes (111.14-23) are
just a few of the many examples of Seneca's departure from strict
argument.
242

Griffin, 13-20, explores the possible traditions on which Seneca might
have relied in writing the dialogi. The problem itself arises, in fact, from
the expectation that Seneca present a lucid and straightforward argument
against anger which progresses without digression. That Seneca does not
fulfill this expectation represents a failure in technique only in that the
De Ira fails to satisfy a preference for such a format. In this sense, the
work is undoubtedly flawed.
The expectation of a linear and
uninterrupted argument, however, is also flawed in that it presumes our
author's inability to continue a sustained argument when he does, in fact,
achieve this for considerable stretches of the work. At the same time, this
expectation is also a refusal to accept the possibilty that Seneca's
digressions may present evidence of models other than philosphical ones,
even though no extant model has been discovered which provides a more
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close reading of the line of reasoning in each of these passages cannot fail
to mark iniuria as his primary object of emphasis.

One retort to his

adversarius clearly demonstrates this.
Adice nunc quod id agis, ut et iram feras et
iniuriam.
(III.26.1)
(Besides, what you now propose is to tolerate
both anger and iniuria.)
The causal connection suggested here is plain; ira results from iniuria, as
the adversarius implies. Yet Seneca conjoins them as separate issues: ira
and iniuria. Likewise, he places them on the same level, since both are
problematic. Be that as it may, it is not difficult to discern precisely which
problem he chooses to address.
Denique debeat poenas; non est quod cum illo paria
faciamus.
(III.25.2)
(Suppose in the end he deserves punishment; then there
is no reason why we should match his misdeeds.)
In the context of the sentence and the De Ira in general, poenas
(punishments) assumes the unmistakable sense of legal penalty incumbent
on iniuria, which he urges the reader to repudiate, in addition to the
or less exact parallel for the De Ira. See Chap. 4, passim, in which a case
is made for the epistolary responsum as the model for the De Ira.
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principle of vengeance intrinsic to ira. 243
In the final passage of the four, Seneca refers to poena (penalty) a
second time, and introduces the stronger term supplicium (execution)
immediately afterward.

Mention of these legal penalties carries

considerable weight, for his argument now emphasizes the contrast
between what is allowable by law on the one hand, and what is demanded
in accordance with higher principles. Seneca had drawn attention to this
disparity earlier in the De Ira, remarking on the limited standard of virtue
the law provides compared with other criteria, such as pietas (duty),

humanitas (humanity), liberalitas (generosity), iustitia (justice), or {ides
(integrity). 244 His second use of poena is clearly intended as part of a
moral position in contrast with iniuria. To repeat the crucial passage:
... maxima est enim factae iniuriae poena fecisse,
nee quisquam gravius adficitur quam qui ad supplicium paenitentiae traditur.
(III.26.2)
(...for the greatest punishment of iniuria is having
done it, and no man is more heavily punished than
he who is consigned to the torture of remorse.)
Seneca's view is radical and in the common perspective unconventional,
but quite consistent with an ethical insight which begins with Socrates in
243

See above, Chap. 2, pp. 62-3.

244

II.28.2

140
the Apology: the criminal is the primary victim of his own crime. 245
This sentiment as expressed in the De Ira certainly connects its
author with a tradition, yet it is a custom and viewpoint assimilated by
the Roman satirists as well, of which Horace is the closest model.
Although Seneca had been anticipated by his predecessors, his detailed
analysis of anger is novel and has extraordinary scope. 246 Once again,
just as he had earlier differentiated his own definition of ira from that of
Aristotle by introducing the terminology of Roman law, he now produces
an old idea in a characteristically Roman manner--its obvious legal
application. 247

And once more, the operative term is poena (penalty),

which he augments with supplicium (execution), as if to remove any doubt
as to his intended meaning. 248
245

In terms of Seneca's persistent and

Plato Apology 18.c-d.

246

Griffin, 168, mentions Posidoni us and Sotion as two of Seneca's
sources for the views expressed in the De Ira. No work on anger which
predates Seneca survives other than in fragments.
Jan Fredrik
Kindstrand, Bion of Borysthenes: A Collection of the Fragments with
Introduction and Commentary (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell
International, 1976), 151, mentions Bion as a source for later pieces on
anger by Philodemus, and cites Antipater and Sotion as authors to whom
works on anger have been attributed.
247

Seneca's definition of ira at l.3.2, "diximus cupiditatem esse poenae
exigendae" (I have ruled that it is the desire to exact a penalty), is
contrasted with Aristotle's "cupiditatem doloris reponendi" (the desire to
repay suffering). The phrase poenae exigendae places ira in a legal
context. See below, Chap. 5, for the formulaic sense of diximus.
248

See above, Chap. 2, pp. 62-3, on the legal meaning of supplicium.
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recent references to iniuria, the implication of the Socratic view acquires
a decidedly Roman cast, since he removes the general notion of
wrongdoing and its consequences from the realm of abstraction and secures
a practical legal context with precise and very circumscribed limits. More
than simply a truism or offhand remark, the assertion that the greatest
penalty for iniuria is to have committed the delict (111.26.2) expands the
original Socratic idea by superimposing a legal framework as an exact
referent.
Despite its legal nuance, Seneca's comment retains a measure of the
Socratic sense for the simple reason that his appeal presumes a higher
moral authority and precepts which transcend the law; in fact, this is the
essential basis of his claim. 249 The recommendation not to feel the blow
nor be stunned by contumelious affronts breaks with accepted Roman
practice, as does the injunction to suffer iniuria, an exceptionally foreign
doctrine (Indeed, Greek!) for a people to whom their obdurate belief in the
preservation of dignitas was a cardinal social tenet. 250 Yet this is what
Seneca unequivocally urges in the passages quoted; the poenae (penalties)
249

Cf. 11.28.2, a passage in which officium (duty) is set in opposition to
iuris regula (the principle of law). In sum, the consistency of Seneca's
opposition of law to morality is apparent in his choice of terms.
250

H. Wegehaupt, "Die Bedeutung von dignitas in den Schriften der
republikanischen Zeit" (Ph.D. diss., Breslau, 1932), offers a comprehensive
discussion of this term.
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and supplicia (punishments) entitled by law are deprecated. A position as
radical as the one he presents must certainly have jarred the the Roman
sensibility perhaps even more than the modern. 251

Nonetheless, his

advocacy, while neither denying legitimate delictal claims nor suggesting
an acquiescence tantamount to the approval of crime, definitely pleads
avoidance of litigation, about which he is quite specific in the last sections
of the De Ira. 252
If Seneca's outspoken denunciation of legal action proceeding from

iniuria begins to reach a climax in these last chapters, it succeeds in part
because he adeptly unites two of the strategies of satire: first, the topical
criticism of the earlier books, and then the proposed reforms which are the
251

Seneca's criticism of talio (retaliation in kind) and ultio (revenge) at
11.32.1, principles upheld either explicitly or implicitly in the Twelve
Tables, runs contrary to the fundamental Roman sense of justice. See
Nicholas, 207, on the principle of vengeance in Roman law.
252

Seneca by no means attempts to deny the severity of iniuria, as he
indicates repeatedly, nor does he suggest that the commission of the delict
is acceptable. Responding to the legal argument of his adversarius at
11.33.1 that we will not be slighted or scorned if we avenge an injury (si
vindicaverimus iniuriam), Seneca takes no issue with legal recourse as
such, but only with litigation pursued as a consequence of any motive
other than expedience (utile). In addition, Seneca suggests an approach to
iniuria (11.28-31) which compares with Horace's advice on overlooking the
faults (vitia) of others (Sermones 1.3.19-98). Remarkably, the passage from
Horace concludes with comments on ira; in point of fact, the spirit and
tone of this portion of the satire displays an uncanny resemblance to
Seneca's advisory comments at II.28-31 in the De Ira and may have served
as his model.
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central focus of the final book. But in the meantime, the mitigation of ira,
Novatus' initial request, is of secondary importance compared with
avoidance of iniuria and the courts, which Seneca now asserts
emphatically .
... nunc ex imperio irae loquemur; cum illa abierit,
tune videbimus, quanto ista lis aestumanda sit.
In hoc enim praecipue fallimur: ad ferrum venimus,
ad capitalia supplicia, et vinculis carcere fame
vindicamus rem castigandam flagris levioribus.
"Quomodo" inquis "nos i ubes intueri, quam omnia,
per quae laedi videamur, exigua, misera, puerilia
sint!" Ego vero nihil magis suaserim quam sumere
ingentem animum et haec propter quae litigamus
discurrimus anhelamus videre quam humilia et abiecta sint, nulli qui altum quiddam aut magnificum
cogitat respicienda.
Circa pecuniam plurimum vociferationis est: haec
fora defatigat, patres liberosque committit, venena
miscet, gladios tam percussoribus quam legionibus
tradit; haec est sanguine nostro delibuta; propter
hanc uxorum maritorumque noctes strepunt litibus et
tribunalia magistratuum premit turba ....
(III.32.2-33.1)
(. .. at the moment we shall speak under the authority
of anger; when that has passed, then we shall be able
to see at what value we should appraise the lawsuit.
For it is in this that we are most liable to be wrong.
We resort to the sword, and to capital punishment, and
an act that deserves the censure of a very light whipping we punish by chains, the prison, and starvation.
"In what way," you ask, "do you bid us discover how
paltry, how pitiful, how childish are all those things
by which we think we are injured!" I, assuredly,
could suggest nothing better than that you realize how
sordid and worthless are all these things for the sake
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of which we litigate, rush to and fro, and pant; these
do not deserve a thought from the man who has any high
and noble purpose.
Most of the outcry is about money. It is this which
wearies the courts, pits father against son, brews
poisons, and gives swords alike to the legions and to
cut-throats; it is daubed with our blood; because of
it the nights resound with hideous quarrels of husbands
and wives; <and by day> the crowds swarm to the tribunals
of the magistrates.)
Mention of ira at the start abruptly ceases, to be replaced with a
succession of judicial images.

Seneca shirks the commonplace and

ordinary case; the circumstances of ira to which he alludes are sufficiently
severe as to warrant a legal intervention he nevertheless regards as often
unnecessary, if not ignoble.
Immediately following his reference to ira, Seneca discusses its
consequences in terms of the standard Roman expression for lawsuit
(lis). 253

A list of particular and especially stringent legal penalties

pursuant to litigation appears next, confirming his intention to place ira
within a legal schema and underscoring the effects of both ira and lis:

ferrum (sword), capitalia supplicia (capital punishment), vinculis (chains),
253

Lis (OLD, entry 1: "A dispute at law, a lawsuit") appears at the

beginning and at the end of a passage rife with legal references. Seneca
cleverly combines its more general meaning (OLD, entry 2: "A dispute,
quarrel, disagreement") with its legal significance by placing it
immediately prior to the connective et (and), thus co-ordinating the
structure (the two clauses) as well as the content (the images of private
and public conflict).
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carcere (prison), fame (starvation). Seneca's passing use of ira becomes
quickly overshadowed by concerns of an exact legal nature, a pattern
which by now has become identifiable and expected. Phrases such as

"vindicamus rem" (we punish) and "propter quae litigamus" (for the sake
of which we litigate) hardly conceal the exigency of reducing the lawsuits
which he believes "nulli qui altum quiddam aut magnificum cogitat

respicienda" (do not deserve a thought from the man who has any high and
noble purpose). 254 Rather than return to ira, Seneca furthers this theme
in his next chapter, but with a continued reversion to the protest of the
legal arena employed so often in the second book. 255

In doing so,

however, he turns to another commonplace topic of satiric ridicule:
avarice. 256 Conflict over money wearies the courts, as he says; it also
engenders domestic discord and produces the crowds at the tribunals.
Finally, Seneca climaxes his criticism of this vice with an overt censure,
begun in the previous chapter, of the willingness to go to trial.
hi sunt propter quos oculi clamore exprimantur,
fremitu i udiciorum basilicae resonent, evocati
ex longinquis regionibus sedeant iudicaturi
254

Berger, 766, cites the technical phrase rei vindicatio as meaning
"laying claim to, asserting one's right." In this instance, res (OLD, entry
11) pertains to the matter at issue in a court of law.
255

256

Cf. II.7-9.

Cf. Horace Sermones I.l. Seneca's comments at III.33.2 parallel
those of Horace in both general treatment and tone.
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utrius iustior avaritia sit.
(III.33.2)
(But these are what men shout for until their eyeballs start; for the sake of these the lawcourts
resound with the din of trials, and jurors summoned
from distant parts sit in judgment to decide which
man's greed has the more just claim.)
The insertion of avarice into the discussion produces a mixture or
medley which is typical of satire and essential to its nature. 257 Just as
he combines topics in a brief span, Seneca intermingles objectives in the
concluding chapters of the De Ira, thereby achieving a medley of
approaches as well. Diatribe, reform, and systematic argument coalesce
to match the variety of concerns treated.

Despite the obligatory and

periodic reversion to ira, the legal terminology associated with iniuria
recurs throughout;

"verba contumeliosa,

motus corporum parum

honorificos," and "interpretationesmalignas vocis alienae" (insulting words,
disrespectful gestures, and malicious misconstruction of another's words)
and similar phrases assume the place of prominence in Seneca's final
considerations. 258

Ira reappears constantly, if only to establish a

convenient point of departure from which to elaborate his numerous
proposals and recommendations for reform, all of which directly relate to
257

Coffey, 11-23, provides a lucid discussion of the origin and nature of
satura, as does Knoche, 3-16.
258

1Il.34.1
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acts covered by the deli ct. 259 Not unexpectedly, then, does Seneca close
the De Ira with a clear condemnation of the "cupiditatem... poenae

exigendae" (the desire to exact a penalty) with which he opened. 260 It
should come as no surprise that he summarizes his message with an
asyndetic flurry of legal circumstances to be shunned.
Interim, dum trahimus, dum inter homines sumus,
colamus humanitatem; non timori cuiquam, non periculo simus; detrimenta iniurias, convicia vellicationes contemnamus et magno animo brevia feramus
incommoda: dum respicimus, quod aiunt, versamusque
nos, iam mortalitas aderit.
(111.43.5)

(Meanwhile, so long as we draw breath, so long as we
live among men, let us cherish humanity. Let us not
cause fear to any man, not danger; let us disdain
losses, injuries, public abuse, and taunts, and let
us endure magnanimously our short-lived annoyances.
While we look back, as they say ,and turning around,
immediately death will be upon us.)
259

The key words and phrases associated with iniuria--contumelia
(insult), conuicium (clamor), percutere (to strike a blow)--repeatedly occur
in the final sections of work, offering still more evidence of Seneca's legal
focus.
260

1.3.2.

CHAPTER FOUR
THE DE IRA AND THE JUDICIAL RESPONSUM
The prominence of Seneca's emphasis on the legal consequences
associated with ira is by now apparent: descriptions of the social results of
anger invariably include the crowded courts, anger is defined and
discussed in terms of the delict iniuria, and recommendations for reform
largely consist of repeated appeals for judicial restraint. But the legal
content of the De Ira raises the possibility of a legal format as well, and
the structure of the work remarkably parallels the observed features of the
judicial or epistolary responsum, a genre in which the Roman jurists
carefully examined individual legal issues or points of law, often at great
length and in detail. Comparison of known characteristics of the responsa
with the technical language and formal elements of the De Ira, in addition
to underscoring Seneca's persistent focus on iniuria, explains the most
important structural anomalies of the work which have set the De Ira
apart from earlier representatives of the philosophical dialogue.
Senecan scholars of the past century have suspected that the Dialogi
generally and the De Ira in particular admit influences and models other
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than the philosophical dialogue. 261 Their suspicions are well justified:
structural and stylistic similarities between many of the dialogues and
other genres, notably the Hellenistic diatribe and Horace's Sermones, have
been recognized. 262 Attention to an individual moral theme, spontaneous
or unsystematic organization, a pointed style, vivid imagery, and
colloquialisms are all features common not only to the Hellenistic diatribe
and Horace's satire, but to the De Ira as well. 263 Like his predecessors,
Seneca chooses a universal moral ill to castigate, tries to expose its
undesirable effects, and urges the benefits of alternate courses of
action. 264 Vividly though he describes the mad countenance of the angry
man or the hideous results of anger, even when justified, Seneca's
descriptions of the pernicious legal and social consequnces of ira are even
more striking; and it is primarily this legal perspective which brings the
elements of satire into sharp focus in the De Ira. He directs his criticism
261

Griffin, 6-16, briefly discusses the scholarly conclusions over the past
century on the structure of the ten dialogues in the Codex Ambrosianus
and the Epistulae Morales; she includes a survey of some of the literary
models on which Seneca may have relied in writing the dialoges.
262

1bid., 13-16.

263

264

lbid.

Examples from Bi on and Horace are plentiful. Kindstrand, passim,
1976) offers an excellent commentary on individual moral issues which
Bion discussed. Rudd, passim, analyzes Horace's moral concerns and
frequently points out his indebtedness to Bion.
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of the age to ajudicial milieu rife with abuse, along with dispraise of folly,
and recommendations for restraint. In the course of this, ira, which
Seneca now calls a delict, stands revealed as not only a moral issue, but
a legal issue as well. 265
The fact remains, however, that De Ira is the title of the work at
hand as it has been transmitted, not De Iniuria; anger is the ostensible
subject, and its relevance to iniuria requires further analysis in light of
Seneca's frank discussion of the delict. Likewise, the three elements of
satire heretofore discussed--topical protest, censure of iniuria, and
recommendations for reform--comprise but a few of the salient features of
the De Ira and only partially succeed in determining Seneca's purpose.
Aside from this, the work has prompted numerous questions which have
largely been left unanswered, but have led to considerable speculation
about Seneca's literary models. 266 Certainly the prevalence of satiric
techniques in a reputed philosophical dialogue is a conspicuous departure
from the stylistic norms of the genre. 267 Yet other aspects of the De Ira
violate the conventions of the type as well. Unlike the most representative
265

1.16.1

266

Griffin, Introduction and Appendix B2.

267

Hirzel, 24-34, examines the Senecan dialogues within the tradition
of the genre and notes some of the peculiarities of style which characterize
the dialogues.
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specimens, such as the Platonic dialogues or those of Cicero, the De Ira
has no definite setting and lacks even the pretense of conversation. 268
At the same time, there are no named interlocutors; indeed, so far from
being a proper dialogue with all its give and take, the only named
personality is Theophrastus, whose appearance in an apostrophe makes the
absence of a real addressee all the more striking. Seneca's adversarius is
the virtually anonymous subject of "inquis" or "inquit. "269

As a

consequence, this rather significant accumulation of unorthodox elements
makes dialogus a flatly inappropriate generic designation of the De Ira,
despite the testimony of Quintilian or the title attached to the Codex

Ambrosianus. 270 If dialogus is an unsatisfactory term to describe the
268

Griffin, 413-14, comments on these anomalies and remarks that
during the early Empire dialogi still referred to "philosophical works with
named characters and organized debate," features which continued to
mark the dialogue long after Seneca's time.
269

At I.12.3, Seneca uses the vocative "Theophraste;" at l.14.1, he
employs the nominative "Theophrastus." Theophrastus, however, is not
a "character" within the dialogue. Justus Lipsius apud Joh. Frid.
Gronovius, 22-25, explain the first mention of Theophrastus as follows:
"Significat igitur, Theophrastum & Peripateticos, popularia serere: &
vulgum, quam sapientes, judicem malle; as for the latter citation: "Hoc
Peripateticisenserunt... " Griffin, 414-415, notes parallels between Seneca's
use of the indefinite "inquit" and Cicero's use of the figure; she also
comments that the audience would naturally attach remarks which follow
"inquit" to the accuser in judicial speech, an observation which hints at
the role this formulaic verb plays in the Roman legal literature.
270

Quintilian 10.1.129. Reynolds, praefatio, discusses the title and the
mss. tradition. Cf. Griffin, 13.

152
design of the De Ira, we must search for precedents elsewhere, and the
satiric techniques and legal content already observed may perhaps offer
clues and provide a direction not yet taken. The exaggerated portrayal of
a particular vice was typical of the diatribe, along with the unsystematic
and casual presentation characterized by stretches of bitter censure, by
argument, or by exhortations to improvement and virtue. The occasional
interjections of an impersonal interlocutor and a colloquial style are also
present, characteristics which are hallmarks of the satiric monologues of
Horace and parallel at least some of the stylistic elements of the De
Ira. 271 Nonetheless, neither investigation of its philosophical tradition
nor study of its satiric background accounts for the absence of the genuine
give and take which had been standard in the philosophical dialogue prior
to Seneca's age. 272 Finally, the serious and highly technical nature of
Seneca's legal comments on iniuria and various ancillary issues has thus
far gone unrecognized because scholars have disregarded the juristic
literature of individual legal problems. This sparse yet important body of
literature may well have served as a precedent for Seneca's purposes in
271

Fraenkel, 76-153, Knoche, 73-98, Coffey, 63-97, and Rudd, passim,
each examine some or all of these characteristics of Horatian satire.
272

See Hirzel, 24-27.
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the De Ira. 273 In addition, the choice of a distinct class of legal literature
on which to pattern the De Ira, when combined with noticeable satiric
features, raises the possibility of still another satiric element being at
work in Seneca--the element of parody. 274
As has been seen, Seneca has staked out a position on various issues
connecting anger with Roman jurisprudence and is familiar with its
terminology and practice: technical distinctions between types of iniuria,
recommendations appropriate for judicial magistrates, protracted criticisms
of overcrowded courts and unnecessary suits, and anecdotes replete with
the appropriate legal terms, judicial settings, and examples of litigation
forestalled or avoided. At the very heart of the De Ira, Seneca summarizes
his view of the law within the larger context:
Ut hoc ita sit, quam angusta innoeentia est ad legem
bonum esse! Quanto latius offieiorum patet quam iuris
regula! Quam multa pietas humanitas liberalitas
iustitia fides exigunt, quae omnia extra publicas
tabulas sunt! Sed ne ad illam quidem artissimam innocentiae formulam praestare nos possumus ....
(Il.28.2-3)

(But assuming that this may be, how limited is the in273

Fritz Schulz, History of Roman Legal Science (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1946), 223, describes the literature of problems as "works devoted
exclusively to problems, to the most difficult and perplexing questions of
law. Their titles vary--Digesta, Responsa, Quaestiones, Disputationes, and
so on ... " Cf. Wolfgang Kunkel, An Introduction to Roman Legal and
Constitutional History, trans. J.M. Kelly (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966),
103-115.
274

See below, Chap. 5.
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nocence whose standard of virtue is the law! How much
more comprehensive is the principle of duty than that
of law! How many are the demands laid upon us by the
sense of duty, humanity, generosity, justice, integrityall of which lie outside the statute books! But even
within that other exceedingly narrow formula of innocence
we cannot distinguish ourselves.)

In one of Seneca's more impassioned appeals, there is no mention of ira as
such, even though one might have expected it; only the clear contrast of
standards between strict legitimacy on the one hand, and virtue on the
other. Seneca's preference is certainly the latter, and is consistent with
his remarks on iniuria throughout the De Ira.
At the very beginning of the same chapter, however, he opens with
a curious protasis.
Si volumus aequi rerum omnium iudices esse ...
(Il.28.1)
(If we intend in all matters to be fair judges ... )

Seneca's subsequent contrast of moral and legal criteria for action acquires
added emphasis in light of this simple condition. If we assume the plural
of the personal pronoun is not rhetorically all-inclusive, but spoken with
reference to the author and his addressee, Seneca's remark recalls the sort
of language used in memoranda between two Roman officials responsible
for dispensing justice, much in the manner of a type of juristic writing
known as a responsum, in which an expert in Roman jurisprudence
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furnishes an answer to a question concerning a special point of law. 275
Thus, if satire of the delict iniuria and its abuses is one of Seneca's
primary aims in the De Ira, what better model could he have chosen for
a parody of law than a familiar genre specifically employed for the formal
discussion of legal problems and their nuances?276
As with of the parallels between the diatribes ofBion ofBorysthenes
and Seneca's Dialogi investigated at the turn of the past century, the
evidence upon which to compare extant samples of judicial responsa with
275

Berger, 681, provides this brief summary on the responsa: "A type
of juristic writing. The jurists used to publish their answers .. .in collections
entitled Responsa. We know of responsa of Labeo, Sabinus, Neratius,
Marcellus, Scaevola, Papinian, Paul, Ulpian, and some other jurists. The
adaptation of the original responsafor publication required sometimes the
addition of specific argumentation, particularly when opinions of other
jurists were being rejected. Some jurists dealt with the cases, on which
they had given opinions (responsa) as respondent lawyers, in other works,
such as Quaestiones, or Digesta(Celsus, Julian, Marcellus) and vice versa,
they inserted some real or fictitious cases they discussed as teachers in the
works published as Responsa." Griffin, 167-68, briefly touches on Seneca's
concern with the appropriate behavior of a judge.
276

Highet, 67-147, offers a somewhat dated, yet still adequate,
discussion of the various types of parody, including parody which is not
comic, but a borrowing of form in a completely new setting. He divides it
into two main classes: formal and material. In the latter, the form of the
original being parodied is maintained, while the thought conveyed is
inappropriate to the chosen form. In the case of the De Ira, Seneca's use
of the responsum would at first sight seem an unusual choice of forms in
which to criticize anger. See below, Chap. 5, passim, for discussion of the
irony involved in Seneca's approach.
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Seneca's De Ira is meager and fragmentary. 277 Nonetheless, aside from
details of Seneca's biography which offer near certainty that he would
have been acquainted with the genre, a satisfactory case based on internal
data can be made that the judicial responsum--at least as it was
traditionally structured in the classical period of Roman law--was his most
likely literary model for the design of the De Ira. 278 If this indeed is the
case, a plausible explanation for previously inexplicable elements of the De
Ira which have no precedent in earlier philosophical dialogues can be
made; and Seneca's rationale for omitting the customary stage, characters,
or the repartee of conversation can be discerned. Moreover, if the De Ira
is fashioned after the judicial responsum, a genre whose extant specimens
are either abridged or epitomized, it would be the sole complete (although
literary) representative of the type, thereby supplying a valuable and
significant source for further study of the legal literature of problems. 279
277

Schulz, Roman Legal Science, 223-26, surveys the problems resulting
from the limited evidence.
278

Griffin, passim, reviews Seneca's legal and political careers,
spanning a period well into the classical age of Roman law in which the
literature of problems came into its own. Schulz, Roman Legal Science,
92, lists Labeo and his teacher Trebati us as two of the jurists of the period
of whose opinions we have some knowledge. Horace (Sermones 2.1)
requests the advice of Trebatius and refers to Labeo disapprovingly (i.3.82).
See also Otto Lenel, Palingenesia Juris Civilis 1. ii 343-52.
279

Schulz, Roman Legal Science, 226, comments on these problems as
typical among works as poorly transmitted as the Responsa.
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Seneca's repeated discussion of iniuria in a prescribed legal sense,
not to mention the range of its applicability or basic disposition, discloses
technical familiarity with a circumscribed area of the Roman law of delicts
and is the most obvious sign that at least one of his objectives in the De
Ira was quasi-legal commentary.

Much of the work is consequently

devoted to the interrelationship between ira and iniuria, or vitium (vice)
and delictum (delict).

Furthermore, Seneca's unremittingly satiric

treatment of iniuria in particular and legal action in general, far from
constituting a distraction, actually enhances what appears to be his overall
design: to parody a responsum in which this particular delict is disparaged
as a social vice and ira is as technically dissected as if it were a delict. In
fact, Seneca quite boldly arrives at precisely this conclusion regarding
anger fairly early in the work, and in a legal context.
Ergo ad coercitationem errantium sceleratorumque
irato castigatore non opus est; nam cum ira delictum
animi sit, non oportet peccata corrigere peccantem.
"Quid ergo? non irascor latroni? Quid ergo? non
irascar venefico?" Non; neque enim mihi irascor,
cum sanguinem mitto. Omne poenae genus remedi loco
admoveo.
(l.16.1)
(Consequently, there is no need that correction be
given in anger in order to restrain the erring and
the wicked. For since anger is the delict of the
mind, it is not right to correct wrong-doing by doing
wrong. "What then?" you exclaim; "shall I not be
angry with a robber? Shall I not be angry with a
poisoner?" No; for I am not angry with myself when
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I let blood. To every form of punishment I will
resort, but in lieu of a remedy.)
Not only does Seneca call anger a deli ct of the mind here, but he
discusses it within the framework of two delictal violations--robbery and
poisoning--and in terms which refer to legal action (remedi) and penalty

(poenae). 280 Be that as it may, the most significant detail of the passage
is his reference to ira as "delictum animi" (deli ct of the mind). Seneca
transfers anger from a philosophical or moral context to a legal one. This
is no idle remark nor casual metaphor on Seneca's part, but a deliberate
and pointed comment which implies an approach toward anger that alters
the entire purpose of the work as it has been understood: namely, the
thorough and complete expression of a Stoic view on anger. 281
Seneca's fundamental attitude toward ira certainly displays the
recognizable tenets of Stoicism; the dangers and folly of passion (adfectus)
are noted; instead, action grounded on the will (voluntas) and on reason

(ratio) is advised. 282 This perspective is clear from the outset and is
280

See Nicholas, 209-15, and Berger, 760.

281

See Sandbach, 152. Cf. Wright, passim, and Basore, 112.

282

Seneca's epigrammatic remark at 1.9.4 summarizes his view of the
passions: "adfectus quidem tam mali ministri quam duces sunt." He
emphasizes voluntas and ratio throughout, but 1.8.1 is a representative
passage: "Nam si coepit ferre transversos, difficilis ad salutem recursusest,
quoniam nihil rationis est, ubi semel adfectus inductus est iusque illi
aliquod voluntate nostra datum est." Rist, 22-36, on human action and
emotion, and 219-32, on knowing and willing, provides an in-depth
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consistent throughout the De Ira. Seneca refers to ira as
... hunc praecipue affectum... maxime ex
omnibus taetrum ac rabidum.
(I.1.1)
(...this, the most hideous and frenzied
of all the emotions...to an exceptional
degree.)
Similarly, in the same chapter, he establishes that
...iram... aeque enim impotens sui est, ...rationi
consiliisque praeclusa....
(1.1.2)

(... anger...is equally devoid of self-control...
and closed to reason and counsel.. ..)

On the surface, therefore, it is readily apparent why the De Ira has long
been assumed to be an exhaustive, if not bloated, examination of anger
from a strict Stoic perspective. 283

Furthermore, Seneca's effort to

distinguish carefully his definition of ira from that of Aristotle greatly
adds to this impression. 284 Nonetheless, this conclusion fails to account
for two important phenomena: first, Seneca's extensive and accurate use
of Roman legal terminology; secondly, the methodological agreement
between Roman law and Stoic moral theory in determining legal liability
in the case of the former, and moral culpability in the latter case. The
discussion of these issues within the Stoic tradition.
283

284

See Wright, 39-40.

Seneca refers to Aristotle's views at I.3.3, l.9.2, l.17.1, lll.3.1, and
III.17 .1. Cf. Aristotle De Anima 403a 30.
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standards of law he employs to decide a violation of iniuria are the
identical criteria relied upon to judge anger.
philosophical methods merge.

In effect, legal and

Rather than being an obstacle to

understanding Seneca's actual purpose, however, this correspondence of
approaches leads to the paradox whereby ira can be assessed as a delictum
(delict) and iniuria as a vitium (vice). Likewise, it reveals the rationale for
his acerbic topical criticisms of iniuria and his admonitions to avoid
litigation, which would seem to be a curiously tangential concern in a
work devoted to anger. Ira is indeed the more central concern in the Stoic
view, but finds expression not only in crime itself, but also in the very

remedia (legal remedies) provided by the ius civile (civil statute). 285
Seneca must accordingly maintain the preeminence of a more elevated
standard than civil law; but to achieve this he must illuminate ira as a
delict in terms of a higher moral schema, as though it were a genuine
legal issue analyzed in a format suited for such analysis: the judicial

responsum.
As a form intended to address a particular legal problem, the

responsum had its origins in the sacerdotal opinions of the pontifices
285

Hans Juli us Wolff, Roman Law: An Historical Introduction (Norman,
Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1951), 61-70, offers a brief
examination of the ius civile and its importance in the development of
Roman Law.
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(priests) during the archaic period of Roman jurisprudence. 286 Although
the responsum retained many of the basic features of these early responsa

Pontificum (responses of the priests), it had developed considerably by
Seneca's time, having derived at least some inspiration for various of its
characteristics

from

Hellenistic

literature

of

a

similar

cast,

notwithstanding a number of distinctively Roman elements, such as a
"predilection for a fully comprehensible concrete case, ... professional taste
for detail, and... very modest interest in systematization. "287

In the

classical period of Roman law, traditionally fixed from the beginning of the
reign of Augustus, the genre was solidly secured as the form in which
leading jurists would publish their answers to specific legal questions. 288
Referred to by this point as the Responsa Prudentium, the replies of such
noteworthy figures as Labeo, Proculus, Sabinus, and Cassius began to
comprise a considerable body of legal literature of which only fragmentary
passages have survived. 289 Despite the little we possess, however, from
the evidence which remains, much can be ascertained about the structure
and content of the responsa and, in some instances, about the formulaic
286

Schulz, Roman Legal Science, 16-19. Cf. Berger, 681.

287

lbid., 223-24.

288

28

Ibid., 99. Cf. Kunkel, 103-108.

9lbid., 141-44. Schulz describes both the state of the evidence and
attempts to reconstruct the lost portions of the texts.
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phraseology and special vocabulary normally employed in these writings-enough, in fact, to be able to make it reasonably certain that the

responsum was the model for the De Ira.
Mention has already been made of structural anomalies of the De Ira
which fail to adhere to the recognized conventions of the philosophical
dialogue: primarily, the lack of a setting, the absence of characters
engaged in conversation or, if you will, dialogue, and the recurrent
presence of an indefinite speaker who offers objections by way of
interjections. 290 Emphasis on the exceptions to the norm, however, will
ultimately mislead us, unless our attention is redirected to those features
which the work actually does incorporate. One such element is apparent
in the very first sentence of the first book.
Exegisti a me, N ovate, ut scriberem quemadmodum
posset ira leniri, nee immerito mihi videris hunc
praecipue affectum pertimuisse maxime ex omnibus
taetrum ac rabidum.
(I.1.1)
(You have importuned me, Novatus, to write on the
subject of how anger may be allayed, and it seems
to me that you had good reason to fear in an especial
degree this, the most hideous and frenzied of all
the emotions.)
The De Ira is addressed to Seneca's elder brother, Novatus, who is
directly named only three additional times; at the opening of the second
290

See above, Introduction.
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and third books, and near the conclusion of the final book. The third book
begins in a manner similar to the first.
Quod maxime desiderasti, Novate, nunc facere temptabimus, iram excidere animis aut certe refrenare
et impetus ei us inhibere.
(III.1.1)
(We shall now, Novatus, attempt to do what you have
especially desired--we shall try to banish anger from
the mind, or at least to bridle and restrain its fury.
N ovatus is not merely addressed in both passages by Seneca under the
guise that he is responding to a request for practical assistance, nor do
these introductory statements offer any suggestion that theoretical or
philosophical speculation on a Stoic view of ira had figured in Novatus'
appeal. Taken at face value, the beginning of at least two of the three
books supposes a wish for an advisory response and, quite literally,
Seneca's reply to that petition is the De Ira.
As it stands, then, the repeated reference to an addressee at the
outset of each book--particularly if one ignores the curious lack of setting,
characters, or genuine dialogue--more closely and obviously resembles a
letter, the apparently common form in which the Responsa Prudentium
(replies of those experienced in law) were conveyed from the start of the
classical period. 291 Although the epistolary responsum had apparently
291

Schulz, Roman Legal Science, 93, discusses the letter as the form of
choice in which to present the responsa. Cf. Kunkel, 108. H. F. Jolowicz
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not been used by the jurists of the Republic, the responsa would easily
have been adapted to this form and, beginning with Labeo, the jurist
prominent in Horace's Sermones, clear evidence of epistolary responsa
becomes available. 292 Later testimony, as well as actual specimens of
the juristic literature of problems which has come down to us, reinforce the
view that the responsa of the classical period were commonly published
originally as letters in reply to questions posed by students, fellow jurists,
or other interested parties on all manner of possible legal points or
problems. 293 Seneca himself, in fact, indicates his acquaintance with the

responsum as a type of juristic writing practiced by the jurisconsults in two
passages in particular from the De Beneficiis and Epistulae Morales .
... ut dialogorum altercatione seposita tamquam iuris
consultus respondeam: mens spectanda est dantis; benefici um ei dedit, cui datum voluit.
(V.19.8)
(...to lay aside the bickering of dialogue, and to give
a response as a jurisconsult, I should say that the
purpose of the giver must be considered; he gave the
benefit to the one to whom he wished it to be given.)

and Barry Nicholas, Historical Introduction to the Study of Roman Law,
3d. ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 376, also comment
on this.
292

Horace, Sermones, I.3.82. Regarding evidence for the epistolary form
of the responsa, see above, n. 289.
293

Schulz, Roman Legal Science, 91-93.
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Quid, quod etiam sine probationibus ipsa monentis auctoritas prodest? Sic quomodo iurisconsultorum valent
responsa, etiam si ratio non redditur.
(XCIV.27)
(But cannot the authority of the one providing advice
avail even without proofs? It is like the replies of
the jurisconsults, which hold good even though the
reasons for them are not delivered.)
Although these ofThand comparisons reveal Seneca's familiarity with the

responsa themselves, further analysis of structure and language is
necessary to support the conclusion that the epistolary format in which the
De Ira seems to have been written actually parodies the very responsa to
which he alludes in the De Beneficiis and Epistulae Morales.
Much has been concluded by scholars in the past century about the
legal literature of problems in general and, more particularly, the letter
as a genre in which to convey legal opinion. 294 A number of central facts
figure critically on the problem at hand and merit discussion, the most
important of which seems to be the well-documented process of compilation
in the post-classical age by which only those opinions most pertinent to a
given legal topic were drawn from an already sizeable body of juristic
writing, a process which led to the conciseness of arrangement
294

Ibid., 91-93, and 224-26.
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characteristic of Justinian's Digest or Gaius' Institutes. 295

However

useful this practice may have been for the purposes of the compilers, only
an abbreviated sense of the complete structure and exact content of legal
literature of the archaic and classical ages has survived. 296 As one of the
more eloquent summaries of the problem and its consequences has it,
"abridgement and epitomization led to the statements of the facts of cases
being pruned of the colorful actual details which enlivened the classical
original; they were stripped of all that was legally irrelevant and made
merely typical; the epistolary form was expunged; sometimes the
statement of facts was even struck out altogether and the discussion thus
reduced to naked abstract rules. 297 The final result, then, is a loss of
much of what a judicial responsum in epistolary form really consisted,
including "specific argumentation, particularly when opinions of other
jurists were being rejected." 298
Despite the abridged and fragmented nature of the evidence, a
sufficient number of the elements which comprise an epistolary responsum
can be cited and used as criteria by which to assess the adaptation of the
295

Ibid., 91, 141-44, and 226.
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Ibid. Cf. Lenel, pal. i, praefatio, and Wolff, 103.
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Schulz, Roman Legal Science, 226.
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Berger, 681. Cf. Schulz, Roman Legal Science, 226.
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De Ira to this form.

The surviving fragments do indicate patterns or

particularly salient aspects also represented in the De Ira, one of the most
notable being the prevalence of a technical or formulaic vocabulary for
expressing legal opinion or referring to other legal opinion, including the
praetorian edict. 299 The verbs ait (he says), respondeo (I reply), dixi (I
have ruled), inquit (he says) or inquis (you say), and quaero (I inquire) all
have special significance in this regard as legal technical terms to be
added to the extensive technical language on iniuria cited earlier. 300 In
short, the legal dimension of the De Ira becomes all the more expansive,
as further examination of Seneca's use of these verbal forms will prove.
In the same vein, epistolary responsa of the classical period were both
casuistic and cautelary. 301 The most difficult and perplexing problems
299

Schulz, 224-25. Cf. Berger, 359, under "Ait."

300

Berger, 359, notes the following on ait and aiunt: "In juristic
writings, opinions of other jurists are thus introduced in this way, e.g.,
Labeo ait. In the commentaries on the praetorian edict, the words praetor
ait (inquit) precede a literal quotation.
Excerpts from statutes,
senatusconsulta and imperial enactments are also often attached to ait."
Cf. Schulz, Roman Legal Science, 224-25, on respondeo, quaero, and dixi,
and Jolowicz and Nicholas, 95-97. Griffin, 414 n.7, remarks that inquis or
inquit in judicial speech would be attributed to the accuser. Both ait and
inquit alone universally precede a quoted objection on the part of Seneca's
adversary, following the pattern observed in the juristic literature. See
below, Chaps. 4 and 5. As for the technical vocabulary of iniuria, see
Chap. 2.
301

Schulz, Roman Legal Science, 223-24, comments on the casuistic
nature of the responsa, noting that they "derived from juristic speculation
as well as practice" and showed a "Roman predilection for a fully
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of every branch of Roman law were scrutinized in the responsa, and this
required both specific argumentation and a presentation as well as a
resolution of cases, often from both a theoretical and practical
perspective. 302 Likewise, determining the admissibility of a course of
action--the cautelary or advisory function of the responsum--constituted a
most common characteristic of the form. 303 Taken together, the presence
of all of these elements in the De Ira emphasizes that its framework is
first and foremost legal, not philosphical. Furthermore, these legal aspects
provide grounds for considering the work a satire of law as a deficient
standard of human conduct and ira as a delict in a more exacting ethical
comprehensible concrete case, ... professional taste for detail, and ... very
modest interest in systematization." In his survey of the literary output
of the jurists, 226ff., Schulz frequently refers to the casuistic character of
the surviving fragments. The cautelary or advisory nature of the responsa
originates, according to Schulz, 15-17, in the early Republic with the
pontifices, who offered advice on the admissibility of a sacral act. David
Daube, Forms of Roman Legislation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956), 4-5,
lists phrases which substitute for the imperative and iussive, such as

"oportet, necesse est, mos est, fas est, ius est, religio est, piaculum est,
licitum est, constitutum est ..." All may be described as cautelary or
advisory expressions, whether in a religious or civil context. In a stricter
sense, according to Jolowicz and Nicholas, 96 n.5, cautelary referred
specifically to a cautio, a written stipulation. Cf. Berger, 384-85, on the
various types of cautiones. By cautelary here, I mean the more general,
or advisory, sense by which the responsa could be described.
302

Jolowicz and Nicholas, 95-6, and 359-63, comment on these features.
Cf. Kunkel, 103-108, and Schulz, Roman Legal Science, 91-93, and 223-26.
303

Schulz, Roman Legal Science, 223-26.
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syst em. 304
In particular, most specifically in his use of certain verbs, Seneca
closely borrows the vocabulary commonly employed in the responsa (1) to
denote the question or problem at hand, (2) to introduce a contrary
argument or opinion, and (3) to cite a formal ruling dispensed previously
by the author or another jurist. 306

Variations of the verb quaero (I

inquire) and its cognate quaestio (inquiry) are a case in point. Ambiguity
has been said to exist between the responsum and the quaestio, another
type of problematic juristic writing. 306 And although the lines between
the two forms have been said to blur, the frequency of quaero (I inquire)
and quaestio (inquiry) in the De Ira are to some extent inevitable, since the

responsum may have been as much a reply to a request or question posed
by another jurist as an unsolicited reaction to a prevailing legal view. 307
304

At II.28.2, approximately midway through the De Ira, Seneca
expands his preceding criticisms of iniuria to include a general judgment
on the limitations of the law.
305
306

Schulz, Roman Legal Science, 224-25.

Ibid. Cf. Berger, 663 and 681.
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Ibid. The legal context of Seneca's use of quaeramus at II.13.1 is a
prime example, and clearly bears out Schulz's observations: "Non est quod
patrocinium nobis quaeramus et excusatam licentiam, dicentes aut utile id
esse aut inevitabile; cui enim tandem vitio advocatus defuit?'' Patrocinium
(Berger, 622: " .. .legal assistance given to a party in a trial by an
advocate."), the direct object of quaeramus, is a common legal term;
advocatus (OLD, entries la and b: "a professional pleader, advocate,
counsel.") completes the thought and makes the legal context indisputable.
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The former situation obviously applies to the De Ira, and Novatus' appeal
for advice, whether genuine or contrived, remains a request which insists
upon a reply. In similar fashion, as the passages of diatribe and the
ongoing censure of iniuria reveal, N ovatus' request also offered Seneca the
pretext to oppose the received opinion on iniuria as a delict as well.
Nonetheless, the forms quaesitum est (it has been asked), quaerimus
(we ask), quaerendum est (it must be asked), and quaestio (the question) all
appear in the De Ira in a formal context suggestive of Seneca's principal
purposes, and each instance where these forms occur is noteworthy,
beginning with quaesitum est (it has been asked) early in the first
book. 308 Almost immediately following his acknowledgement of Novatus'
request, an exaggerated description of the irate man, and a diatribe on the
social consequences of anger, Seneca departs from a graphic depiction of

ira to a more systematic and rational analysis, which he summarizes in
the following passage.
Quid esset ira quaesitum est, an in ullum aliud
animal quam in hominem caderet, quo ab iracundia
distaret, quot eius species essent: nunc quaeramus
an ira secundum naturam sit et an utilis atque ex
aliqua parte retinenda.
(1.5.1)
(Hitherto we have inquired what anger is, whether it
belongs to any other creature than man, how it dif308I.5.1.
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fers from irascibility, and in how many aspects it
appears; let us now inquire whether anger is in accordance with nature; whether it is expedient and
ought, therefore, in some measure to be kept.)
Seneca thus recapitulates the topics of the two previous chapters and
establishes a direction for further discussion; but the excerpt is remarkable
for other reasons also.

Quaeramus (let us inquire) closely follows

quaesitum est (it has been asked) in a point-by-point agenda; first, of the
main topics covered in the two previous chapters; secondly, of themes
about to be pursued. The passage is a strikingly succinct, methodical, and
systematic piece of prose in comparison with the more extended stretches
of diatribe or exaggerated description; in short, its formality is abrupt and
uncharacteristic, but all the more striking for this very reason and
consequently the more deserving of close attention.
In a brief display of clarity and concision that perhaps many of
Seneca's readers would vainly expect to pervade the entire De Ira, the
essential outline of a program or a statement of purpose is apparent. More
interesting, however, is the double occurrence of other forms of quaero (I
ask or inquire): quaesitum est (it has been asked) with which to begin the
passage and refer to what ideas have preceded, and quaeramus (let us
inquire) with which to signal what considerations will follow. Thus, in an
ostensible statement of intent, Seneca employs the verb typically used to
indicate either doubtful legal issues or cases in casuistic writings such as
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the responsa. 309

Furthermore, Seneca's queries aim to make precise

distinctions--between ira and iracundia (irascibility), animal and human
aggression, the natural and unnatural, the expedient and impractical-much in the same fashion as a jurist in pursuit of accurate legal
distinctions.
In the second book Seneca has no need to preface a declaration of
intent; Novatus' petition for counsel has already been acknowledged and

ira has been as grotesquely pictured as in some of the most impassioned
speeches in his plays. 310 Nevertheless, quaestio (inquiry) still occurs once
and quaerimus (we inquire) twice within the first two chapters, again to
mark the exact refinements necessary to his investigation. The three
passages in which these forms are present demonstrate the same formality
and systematic concision as in the selection cited earlier, and merit equally
close study.
(1) Primus liber, Novate, benigniorem habuit materiam;
309

Schulz,Roman Legal Science, 224. Cf. Berger, 662: "The jurists used
these locutions to introduce doubtful cases in which "a question arises" ("it
has been questioned") about the legal solution of the situation presented.
The terms occur not only in collections of so-called quaestiones, but also in
other writings of the casuistic type. Similar phrases were: quaestio
(quaestionis) est, quaestio in eo constitit (=the question consists in that)."
31

°Cf. what Wright, 47, calls "a fairly accurate description of the
physical appearance produced by anger in its subject" at I.1, II.35, and
III.4 with similar descriptions at Medea 380-96, Thyestes 732-43, and
Phaedra 360-86.
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facilis enim in proclivia vitiorum decursus est.
Nunc ad exiliora veniendum est; quaerimus enim ira
utrum iudicio an impetu incipiat, id est utrum sua
sponte moveatur an quemadmodum pleraque quae intra
nos <non> insciis nobis oriuntur. Debet autem in haec
se demittere disputatio, ut ad illa quoque altiora
possit exsurgere ....
(Il.1.1-2)
(My first book, N ovatus, had a more bountiful theme;
for easy is the descent into the downward course of
vice. Now we must come to narrower matters; for we
ask the question whether anger originates from choice or
from impulse, that is, whether it is aroused of its
own accord, or whether it behaves like much else that
does not arise within us without our knowledge.
But the discussion must be lowered to the consideration of these things in order that it may afterwards
rise to the other, loftier themes.)
(2) Iram quin species oblata iniuriae moveat non est
dubium; sed utrum speciem ipsa statim sequatur et
non accedente animo excurrat, an illo adsentiente
moveatur quaerimus. Nobis placet nihil illam per
se audere sed animo adprobante ....
(Il.1.3-4)
(There can be no doubt that anger is aroused by the
direct impression of injury; but the question is
whether it follows immediately upon the impression
and springs up without assistance from the mind, or
whether it is aroused only with the assent of the
mind. Our opinion is that it ventures nothing by
itself, but acts only with the approval of the mind.)
(3) "Quorsus" inquis "haec quaestio pertinet?" Ut
sciamus quid sit ira; nam si invitis nobis nascitur, numquam rationi succumbet.
(Il.2.1)
("But," you ask, "what is the purpose of such an inquiry?" I answer, in order that we may know what
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anger is; for if it arises against our will, it will
never succumb to reason.)
All three passages resemble the excerpt from book one (I.5.1) not
only in tone and composition, but particularly in the technical insertion of

quaerimus (we inquire) and quaestio (the question) to mark the casuistic
nature of the endeavor. In each case a statement of purpose or short
overview of Seneca's plan is noticeable; in fact, the brief span in which
these sections occur comprise an extended declaration of objectives
interrupted only by analogies apparently included to justify the direction
his discussion must take before he can arrive at illa altiora", those "other,
loftier themes" which are contrasted with the objects of quaerimus (we
inquire). 311 Again, as in the parallel passage in the first book (l.5.1),
Seneca systematically addresses problematic issues in need of resolution.
The formal distinctions he pursues here are related to his initial question:

"quid esset ira quaesitum est" (we have inquired what anger is). 312
Seneca repeats this objective a second time in reply to the impatient
interjection of his adversarius in the second chapter of book two. The
311

Seneca juxtaposes these technical questions unfavorably with what
he vaguely terms "illa altiora" (loftier matters), thereby implying a
subordinate status to legal analysis. "Illa altiora" becomes more apparent
later in book two (ll.28.2), when he contrasts the narrowness of innocence
before the law with the more exacting demands of moral rectitude.
312

Cf. I.4-5.
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purpose of the quaestio (question) is simply "ut sciamus quid sit ira" ("in
order that we may know what anger is).

Seneca thus reiterates the

problematic character of ira with a substantival variant of quaesitum est
(it has been asked). More importantly, he emphasizes the significance of
establishing appropriate distinctions necessary to a solid understanding of
anger, distinctions which he has just framed as indirect questions
introduced by quaerimus (we inquire), the formal term of legal
examination. 313
Just as the use of quaerimus (we inquire) or quaestio (the question)
establishes a legal design, Seneca's method of resolving the questions he
poses proceeds by way of analysis as easily employed to determine moral
culpability according to a Stoic ethical model as to fix legal liability under
Roman law. The occurrence of iniuria in the second passage, however,
makes it more probable that a judgment of legal liability is the more
probable goal, especially in view of the prominence given to iniuria
throughout the De Ira. Although the objects of the initial quaerimus (we
inquire) in the first passage pertain to ira--whether anger originates from
choice or impulse on the one hand, and whether it arises of its own accord
or with our knowledge on the other--the inextricable association between

ira and iniuria cited in the second passage (and often elsewhere) is so
313

Schulz, Roman Legal Science, 224. Cf. Berger, 662.
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drawn that the distinctions pursued in both passages serve a similar
purpose: a working definition of anger preliminary to any conclusion as to
its reduction or outright elimination. If Seneca cannot prove that anger
is subject to the will, assented to by the mind, or amenable to reason, the
request of Novatus becomes futile and the De Ira pointless.

As a

consequence, the success or failure of the De Ira depends on how well
Seneca settles these issues, a task he begins to achieve in a crucial
segment of chapter one, immediately after he has formulated the
alternatives introduced by quaerimus .
... nam species capere acceptae iniuriae et ultionem
ei us concupiscere et utrumque coni ungere, nee laedi
se debuisse et vindicari debere, non est ei us impetus
qui sine voluntate nostra concitatur. Ille simplex
est, hie compositus et plura continens: intellexit
aliquid, indignatus est, damnavit, ulciscitur: haec
non possunt fieri, nisi animus eis quibus tangebatur
adsensus est.
(11.1.4-5)

(For to form the impression of having received an injury and to long to avenge it, and then to couple
together the two propositions that one ought not to
have been wronged and that one ought to be avenged-this is not a mere impulse of the mind acting without
our volition. The one is a single mental process, the
other a complex one composed of several elements; the
mind has grasped something, has become indignant, has
condemned the act, and now tries to avenge it. These
processes are impossible unless the mind has given assent
to the impressions that moved it.)
The context of Seneca's comments earlier in chapter one and in the

177
three passages previously listed becomes much clearer as a result of these
concluding sections of the chapter.

The conscious, deliberate, and

voluntary basis for anger must be proven before any attempt at curbing
it can possibly proceed, and Seneca expeditiously works toward this
determination by demonstrating that anger involves a complex process
which engages both mind and will. The lucid presentation of each stage
of this process--speciem... acceptae iniuriae (the impression of having
received an injury, ultionem concupiscere(the desire for revenge), nee laedi

se debuisse (the judgment that one ought not to have been wronged, and
vindicari debere (ought to be avenged)--to a great extent answers the
formal questions posed earlier, initiated by the two instances of quaerimus
(we inquire) and followed by the occurrence of quaestio (the question). 314
Furthermore, Seneca boldly supplies answers to his own questions without
any of the conversational give-and-take which is customary in a
philosophical dialogue. 315 More significantly, however, he couches his
conclusions in terms which are quite unambiguous, for he systematically
describes the course of anger as the identical series of steps necessarily
314

At II.1-2.1, Seneca questions whether ira originates from choice or
impulse, and whether it arises with our knowledge or of its own accord.
Only by determining what anger is can Seneca conclude that it is--or is
not--subject to the will and reason.
315

Griffin, Appendix B2. Cf. Hirzel, II, 27-34.
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undertaken for legal action based on a violation of iniuria.
In the course of establishing the intricate cognitive and volitional
foundation of ira, Seneca begins by stressing the judgment that an injury
has been received (acceptae iniuriae). Any idea that the sense of iniuria
he intends possesses no more than a generic meaning stripped of any
specialized significance (a corollary to the proposition that the De Ira is
foremost and primarily a philosophical work) is quickly dispelled by the
immediately subsequent appearance of terms typically descriptive of
Roman legal procedure. 316 This fact, coupled with a recognition that
anger advances in a manner indistinguishable from the conduct of
litigation, has broad implications. To begin with, Seneca points out that
the subjective judgment that one ought to be avenged (vindicari debere) is
the first stage in the composite process basic to anger (compositus et plura

continens). He has already introduced an official term for a deli ct (iniuria),
and now includes the verb vindicari, the formal expression for remedial
action approved by law. 317 In what may conceivably be one of the most
316
317

See above, Chap. 2.

Seneca uses this verb throughout the De Ira to mean the act of
avenging or exacting reparation for an offense (OLD, entry 5a). The
regular occurrence of some form of vindicare to signify the ordinary
response to various violations of the law, however, is noteworthy. That
Seneca widely employs the word to cover legal actions brought as a result
of parricide (1.12.1), outrage (Ill.5.7), and monetary lass (Ill.33.3) implies
a more general application than has been commonly assumed and blurs
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the distinction between actiones in rem (actions asserting one's right to a
thing) and actiones in personam (actions asserting a right against a
person). Cf. Nicholas, 99-103. Under vindicatio (vindicare), Berger, 766,
notes the following: "In earlier times, the act of avenging an offense, selfdefense against the violence of an aggressor. Later, the term was applied
to the defense of one's property by seeking its recovery in court. Gaius
(Inst. 4.5) uses the term vindicationes for all actiones in rem and Justinian
accepted his terminology (Inst .. 4.6.15)." OLD, entry la, concurs with
Berger's remarks, and lists the assertion to "one's title to ... one's property"
as the legal definition of vindicare. Vindicatio, however, the common legal
term denoting an actio in rem (claim to a thing), does not appear in the
Senecan corpus. To confuse the matter further, OLD, entry 2, cites a more
general meaning for vindicatio than the primary legal sources would
suppose, and offers the following definition by Cicero (Inv. 2.66; 2.161):
"vindicationem (earn appellant) per quam vim et contumeliam defendendo
aut ulciscendo propulsamus a nobis et nostris, qui nobis cari esse debent,
et per quam peccata punimur... " This contrasts sharply with the legal
definition given (OLD, entry 1) for vindicatio, and the examples provided
are taken from later legal sources (e.g., Gaius, Inst. 4.5: "appellantur... in
rem quidem actiones vindicationes, in personam vero
actiones... condictiones... "). Cicero cites vis (force/violence) and contumelia
(insult), terms normally associated with iniuria, in connection with
vindicatio, which refers to an actio in rem (action asserting one's right to
a thing) in the primary legal sources. The term condictio, which Gai us
(Inst. 4.5) uses and Berger, 346, elaborates on regarding actiones in
personam, is strangely absent from the De Ira in particular, and Seneca's
works in general. Remarkably, neither vindicatio nor condictio, the two
nouns used used in the primary legal sources to separate the two most
fundamental classes of legal action in Roman law, actiones in rem and
actiones in personam, are present in the De Ira, despite Seneca's
thoroughgoing references to other technical terms ordinarily associated
with iniuria (e.g., contumelia, convicium, and percutere) and despite his
well-attested legal background and career (See above, p., n.). That Seneca
introduces vindicare in a legal context is clear based on the topics at hand
in the passages where the verb appears (e.g., I.12.1, II.4.1, II.32-33, and
III.32-33); why he misappropriates a verb describing one course of legal
actions (with the exception of IIl.32.2) which the sources reserve for a
different class of actions is not. Nonetheless, some conclusions can be
reached from the facts at hand. David Daube, Roman Law: Linguistic,
Social, and Philosophical Aspects(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press,
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critically telling sections in the entire work, Seneca not only employs two
more legally significant terms, indignatus (outraged or offended) and

damnavit (has found guilty or sentenced), but demonstrates convincingly
that

two

processes

(understanding),

are

simultaneously

indignatus (personal

at

affront),

work. 318

Intellexit

damnavit (judicial

condemnation), and ulciscitur (revenge)--the four phases which constitute
the necessary stages of a successful suit based on iniuria--are the same
1969), 11-63, examines the process whereby a pattern becomes evident in
the history of language: nouns which refer to actions appear much later
than the verbs from which they are formed. This would account for the
use of vindicatio and condictio in Gaius and Justinian to distinguish an
actio in rem from an actio in personam and suggest that these distinctions
were officially observed later than the first century A.D. Secondly,
Seneca's use of vindicare to describe legal action as such, but especially
iniuria, would not only offer an important example demonstrating Daube's
theory; it would indicate that the sense of vindicatio as a means of
redressing violence and insult--the definition provided by Cicero--still
prevailed in Seneca's time as evidenced by his use of the cognate verb,
vindicare, to describe this type of legal action. Finally, vindicare, although
initially referring to general legal action, most probably acquired the more
specialized sense as described in the post-classical sources and as defined
in the lexica and the most recent surveys of Roman law.
318

lndignor (OLD, entry 1: "To regard with indignation, take offense
at ... ") implies the recognition that one has been the victim of an offense
against either one's person or reputation. Cf. contumelia (OLD, entry 1).
Indignor asserts that one is in the state of having been affronted or
outraged as a result of the commission of iniuria, and is necessary prior to
a legal judgment or penalty denoted by damno (OLD, entry 1: "To pass
judgment against <in a civil or criminal case>, condemn.") Cf. OLD,
entry 4: "To deliver by judicial sentence, consign." Cf. Gaius, Inst. 3.224
for damno in cases of iniuria.
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four phases which comprise the course of ira. 319

As a consequence,

quaerimus (we inquire) and quaestio (the question), terms which commonly
appear in epistolary responsa of the classical period to identify the legal
issues at hand, identify a legal issue here as well.

If, as Seneca certainly implies, the conduct of an iniuria case from
onset to conclusion exactly parallels the duration of anger from the first
assessment of wrongdoing to the exacting of revenge, a number of
apparently unrelated facts reveal new associations which compel an
extensive reinterpretation of the De Ira.

First, Seneca's recurrent

references to iniuria, whether straightforward or oblique, cannot be
construed as a merely coincidental occurrence of allusions or off-hand
metaphors derived from the law in an otherwise philosophical context.
The evidence by now is sufficiently clear-cut: to address the problem of ira
is to examine the enigma of law, not as the ars boni et aequi (the art of the
good and the fair), but as ars irae et ultionis (the art of anger and
319

/ntellexit, the first word of the series, occurs commonly in the

primary legal sources, and in its most general sense means to "grasp
mentally, understand, realize ... " (OLD, entry 1). Cf. Gaius, Inst. 4.178:
"nemo damnatur nisi qui intellegit non recte se agere ... " It may also mean
to "understand, regard (as being... " or "(a term) to mean ... " (OLD, entries
6a and b). Cf. Gaius, Inst. 3.224: " ... nulla iniuria intellegitur fieri ... " or
Justinian, Inst. 4.4.3: "... nulla iniuria fieri intellegitur... " Intellexit in the
passage under discussion= iniuria fieri intellegitur. Cf. Berger, 506. See
above, p., n., for ulcisci in connection with iniuria.
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revenge). 320 Seneca's insight that ira is as much a legal issue as iniuria
is a moral one--a paradox which serves as the focus of the following
chapter--thus supplies the raw material for his parody of an epistolary

responsum, given the inability of the legal process itself to deal with moral
issues or the higher good is to be thoroughly exposed and satirized.
Seneca has chosen his terms well: iniuria (injury), vindicari (legal redress),

indignatus (personal affront), and damnavit (legal condemnation). Anger
is described in the language of the law, as any jurist would treat a
debatable legal point. An epistolary responsum would have been Seneca's
most appropriate form of choice in which to draw the connections he
recognized between iniuria and ira. His choice became all the more ironic
in that Roman law could neither acknowledge ira as illegitimate, nor

iniuria as immoral.
All this considered, there is yet more to suggest that the De Ira
structurally and thematically merits comparison to an epistolary

responsum besides the calculated use of quaesitum est (it has been asked),
quaerimus (we inquire), or quaestio (the question), terms conventionally
associated with legal inquiry. Other examples of the formulaic expression
which mark the surviving legal literature of problems occur with
regularity throughout the entire work.
320

Digest 1.1.

Of these, one of the most
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noteworthy is the omnipresent inquit (he says), upon whose precise import
and frequency there has been both attention and speculation. 321

The

now commonplace observation that the De Ira lacks the setting,
characters, or conversation formally present in a typically representative
dialogue is often accompanied by the observation that inquit (he says) or
a variant thereof--such as inquis (you say) or ait (he says)--is the sole
feature of the De Ira which approximates the conversational element or
technique of the dialogue. 322

Apart from Senecan scholarship on the

incidence and function of its use, however, at least one study of the legal
literature cites a more specialized meaning for inquit. 323 Rather than
signal the comments or objections of one of the participants in a dialogue,

inquit has been noted to introduce the opinions of another (often unnamed)
jurist or the guidelines from the praetor's edict. 324 Given the evidence
of legal usage thus far, the purpose inquit serves as a transitional device
marking an objection or a new direction deserves another look as a
convention of Roman legal writing.
As observed earlier, Seneca perceptively identifies the process of
321

Griffin, 414-15.

322

Ibid., 413-15.

323

Berger, 359, mentions inquit under the heading "ait (aiunt)." Cf.
Digest 47.2.21, e.g.: " ... inquit Trebatius ... "
324

Ibid. Cf. inquam (OLD, entries la and lb) and ait (OLD, entry 7).
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anger with that of an iniuria suit in every phase, a connection which not
only underscores his references to the delict, but influences his choice of
historical anecdotes as models for emulation or avoidance. The ubiquity
of inquit, however, plays at least as important a role in Seneca's overall
design, as a few representative passages will indicate.

Its first

occurrences, in the third chapter of book one, not only supply the
necessary context for connecting ira and iniuria, but they inaugurate the
continuous association of the two ideas.
"Irascimur" inquit "saepe non illis qui laeserunt,
sed iis qui laesuri sunt; ut scias iram non ex ini uria nasci." Verum est irasci nos laesuris, sed
ipsa cogitatione nos laedunt, et iniuriam qui facturus est iam facit. "Ut scias" inquit "non esse iram
poenae cupiditatem, infirmissimi saepe potentissimis
irascuntur nee poenam concupiscunt quam non sperant."
(1.3.1-2)
("We often get angry," someone rejoins, "not at those
who have hurt us, but at those who intend to hurt us;
you may, therefore, be sure that anger is not born of
injury." It is true that we do get angry at those who
intend to hurt us, but by the very intention they do
hurt us; the man who intends to do injury has already
done it. "But," he says, "that you may know that anger
is not the desire to exact punishment, the weakest men
are often angry at the most powerful, but hardly
desirous of a punishment which they have no hope of inflicting.)
The most obvious point of contention between Seneca and his adversary
curiously concerns the part iniuria plays in fixing the origin of ira. The
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passage is crucial for other reasons also, chief among which is that it
establishes a pattern and tone for other passages of the same kind. 325
First of all, the exchange appears unexpectedly in the aftermath of
Seneca's acknowledgement of Novatus' request and a lengthy diatribe on
the baneful social and legal effects of anger.

The inclusion of legal

consequences, however, provides a prelude to subsequent references to

iniuria, the first of which takes place in the course of Seneca's description
of the spectators at the games who are offended by a gladiator's
unwillingness to die. 326 In the two sections immediately preceding the
initial disagreement between Seneca and his adversary, iniuria figures
three times, effectively becoming the operative term seized upon by
Seneca's opponent to distinguish their differences and indeed fundamental
points of view. 327

Significantly, this first occasion of inquit (he says)

represents an attempt to disassociate ira from iniuria--to dissociate the
ethical from the legal, that is--a position Seneca disputes repeatedly and
successfully counters in the legally phrased description of the course of
anger in book two. 328
325

Cf.

11.26.1,

Nonetheless, the implications of this leading

just one of many examples.

3261.2.4
3271.2.4-5.
328

See especially 11.1.3-5.
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conversational interlude are clear: ira and iniuria have become formally
connected as principal concepts which either must logically relate or else
have no affinity. More importantly, a legal notion and a legal manner of
disagreement are given considerable weight at the very outset of the work.
Although the objections of Seneca's unnamed opponent vary widely,
the manner of objecting remains the same: quoted comments accompanied
by an unadorned and undistinctive "inquit." Of the numerous arguments
his adversarius presents, every conceivable attempt is made to give some
semblance of justification and respectability to anger, whether on serious
or trivial grounds. The necessity and utility of ira--conditions applied
legally in a variety of circumstances--are addressed from different
perspectives (the soldier and orator, for example), but when these grounds
fall short, more emotional pretexts--the nobility of savage beasts or the
languor of a peaceful spirit--prevail and are given due regard, since such
commonplaces and constituted real evidence for Seneca and his

adversarius. 329 Toward the conclusion of book two, however, his rival
returns to the original association between ira and iniuria proposed by
32

9Both Seneca and his adversarius introduce exempla from the animal
world for the sake of argument. Cf. 1.1.6-7 and II.15.4-16.2. See Wright,
55, for a brief analysis of this argument. Animal parallels for human
action and emotion were common and were taken as genuine evidence
from Homer on. Pliny Natural History 7-11, passim, offers an exhaustive
survey of animals and their distinctive traits.
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Seneca in the early chapters of the first book. The interchange between
the two adversaries at this point in the De Ira is noteworthy.
"Minus" inquit "contemnemur, si vindicaverimus iniuriam." Si tamquam ad remedium venimus, sine ira
veniamus, non quasi dulce sit vindicari, sed quasi
utile; saepe autem satins fuit dissimulare quam ulcisci.
(Il.33.1)
("If we avenge an injury, "he says," we shall be less
subject to contempt." If we must resort to a remedy,
as it were, for contempt, let us do so without anger-not with the plea that revenge is sweet, but that it
is expedient; it is often, however, better to feign
ignorance of an act than to take vengeance for it.)

As already noted, Seneca's anonymous adversary insists early on
that anger does not originate with iniuria, a notion with which Seneca
completely disagrees. By well into the second book, Seneca's opponent
introduces iniuria once again as a term apropos to the discussion; this
time, however, with a telling difference. Here, the reference to iniuria is
unequivocally legal in the context of what has preceded and what follows.
The famous exemplum in which Seneca invokes Marcus Cato's refusal to
vindicate the assault in the public bath occursjust before this excerpt, and
Seneca's use of the incident to illustrate his point heralds the adversarial
opinion that avoiding contempt (saving face, in other words) demands the
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vindication of iniuria. 330

More

importantly,

however,

Seneca's

opponent's rejection of the standard proposed in the anecdote assumes a
dismissal of the legal as well as the moral recommendation being
introduced, since both elements are essential to Seneca's argument and
presentation. 331 Cato's grounds for litigation are indisputable at law, as
both the facts which Seneca presents and his choice of the verb vindicare
(to assert a legal claim) in the anecdote clearly demonstrate. 332
Obviously not convinced by Seneca's recourse to Cato's exceptional
restraint as a norm, the adversarius uses vindicaverimus (if we avenge)-with iniuriam as its object--as being essential to avoiding scorn and in
consequence to preserving one's personal dignity. Seneca's reply not only
repeats vindicari (to be avenged), but adds remedium, a term often
employed to denote legal redress. 333
The adversarius has by now either accepted Seneca's initial claim
that ira and iniuria are intimately connected or has at least given up
330

Il.32.2-3.

331

For the legal sense of percussum and atrox iniuria contained in the
anecdote, see Chap. 2, 94-95.
332
333

See above, n. 317.

Berger, p.67 4, comments on re medium as follows: "Legal procedural
measures introduced by praetorian law, senatusconsulta, or imperial
legislation, such as actio, interdictum, exceptio, restitutio in integrum,
appellatio, etc."
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attempting to refute Seneca's arguments. 334

He not only accepts

Seneca's use of the term iniuria, but actively defends legal retaliation for
the delict of iniuria. 335

Just as important, however, are Seneca's

opposing remarks, which grant some value to the usefulness of litigation,
but with a caveat that it be undertaken "sine ira. "336 But whether in
334

1.3.1 provides the first connection between the two notions.

335

II.33.1 seems to make this clear, given the terminology: "Si
tamquam ad remedium venimus, sine ira veniamus, non quasi dulce sit
vindieari, sed quasi utile... "
336

Cf. the disclaimer "sine ira" here with a similar expression at the
opening of the Apocolocyntosis: "Quid aetum sit in eaelo ante diem III idus
Oetobris anno novo, initio saeeuli felicissimi, volo memoriae tradere. Nihil
nee offensae nee gratiae dabitur." Knoche, 107-108, comments on
similarities between parts of the Apocolocyntosis and the rules for a
Roman will. The formulaic language includes an official disavowal ("nee
offensae nee gratiae") which parallels the "sine ira. .. non dulce" at Il.33.1.
Although Knoche, 104, interprets the beginning of ther Apocolocyntosis as
the parody of a standard introduction to historical treatises, the famous
"sine ira et studio" (Annals I.1) or "neque amore... et sine odio" (Histories
I.1) of Tacitus bear striking resemblance to the two Senecan passages in
structure, tone, and meaning, amounting to formulaic judicial disclaimers
of what J.M. Kelly, Roman Litigation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), 3168, calls improper influences in Roman litigation on the part of the judge.
Thus, rather than Seneca parodying the introductions of historical
treatises, both Tacitus and Seneca may in fact have been employing the
standard formulaic language of the law. In addition, Tacitus himself(with
heretofore unrecognized, but characteristicirony) may have been using the
phraseology of the Roman will which ensured the exile of L. Fabricius
Veiento (Annals 14.50). Tacitus, Annals XIII-XVI, ed. John Jackson
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1937), 186 n.2, contains the
following remark about the literary activity of this figure of the Neronian
age: "His libels were embodied in an imaginary will. For as candour,
under the empire, was safest when posthumous, this was a favorite vehicle
for attacks on the great." Knoche, 107-108, dates the parodying of the
rules for a Roman will to Varro, and comments that parodies which made
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the adversarial plea for vindication or in Seneca's appeal to utile
(expedience) as the only acceptable condition upon which litigation for

Iniuria be pursued, the context of the passage is unmistakeably legal. 337
Both content--a legal case accompanied by legal distinctions and terms--and
form--objections prefaced only by inquit (he says)--in each of the excerpted
sections presumably typify various classical epistolary responsa in their
original unexpurgated versions. 338 Colorful case presentations, extensive
and copiously detailed legal analyses, and an often casual or colloquial
manner of speaking expected in a letter--elements readily observable in the
De Ira--all suggest the unabridged and unepitomized structure of the

responsa only

surmised from

the

evidence

available

from

the

fragments. 339
One final and significant attribute of the responsum appears
use of legal formulae were also circulating in imperial times as separate
brochures in prose. Knoche also makes passing mention of the will of the
little pig, the Testamentum Porcelli, as a legal parody which circulated in
late antiquity. F. Buecheler, Petronii Saturae (Berlin: Weidmannsche
Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1968), 346-47, includes a copy of this parody.
337

Berger, 756, notes the legal meaning of utilis: "Used of legal acts,
transactions, and procedural steps which have been, or can be, successfully
accomplished in a given situation." Cf. OLD, entry 2b.
338

Digest excerpts, themselves excerpted at times from responsa seem
to establish this. Frier, 177-200, offers various examples drawn from the
primary legal sources which demonstrate this point.
339

Schulz, Roman Legal Science, 223-26.
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frequently in the De Ira. The casuistic nature of the work comes in full
view when Seneca's legal vocabulary becomes apparent: specific arguments
acquire an altogether different sense, anecdotes once thought to be
overstated and extreme examples of Stoic virtus (virtue) in fact represent
concrete cases cases at law, and a particular problem or issue (iniuria)
obtains the sort of exhaustive examination it would at the hands of the
jurisconsults. 340 The cautelary character of many of the responsa--an
early and persistent aspect of the genre--is also present in the De Ira, and
closely parallels the reformative element of satire intimated by the
numerous advisory passages which recur. 341 As mentioned before, the
term cautelary refers to one of the essential functions of the Roman legal
expert: estimating the legitimacy or propriety of a particular act that is
contemplated by the inquirer. 342 As to the De Ira, Seneca's ostensible
subject is anger, but his concern with the delict iniuria invariably compels
a legal look at a problem otherwise deemed exclusively moral. Seneca
340

Ibid.

341

See above, Chap. 3, on the reformative aspect of satire. The
intentions of the jurist and the satirist merge at this point. The advisory
elements of the De Ira are in keeping with a satiric insistence on reform
or a juristic proposal consisting of sound advice, but inappropriate to a
philosophical demonstration of proofs. This advisory feature has thus
produced the hypothesis that Seneca's dialogues are more akin to the
informal Hellenistic diatribes. Cf. Weber, passim.
342

Schulz, Roman Legal Science, 19-22.
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disparages ira and especially inveighs against actions for iniuria as its
accepted social expression; even more disapprovingly, he calls to account
the least hint of anger in anyone charged with dispensing justice. It is
this insistence that a judge restrain his own anger, perhaps more than any
other aspect of the De Ira, which furnishes a secure context for Novatus'
query and Seneca's reply, since our author offers no other clue to the
background or circumstances which gave rise to his brother's petition.
Seneca's opening charge, though examined earlier at some length,
bears repeating, since it provides a suitable point of for comparison with
later passages of an explicitly cautelary nature.
aeque enim impotens sui est, decoris oblita, necessitudinum immemor, in quod coepit pertinax et intenta,
rationi consiliisque praecl usa, vanis agitata causis,
ad dispectum aequi verique inhabilis, ruinis simillima,
quae super id quod oppressere franguntur.
(1.1.2)
(For it is equally devoid of self-control, forgetful of
decency, unmindful of ties, persistent and diligent in
in whatever it begins, closed to reason and counsel,
excited by trifling cases, unfit to discern the fair
and true--the very counterpart of a ruin that is shattered to pieces on what it overwhelmed.)
As discussed earlier, Seneca's choice of terms appears oddly unsuited for
general application and more closely tailored to describe the consequences
of anger among those in positions of civic responsibility and authority. 343
343

See above, Chap. 3.
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The comments which bracket this description are yet more intriguing,
since they narrow the focus of Seneca's remarks and specify the grounds
on which he will continue. As he says before listing the results of anger:
Quidam itaque e sapientibus viris iram Dixerunt
brevem insaniam ....
(I.1.2)
(Certain wise men, therefore, have ruled that anger
is temporary madness ... )
And concluding the survey, he states:
Ut scias autem non esse sanos quos ira possedit,
ipsum illorum habitum intuere.
(1.1.3)
(But you have only to behold the aspect of those
possessed by anger to know that they are insane.)
Anger produces the personal effects he cites, then, since it either
indicates or resembles madness, whose physiological manifestations he
soon begins to detail. More importantly, however, Seneca's terms deserve
notice, for they correspond to a standard manner of speaking noted in the

responsa. 344 Secondly, and even more remarkable, the connection of ira
with insania unquestionably raises a legal issue, since insanity involved
344

Schulz, Roman Legal Science, 225, notes the following with regard
to the occurrence of dixi in the responsa: "Many of our responsa may have
come from this source; they may even be presumed to have done so when
the jurist introduces his answer by "dixi." And: "The use of the word dixi
is proof enough, since it would have been sheer affectation for a jurist to
use the past tense in reference to an opinion which he was reaching at the
moment of writing."
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restrictions on personal freedom according to Roman law. 345

To start

with, the verb dixerunt (they have said/ruled) and the connective ut in
combination with scias (so that you may know) have legal overtones. The
former became a common formulaic expression by which jurists would
refer to an earlier opinion or ruling, whereas the latter--found at critical
points throughout the De Ira--has almost the approximate sense of

sciendum est (it must be understood), "a favorite locution of many jurists
to introduce an important, general legal rule," as Berger observes. 346
Seneca's reliance on sapientibus viris (wise men) can be quite misleading,
however, and been taken to mean philosophers generally, or, in a more
confined sense, the wise (i.e., the virtuous) according to the tenets of the
Stoic school. 347

Yet another possible (and more likely) meaning of

345

Although insania remains the general term for mental disease
(Berger, 503), forms of furor, furere, or furiosus are the terms of choice in
the primary legal sources (Cf. Digest 50.17.124.1 and 50.17.40). Seneca
uses these terms repeatedly in connection with ira, as, for example, at
II.36.5: " .. .irasci se negant non minus quam insanire furiosi." Cf. Berger,
480, on the legal restrictions placed on the furiosi.
346

Schulz, Roman Legal Science, 225, 230, 234. Cf. Berger, 691. Busa
and Zampolli, 1194-97, list the frequency of scire and its variants as
spoken by both Seneca and his adversarius in the De Ira.
347

0LD, entries la and lb, provide the general meaning: "A wise man
(esp. as implying a virtuous man); ... a teacher of wisdom, sage,
philosopher." By itself, then, the phrase may refer to earlier philosophers
of the Stoic school, such as Panaetius, Posidonius, or Chrysippus, a
plausible interpretation in that the thought conveyed appears doctrinal.
It is less likely that the phrase alludes to the Stoic "sage," or virtuous man
(Cf. Sandbach, 22, 28, 43-45, 126), since this sense of sapiens is generally
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sapiens (wise man) pertains to the epithet awarded certain eminent jurists
known for their perspicacity of judgment, among whom would be included
Sempronius in the late fourth century B. C. and Lucius Acilius in the late
Republic. 348 If for no other reason, the context would seem to call for
this interpretation given the absence of any qualification limiting

sapientibus viris (wise men) to notable Stoic figures by direct citation or
indirectly by the use of a possessive adjective (e.g., nostris), methods he
employs elsewhere to designate Stoic affiliation. 349
Though brief, this entire passage (1.1.2-3) illustrates Seneca's legal
aims in several ways: the nature of the description of anger, the
association of ira and insania, and the deliberate use of both legal terms
applied to someone whose specific conduct is exemplary, such as Cato in
De Constantia Sa.pientis. In short, the difference of interpretation recalls
the Aristotelian distinction between practical and intellectual virtue in the
Nicomachean Ethics.
348

Berger, 694, cites these two figures in particular as having acquired
the agnomen "Sapiens" because of their extensive knowledge of the law,
a use that presupposes the general use of Sapiens as equivalent to "wise
in the law," as in the De Ira. Justus Lipsius apud Joh. Frid. Gronovius,
2, while commenting on the passage and the notion that ira implies brevis
insania, cite parallel statements by both Greek and Roman authors who
predate Seneca.
349

Cf. 11.19.3: "Volunt itaque quidam ex nostris iram in pectore moveri
effervescente circa cor sanguine... 11
Justus Lipsius apud Joh. Frid.
Gronovius, 64 n.3, identify nostris as being the Stoics. Cf. OLD, entry 6b:
"of our sect or philosophy; (masc. pl. as sh.) those who hold our views. 11
Seneca thus appears to be making a distinction between sapientes
generally, and nostri, or those belonging to the Stoic school.
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and the formulaic expressions found in the responsa. Appearing as early
in the De Ira as they do, the inclusion of these elements sets the pattern
for the legal dimension of what follows. Even more to the point, Seneca's
fundamental approach is presented: the nature of his study will be legal.
The formulaic dixerunt (they have said/ruled) and ut scias (so that you may
know), coupled with a short catalogue of anger's ill effects, underscore the
cautelary aspect which marks much of the De Ira. Seneca not only views
anger as a legal issue, he repeatedly refers to it as a particularly
destructive judicial problem as well, paying special attention to the
conduct of the iudex (judge) in the discharge of his duties. Taken together,
the anecdotes or exempla in the third book in fact comprise a contrasting
set of judicial practices which illustrate Seneca's point.

Generally

speaking, iudex (judge), and (to judge), and other words which specify
aspects of the judicial process regularly occur in a cautelary context.
Following a very general series of suggestions on preventing anger in
various circumstances, Seneca begins a sequence of explicitly legal
recommendations.
De parvola summa i udicat uro tibi res sine teste non
probaretur, testis sine iureiurando non valeret, utrique parti dares actionem, dares tempus, non semel
audires; magis enim veritas elucet quo saepius ad
manum venit: amicum condemnas de praesentibus? Antequam audias, antequam interroges, antequam illi aut
accusatorem suum nosse liceat aut crimen, irasceris?
lam enim, iam utrimque <quid> diceretur audisti? Hie
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ipse, qui ad te detulit desinet dicere, si probare
debuerit: "non est" inquit "quad me protrahas;
ego productus negabo; alioqui nihil umquam tibi dicam."
Eodem tempore et instigat et ipse se certamini pugnaeque subtrahit. Qui dicere tibi nisi clam non vult,
paene non dicit: quid est iniquius quam secreto credere,
palam irasci?
Quorundum ipsi testes sumus: in his naturam excutiemus voluntatemgue facientium.
(Il.29.3--30.1)
(If the question of even a small payment should come

before you to be judged, you would require a witness
to prove the claim, the witness would have no weight
except on oath, you would grant legal action to both
parties, you would allow them time, you would give more
than one hearing; for the oftener you come to close
quarters with truth, the more it becomes manifest. Do
you condemn a friend on the spot? Will you be angry
with him before you hear his side, before you question
him, before he has a chance to know either his accuser
or the charge? What, have you already heard what is to
be said on both sides? The man who gave you the information will of his own accord stop talking if he is
forced to prove what he says. "No need to drag me forward," he says; "if I am brought forward I shall make
denial; otherwise, I shall never tell you anything."
At one and the same time he both goads you on and withdraws himself from the strife and the battle. The man
who is unwilling to tell you anything except in secret
has, we may almost say, nothing to tell. What is more
unfair than to give credence secretly but to be angry
openly?
To some offences we can bear witness ourselves; in
such cases we shall search into the character and the
intention of the offenders.
Although Seneca's opening protasis specifies a trivial issue of the
sort which might be summarily treated in a modern small claims court, his
diminution of the offence--parvola summa (a minimal amount)--is deliberate
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and worthy of notice. First and foremost, the legal context of the passage
is immediately apparent from Seneca's choice of terms. Iudicaturo (about
to judge), teste and testis (witness), probaretur (given official approval),

iureiurando (on oath), and dares actionem (grant of legal action) evince an
unequivocally judicial setting; condemnas (pass sentence), accusator
(accuser or plaintiff), and crimen (crime) in the suceeding sentences sustain
the effect. 350 Most unusual, however, is the scope of Seneca's advisory
comments and prescriptions compared with so negligible a problem. Even
a pittance warrants great thoroughness and caution, and Seneca considers
every conceivable angle and each step necessary for arriving at a
conclusion untainted by ira, the topic with which he begins the chapter.
But here too, his remarks are clearly confined to ira as it bears on judicial
propriety.
Maximum remedi um irae mora est. Hoc ab illa pete
initio, non ut ignoscat, sed ut iudicet ...
350

Given the judicial setting, it should come as no surprise that in much
of Seneca's vocabulary here the legal sense is the primary sense. Note the
following terms: iudico (OLD, entry 1: "To judge, try, or decide <a
case> ... "); testis (OLD, entry 1: "One present at a legal transaction to give
the proceedings validity, a witness."); probo (OLD, entry le: "<leg.> to
give official approval to ... "); ius iurandum (OLD, entry 5: "A binding
formula to be sworn to, an oath <whether or not in legal contexts> ... ");
actionem dare (OLD, entry 2c: "... to grant <the right to take a legal
action> ... "); condemnas (OLD, entry 1: "<leg.> To pass sentence of
condemnation on, condemn <whether in a criminal or civil case> ... );
accusator (OLD, entry 1: "The prosecutor in a public trial, accuser,
plaintiff."); crimen (OLD, entry 1: an indictment, charge, accusation... ").
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II.29.1
(The best remedy for anger lies in delay. Beg this
of anger at the first, not in order to pardon, but
in order to judge.)
Judgment without anger, then, is Seneca's stated ideal; but
judgment in a technical sense, as the passage soon discloses. The small
size of the contested amount only further stresses the great care needed to
circumvent the influence of anger in decisions over seemingly negligible
matters. The aequus iudex (fair judge) or bonus iudex (good judge) is a
figure to whom Seneca makes repeated mention, either in passing or with
greater detail. 351 A few of the exceptional cases are noteworthy.
(1) Si volumus aegui rerum omnium iudices esse ....
(II.28.1)
(If we wish to be fair judges in all matters .... )

(2) N eque enim aeguus iudex aliam de sua, aliam de
aliena causa sententiam fert.
(I.14.2)
(For no just judge will pronounce one sort of judgment in his own case and a different one in the case
of others.)
351

Kelly, 102-117, examines the problem of "the misbehaving judge,"
the "iudex qui litem suam facit" (Digest 5.1.15.1), and a related matter,
improper influences in Roman litigation (31-68). Kelly, 33, quotes Cicero's
ideal of the ius civile (Pro Caecina, 71): "Quod enim est ius civile? quod
neque infiecti gratia neque perfringi potentia neque adulterari pecunia
possit." The Senecan passages below add a fourth corrupting influence-ira--to Cicero's tricolon, and insist on the ideal of the aequus or bonus
iudex.
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(3) Deinde ad condicionem rerum humanarum respiciendum
est, ut omnium accidentium aequi iudices simus ....
(111.26.3)
(Again, we must consider the limitations of our human
lot if we are to be fair judges of all that happens.)
(4) ... bonus iudex damnat improbanda, non odit.
(1.16.6)
(... a good judge condemns wrongful deeds, but he does
not hate them.)
Each of these instances calls attention to an important aim of the De Ira:
the presentation of a standard of judicial propriety untainted by anger.
Such an emphasis is at bottom juristic and in keeping with the spirit of
the responsa in accent and design.

Nowhere does Seneca display this

better than at the center of a sustained critique of punishment
accompanied by anger in Book One.
ltaque etsi perversa induenda magistratui vestis
et convocanda classico contio est, procedam in
tribunal non furens nee infestus sed vultu legis
et illa solemnia verba leni magis gravique quam
rabida voce concipiam et agi lege iubebo non iratus sed severus; et cum cervicem noxio imperabo
praecidi et cum parricidas insuam culleo et cum
mittam in supplici um militare et cum Tarpeio proditorem hostemve publicum imponam, sine ira eo
vultu animoque ero, quo serpentes et animalia
venenata percutio.
(1.16.5)
(Accordingly, even if as a magistrate I must put on
my robe awry and summon the assembly by the trumpet,
I shall advance to the high tribunal, not in rage
nor in enmity, but with the visage of the law, and
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as I pronounce those solemn words my voice will not
be fierce, but rather grave and gentle, and not with
anger, but with sternness, I shall order the law to
be enforced. And when I command a criminal to be
beheaded, or sew up a parricide in the sack, or send
a soldier to his doom, or stand a traitor or a public
enemy upon the Tarpeian rock, I shall have no trace
of anger, but shall look and feel as I might if I
were killing a snake or any poisonous creature.)
These comments feature the author himself, unlike similar passages
where Seneca's discussion of judicial practice remains one of detached
observation and advice; no longer in the background, Seneca states
emphatically how he is determined to conduct himself as a magistrate. In
sum, his comments are a profession of personal resolve to be the aequus

iudex (fair judge) he proclaims as the figure to be emulated. More broadly,
however, Seneca's personal declaration of impartiality in the exercise of
judicial office contains much more of note. Not surprisingly, as in other
sections of this type, he singles out ira as the vice least tolerable in a judge
and introduces his own avowal of equanimity as a more intense personal
recognition of the problem as well as his own responsibility as a public
official to ensure that anger does not impair his judgment. The examples
he uses to illustrate the difficulty of sustaining the desired attitude are
deliberately extreme--the parricide, the traitor, the public enemy--so as to
emphasize his objective even more. As a consequence, he replies to the
earlier examples of his adversarius--the robber and poisoner--with the most
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dire cases he can imagine, thereby heightening the contrast between judge
and criminal, justice and crime. 352
That Seneca so naturally places himself in the role of iudex (judge)
or praetor (praetor) with authority to pass sentence for capital offenses
clearly reveals a familiarity with the office and its processes he can easily
assume in collegial correspondence with a fellow magistrate. Likewise, he
can readily refer to or advise on matters of magisterial or judicial conduct
in general on similar grounds, as one jurist writing to another, a
circumstance the representative passages quoted illustrate so well. More
than this, however, Seneca's not infrequent insistence on the absence of
anger in one who aspires to be considered, as he so often says, an aequus

iudex (fair judge), simply redirects attention to the overall legal aspect of
the De Ira, of which his remarksonjudicial conduct constitute only a part.
Together with other key features, such as the formulaic terms found in the
legal literature of problems, for example, Seneca's advisory comments on
the deportment of a judge add one more element among several which
parallel elements known to have distinguished epistolary responsa in the
classical era. At the same time, the coexistence of elements in the De Ira
that are found in the responsa help, at least in part, to explain the
352

At 1.16.1, the adversarius asks: "Quid ergo? Non irascar latroni?
Quid ergo? Non irascar venefico'f'
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puzzling absence of conventions which mark the philosophical dialogue:
the lack of definite setting, organized conversation, and named characters.
In terms of both structure and content, then, the De Ira resembles
both a literary epistle and a legal responsum; its addressee is stated and
the sum of Seneca's observations comprise a lengthy reply to an
apparently sincere ethical question. Ira, the subject of Novatus' inquiry,
is not solely a moral issue: this Seneca clearly believes, given the way that
he associates each aspect of anger with the stages of litigation for

iniuria. 353

But even if Seneca constructed the De Ira with the

responsum of his age as a model, his basic position regarding anger
suggests a further possibility, since he so closely links the two notions of

ira and iniuria. Not merely one vice among the usual roster of Stoic sins
to be avoided, ira is a delictum animi (delict of the mind), and he discusses
it correspondingly--asajurist rather than a philosopher. The consideration
of anger as a delict produces a curious paradox whereby iniuria, a delict

de iure almost by definition becomes a de facto philosophic vice as well.
Thus, the De Ira, which seems to share so many features with an
epistolary responsum, may well reproduce the form while concealing a
more elusive purpose--taking the law itself to task for encouraging ira
through sanctioning iniuria--by means of the very genre enlisted in the
353

11.1.3-5.
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service of legal clarity. If ira is, as Seneca seems to claim, a genuine legal
ill and iniuria an avoidable vice, the responsum furnishes the consummate
form by which to parody the artificial and ineffective claims of the law, a
form which enables him to speak not solely as a jurist, but as a satirist.

CHAPTER FIVE
THE DE IRA AS PARODY

Although the recognized features of the epistolary responsum clearly
correspond to the form of the De Ira, Seneca does not merely use the

responsum as a model; he parodies it. A typical responsum of the classical
period might discuss any problematic point of law, such as a particular
delict, for example. The ostensible theme of the De Ira is moral, however,
not legal, and Seneca uses the form of the responsum to discuss the delict

iniuria only as it pertains to ira, thereby diminishing the importance of
the delict as part of the discussion. By giving the delict lesser status,
Seneca "insults" the legal dignity of iniuria and misappropriates the form
of the responsum for the analysis of a moral problem, an irony which
would not be missed by his addressee or a contemporary audience. A later
audience, however, neither attuned to the technical nature of Seneca's
vocabulary nor familiar with the unabridged writings of the Roman jurists,
could hardly be expected to understand the De Ira as anything other than
a discussion on the morality of anger and a dialogue of inferior quality
when held up to earlier standards of composition.
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A parody of the

206

responsum to censure a moral ill and discourage the legitimate use of the
delict both mocks the legal genre and is an affront to the seriousness of

iniuria, details a Roman audience would have immediately noticed.
The epistolary responsum was by nature as serious an effort as a
philosophical dialogue, and could be distorted by parody only at the hands
of an author skilled at adapting a serious genre to a far different and more
subtle end. As his works reveal, Seneca was a multi-talented author,
capable of serious philosophical works and tragic drama, but of satire as
well, as we know because of a single work which may offer the best clue
for understanding Seneca's purpose in choosing the responsum as the most
suitable model for the De Ira.
Perhaps the most intriguing work of the Senecan corpus which has
been handed down by tradition, the Apocolocyntosis, represents an
excellent example of Menippean satire, a genre in which prose was
intermixed with various verse forms in order to "enhance a moment of the
story or to illustrate the argument," as one critic puts it. 354

Long

considered an anomaly among Seneca's writings, the Apocolocyntosis
demonstrates the extent to which its author was capable of adding satire
354

Coffey, 149.
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to a repertoire composed primarily of tragic drama and philosophy. 355
Written early in the reign of the emperor Nero by most accounts, it is a
few years later than the De Ira. 356 Consequently, it bears comparison
with the De Ira; Seneca had already satirised the law there, and the
Apocolocyntosis continues the practice. 357

The recognizable legal

trappings which it features--the formulaic dating and disclaimer (1), the
355

Knoche, 99-108, offers an excellent discussion of the exceptional
nature of the Apocolocyntosis among the writings of Seneca, and includes
a brief synopsis of the MSS tradition and the questioning of authorship.
According to Coffey, 166, the title ludus is not found in the MSS, but
rather in "the epitome of Cassius Dio (60 ... 35) ... among the jokes and
frivolities that followed the death of Claudius ... "
356

K. Abel, Bauformen in Senecas Dialogues (Heidelberg: C. Winter,
Universitatsverlag, 1967), 155-70, surveys the evidence for the dating of
Seneca's works. Cf. F. Giancotti, Cronologia dei "Dialoghi" di Seneca
(Turin: Loescher, 1957), 93-150.
357

Knoche, 107-108, makes a number of interesting observations about
the Apocolocyntosis as a political pamphlet and a parody of a Roman will,
remarking that the latter enjoyed a lengthy tradition which begins with
Varro's Menippean satires (543) and continues well into the imperial age.
Cf. Suetonius Augustus 56 and Tacitus Annals 14.50 for examples of
political pamphlets and parodies of this sort. Knoche also notes that
parodies " which made use of legal formulae were ... circulating in imperial
times as separate brochures in prose, but since here it was only a case of
quite modest writings serving the purpose of amusement, our knowledge
of them is both casual and incomplete." Horace Sermones 2.1 offers a
parody of a legal discussion between the poet and the jurist Trebatius
which demonstrates Knoche' s point. Lines 82-86 are especially relevant
here, since defamatory poems (carmina mala), one of the offences included
within the scope of iniuria, is the issue discussed. Horace's "Esto, si quis
mala. .. " (line 83) parodies the formulaic language of the Twelve Tables as
well as later legal writings. See Berger, 381, on carmen malum, or carmen
famosum.
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senatorial deliberations (8-11), and the scene from the Roman court
(14-15)--indicates how very comfortable (and masterful) Seneca was with
parody. 358
Undeniably the difference of genre makes comparison difficult at
first glance; as transmitted, the De Ira is classified a dialogus (dialogue)
and the Apocolocyntosis a ludus (play/skit/) or satura (satire). 359 On the
face of it, the Menippean form of the Apocolocyntosis is unmistakeable,
and the parodies present are obvious. Seneca's adroit ridicule of the
funeral and deification ceremonies, however, is apparent because of his
revealing use of the familiar Meni ppean form and an unconcealed
distortion of the formalities he describes; the Menippean form, however,
was not the genre on which the De Ira was based, and herein lies a
frequently cited obstacle to the acknowledgement that a parody is taking
place, a difficulty which has been overlooked by scholars attempting to
358

Cf. Petronius and Seneca, Apocolocyntosis, trans. Michael Haseltine
and W.H.D. Rouse, rev. E.H. Warmington, Loeb Classical Library
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987), 436-39, 456-69, and 478-83,
for text and translation. Seneca describes the Roman courts and their
environs in unflattering terms at De Ira Il.7-9 ..
359

See above, Introduction, on the classification of the De Ira as a
dialogue. Knoche, 99-100, and Coffey, 166-67, discuss the Apocolocyntosis
and the problem of attribution.
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understand the structural irregularities in the De Ira. 360

The terms

ludus (play/skit/joke) and satura (satire) at least suggest the possibility
that parody--one of the most attractive and effective forms of satire--will,
of course, be found upon even an initial reading. Absent such a title, the
De Ira can be parodying a whole genre (i.e., Roman legal procedure as
such) and go entirely unnoticed; especially so the more cleverly and
skilfully an author succeeds in concealing the original form upon which he
bases his imitation. 361 In the case of the Apocolocyntosis, then, no such
problems arise; it is the De Ira, if it is to be understood as parody, that
poses all the problems.
Although nothing in the title or its traditional generic designation
would prompt any conclusion other than the most widely accepted--that the
De Ira is a philosophical work--its failure to meet the previous standards
of the genre ever since the dialogues of Plato have persuaded most critics
360

Highet, 72, remarks that skillful parody "almost coincides with
reality ... ," and is such that it "might, by the unwary, be accepted as
genuine work of the original author or style parodied." Princeton
Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics(Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1993), s.v. "Parody," by R. P. Falk and Frances Teague, enlarges on
Highet's observations: "Because the success of parody depends not only on
the reader's understanding of the text, but also on the recognition of the
source-text it is based on and the comical twist or reversal of those cultural
values embedded in the source-text, the readerly transaction is complex.
And the parody itself of course instantiates the source at the same time
that it subverts it."
361

Ibid.
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that Seneca's methods were unsatisfactory. 362 In light of the outright
ridicule of Claudius in the Apocolocyntosis, the one work which certainly
reveals a facility with satire on Seneca's part, both critics and admirers
overlook the more subtle Etwas fehlt of which he was capable.

The

versatile Seneca, after all, penned this caustic mockery of Claudius at
precisely the same time he publicly eulogized the safely dead god in a
speech written for the young Nero to deliver. 363

Not even that

panegyric, however, could remain free from the irony that survival had
cultivated in Seneca under the reigns of Gaius and Claudius, as a wellknown observation of Tacitus testifies .
... postquam ad providentiam sapientiamque fl.exit, nemo
risui temperare, quamquam oratio a Seneca composita
multum cultus praeferret, ut fuit illi viro ingenium
amoenum et temporis eius auribus adcommodatum.
(Ann. XIII.3)
(... after he shifted to the foresight and wisdom < sc.,
of Claudius>, no one could keep from laughing, although
the speech, written by Seneca, displayed much care,
as the man possessed a talent congenial and suitable for the listeners of his age.)
Noted mostly for the seriousness of the Dialogi or Epistulae Morales
and the grimness of his Tragoediae, the Seneca of the Apocolocyntosis is
too easily dismissed, an oversight resulting in a failure to appreciate the
362

36

See Wright, 39-40. Cf. Griffin, Introduction.

3Tacitus Annales 13.3. contains a description of the event.
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not inconsiderable gift for satire hinted at by Tacitus. Despite the slim
bulk of the Apocolocyntosis in the Senecan corpus, the talent for parody
evidenced is quite as remarkable as the attested sense of irony displayed
in the ghost-written eulogy for Claudius, whose reputation for unwisdom
and improvidence is well-documented. 364

Such facility for satiric

technique, although observed in the philosophical works and letters by
some scholars, undercuts an assumed seriousness of intent in those
writings and occasions an understandable disregard for the degree to
which Seneca could indeed shift from philosopher to satirist and back
again. 365
Non-fiction parody had enjoyed a tradition at least as far back as
Plato's Menexenus, with its mockery of the sophists: Plato's knack for
parody remains one of his more memorable gifts. 366 Yet Seneca had a
Roman tradition on which to rely as well. Prose parodies of Roman legal
formulae can be found in Varro, and similar efforts have been attested in
the imperial age, though our knowledge of them is scanty. 367 In addition
to the satiric elements already noted in the De Ira, the above factors
364

Suetonius Claudius passim.

365

See Weber,1-6.

366

Highet, 137-8, examines Plato's parody of Lysias' style at the
beginning of the Phaedrus and his parodies of speeches in the Menexemus.
367

See above, n. 357.
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suggest that there is a scheme in the De Ira far different from the ethical
purpose that it has been assumed to exhibit, a design in which the satirist
of the Apocolocyntosis presupposes the satirist of the De Ira.
Whereas the parodies in the Apocolocyntosis--including the selfparody of the Hercules Furens--point to the models on which they are
founded, the structure of the De Ira, possessing little formal resemblance
to earlier philosophical dialogues, suggests no source-text or original upon
which to establish a comparison. 368 But if Seneca's legal emphasis is
kept in mind, it becomes clear that the legal literature provides the sourcetext for the De Ira. The most likely candidate in this regard are the legal
briefs discussed in the preceeding chapter--the responsa; unfortunately, not
a single complete example survives, but there are enough surviving
fragments of the genre which the De Ira may well illustrate if not entirely
exemplify. 369 If this is the case, many of the unsettling problems of form
and content in the De Ira find a solution and Seneca's underrated abilities
368

Knoche, 104-08, elaborates on the various parodies within the
Apocolocyntosis, including the funeral eulogy (laudatio funebris) and even
self-parody--the figure of Hercules here, based on the Hercules Furens. Cf.
0. Weinreich, Senecas Apocolocyntosis, die Satire auf Tod, Himmel- und
Hollenfahrt des Kaisers Claudius: Einfiihrung, Analyse, und
Untersuchungen (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1923), passim.
369

See Schulz, Roman Legal Science, 223-61, on the state of the
evidence.
Lenel, passim, remains the most complete attempt at
reconstructing portions of the responsa and other forms of the literature
of legal problems.
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as a satirist--and a parodist--assume a new prominence. The humor and
sense of the ridiculous necessary to the best of parodies depend on an
accuracy of imitation in which the parody and its source become
indistinguishable the more aware the reader is of the sty le and thought of
the text or tradition being parodied. 370

Since only fragments of the

responsa and references to their general shape and content survive,
evidence must be confined to these sources and what Roman legal
historians have been able to adduce about them. Nonetheless, enough
parallels exist between what is known of the responsa and internal data
from the text to support the idea that the De Ira is a parody of a

responsum.
Pedantry, dullness, pomposity, and self-importance have been listed
as some of the more obvious targets of parody which, when successful,
provides the most trenchant criticism of its subject by attacking it on its
own grounds. 371

As chance would have it, these are precisely the

qualities that critics of the De Ira have not merely cited as characteristic
of the work, but even turned into judgments long detrimental to Seneca's
370

See Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics, 1972 ed., s.v.
"Parody," by R.P. Falk and William Beare.
371

Ibid.
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reputation. 372 It is hardly in character for the author of so lively a piece
as the Apocolocyntosis or so ironic a speech as that which he wrote for
Nero on the occasion of Claudius' funeral to pen a deliberately tedious and
unphilosophic "dialogue" when outstanding models of the dialogue in both
Greek and Roman traditions were still well-known.

The greater

probability is that the juristic writing availed Seneca the opportunity to
apply his talent for parody toward illuminating the legalistic absurdities
of the age in a style all too common in the legal writing in any era--dull,
pedantic, and pompous. 373

Combining legal expertise with a satiric

sensibility, he could mimic the jurists and Claudius, whose mania for legal
pronouncements is amply attested and seems to have stamped his
reign. 374 It is the selfsame Seneca who decried the way people resorted
to actions for iniuria in the De Ira who later envisions Claudius in the
underworld, accused of transgressing the very Lex Cornelia to which he
372

Michele Coccia, I problemi del De ira di Seneca alla luce dell'analisi
stilistica (Rome: Edizioni dell'Ateneo, 1957) addresses many of these
issues. Cf. Giovanni Cupaivolo lntroduzione al De Ira di Seneca (Naples:
Societa Editrice Napoletana, 1975), provides a more recent survey of the
problems.
37

3The pronouncements of Judge Bridlegoose in Rabelais' Gargantua
and Pantagruel are examples of what would now be called "legalese."
374

Villy Sorensen, Seneca: The Humanist at the Court of Nero trans.
W. Glyn Jones (Edinburgh and Chicago: Canongate Publishing Ltd. and
The University of Chicago Press, 1984), 110, casually comments on this
trait of Claudius. Cf. Tacitus Annales 13.4, and Suetonius Claudius 14-15.
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had apparently resorted so often in life. 375
Ducit ilium ad tribunal Aeaci: is lege Cornelia
quae de sicariis lata est, quaerebat. Postulat,
nomen eius recipiat; edit subscriptionem: occisos
senatores XXXV, equites R. CCXXI, ceteros oaa
11J&µa0o, -re Kov1, '!:€. Advocatum non venit.
(Apocolo. 14)
(Pedo brings him before the judgment seat of Aeacus,
who was holding court under the Lex Cornelia to try
cases of murder and assassination. Pedo requests
the judge to take the prisoner's name, and produces
a summons with this charge: Senators killed 35, Roman
knights, 221; others. as many as the grains of sand
and dust. Claudius finds no counsel.)
The roughshod misuse of the law depicted here is of the same sort
recounted over and over in the De Ira, especially in the exempla of book
three. 376 Seneca's protests about the condition of the courts and those
who frequent them, or his unrelenting condemnation of iniuria as little
more than legitimized anger, are straightforward and conspicuous satiric
features with origins in the diatribe. 377 Aside from the reasons already
375

Berger, 549-50, lists the various Cornelian Laws (Leges Corneliae)
enacted under the dictator Sulla during the years 82-79 B.C., which
included the Lex Cornelia de sicariis et veneficiis mentioned by Seneca
here. Berger notes that although some of these laws were repealed, the
Lex Cornelia de sicariis et venejiciis remained in force under Justinian. Cf.
Digest 48.8. Suetonius Claudius 14-15 and 34-38 details many of the
emperor's misdeeds.
376
377

Cf. III. 14-21.

Cf. Horace Sermones 1.1.28 ff. and 1.1.1 ff. with De Ira 111.33 and
III.31 respectively, parallels observed in the last century by Weber, 3.

216
given, the element of parody in the De Ira remains hard to recognize
precisely because it too closely resembles a philosophical line of reasoning.
Yet one of the most effective weapons at the disposal of the parodist is the
slight distortion which compels a novel, cutting, but ultimately accurate
recognition of the object of parody--in this case, Roman law and the bloated
pronouncements of the imperial jurists. 378

There may be very little

which distinguishes an ethical from a legal line of argument, and Seneca
has brilliantly blurred the lines separating morality and law early in Book
Two by representing anger as a process identical to the stages of litigation
for iniuria.
.. .intellexit aliguid, indignatus est, damnavit, ulciscitur: haec non possunt fieri, nisi animus eis
quibus tangebatur adsensus est.
(II.1.5)
(He has formed a judgement, become outraged, has
passed sentence, and achieves vengeance. These
processes are impossible unless the mind has given
assent to the impressions that moved it.)
378

Highet, 68-70, remarks that satiric parody "wounds the original
(however slightly), pointing out faults, revealing hidden affectations,
emphasizing weaknesses and diminishing strengths ... " In addition, he
observes that there are satiric parodies "in which the form is maintained
virtually unaltered, without exaggeration, without distortion, while the
thought within it is made hideously inappropriate to the form, or inwardly
distorted, or comically expanded." Seneca uses the responsum to his
advantage in the De Ira and achieves many of effects which Highet lists,
ironically employing a legal form to criticize legal principles--most
prominently iniuria--considered worthwhile from the time of the Twelve
Tables.
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On first glance, Seneca's concise account of this process looks like a
standard philosophical treatment in which anger is treated as a moral
problem involving an acknowledged course of action freely chosen; his
ostensible topic is an ethical malaise, not a statutory offense, unless one
examines the language and context of the chapter and recalls a revealing
remark from Book One which bears further examination:
... nam cum ira delictum animi sit, non oportet
peccata corrigere peccantem. "Quid ergo? Non
irascar latroni? Quid ergo? Non irascar venefico?" Non; neque enim mihi irascor, cum sanguinem
mitto. Omne poenae genus remedi loco admoveo.
(1.16.1)
(... For since anger is a deli ct of the mind, it is
not right to correct wrong-doing by doing wrong.
"What then," you exclaim; "shall I not be angry
with a robber? Shall I not be angry with a poisoner?" No; for I am not angry with myself when I let
my own blood. To every form of punishment will I
resort, but only as a remedy.)
Here, in unequivocal terms, Seneca boldly employs the legal metaphor

"delictum animi" (delict of the mind) to characterize anger. 379 In doing
379

Cf. the legal contexts of Seneca's use of delictum at 1.14.2, 11.6.2-4,
and 1.19.6. There are, however, other significant aspects about the passage
that are worthy of mention. First of all, the question asked by Seneca's
adversarius suggests that ira is an appropriate response to the robber
(latro) or the poisoner (veneficus). By referring to anger as a delict of the
mind, Seneca has criminalized ira and places it in relationship with the
criminal offences introduced by his adversarius. Secondly, there is a legal
nuance to Seneca's use of non oportet(it is not right). David Daube, Forms
of Roman Legislation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956), 8-23, closely
examines the substitutes for the imperative which express necessity or
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so, Seneca's emphasis and intent is to establish a context which "poena"
(penalty) can be exacted, but fairly. Delictum (delict) denotes a statutory
offense, and poena (penalty) is the generic term for a legal fine or
judgment. 380 With this in mind, Seneca's later discussion on the nature
and the course of anger (Il.1.1-5) assumes a direction not unlike that of a
juristic analysis of some particular crime or offense, and reaches a
crescendo delivered as though it were the final statement of a judge's
verdict of guilt: intellexit (he formed a judgment), indignatus est (became
outraged), damnavit (passed sentence), ulciscitur (achieves revenge)--a
succinct and powerful summation of the facts essential for Seneca to secure
a verdict in iram (against anger) in the "court" of public opinion. That
Seneca has concluded his condemnation of ira by enlisting terms which
express an approved procedure of the law achieves an irony pleasantly
reminiscent of the satiric subtleties of Horace, not the philosophical
sobriety of Cicero.
Repeatedly and consistently, legal metaphor and analysis recur in
obligation, such as oportet and necesse est, to present a recognized legal
standard or juristic interpretation of what is required by law. For the
frequency of oportere or its forms in the De Ira, see Busa and Zampolli,
924.
3

~erger,

430, comments thus on delictum: " ... the source of one group
of obligations (obligationes ex delicto) which in the fundamental division
of obligations is opposed to the contractual ones (obligationes ex contractu).
Cf. Nicholas, 207-09.
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the De Ira, most noticeably where the ethical analysis seems to be
plodding along precisely because Seneca has adopted the airs (or rather
long-windedness) of a jurist so faithfully that his very skill at imitation
has been taken for a genuinely unskillful effort on his part. 381

The

result has been that critics fail to recognize the tone the significance of
precisely those stretches of the work where parody of a responsum is often
most successfully achieved. Seneca's continuous handling of ira as a delict
conforms to an observed feature of the responsa so far as can be drawn
from fragments or testimonia: the exhaustive legal analysis of a single
problematic legal question or issue. 382

In addition to the specialized

terminology of iniuria, to the advice specific to the activities of a judge,
and to the number of anecdotal exempla which double as either legal cases
or trial settings, Seneca's treatment of ira as delict presents a still more
persuasive argument for the De Ira as parody of a jurist's responsum. The
381

Suetonius Claudius 38.1, refers to an edict of Claudius which may
well have been Seneca's inspiration for writing the De Ira: /rae atque
iracundiae conscius sibi, utramque excusavit edicto distinxitque, pollicitus
alteram quidem brevem et innoxiam, alteram non iniustam fore. 11 (He was
aware of his tendency to anger and irascibility and excused both in an
edict; he also drew a distinction between them, promising that the former
would be short and harmless and the latter not unjust.)
11

382

Schulz, Roman Legal Science, 223, characterizes the literature of
legal problems as 11 . . . works devoted exclusively to problems, to the most
difficult and perplexing questions of law... The problems are discussed
individually, at varying length... "
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implications of this conclusion and a more detailed account of just how
Seneca's parody unfolds require additional discussion, however, before a
final assessment can be ventured as to the status of the De Ira as legal
parody in particular and as satire in general.
With regard to Seneca's idiosyncratic view of ira, one must begin by
examining some of the common characteristics and effects of parody and
the ways they function in the De Ira. One of the hallmarks of parody is
distortion of a style, author, or work by as close an imitation as possible
in order to heighten the intended ridicule of what is being parodied. 383
Whether Seneca had an individual jurist in mind can hardly be
determined at this late date--their works are mostly lost, in any case--but
the content and structure of the De Ira certainly appear to mimic the style
and format of a responsum in so far as the available evidence allows. The
distortion occurs as a result of Seneca's equation of anger with a legally
actionable delict. He thus fashions both a reversal of social priorities-morality taking precedence over law--and infers the moral and legal
equivalence of ira and iniuria. At this point, law turns into a universal
collusion to legalize acts malign by nature. Accordingly, Seneca strips the
pretense of innocence from the victims of iniuria in their pursuit of justice
383

Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics, 1972 ed., s.v.
"Parody," by R.P. Falk and William Beare.
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and exposes the delict as merely an opportunity for the aggrieved to
satiate their desire for revenge. In much the same fashion as the tragic
cliche that suffering brings wisdom, for the parodist, distortion yields a
clarity which also produces wisdom. 384
Well-versed in Stoic thought and an innovator in tragic drama,
Seneca understood the power and importance of paradox in each
tradition. 385 Indeed, the epigrammatic point for which he is both blamed
and praised is often no more than a terse truth consisting of an elegant
paradox, and although the De Ira has its share of these pithy aphorisms,
the overriding paradox of ira as delict, and delict as vice, suffuses the
work. 386 Much like the realization in the tragedy of Oedipus that vision
384

See Aeschylus Agamemnon 171-78. Aristotle Poetics 4 briefly
comments on the distorted mask of comedy.
385

The Stoic paradoxes were well known in the Republic. Cicero
(Paradoxa Stoicorum) lists and discusses the six most common paradoxes.
These paradoxes were at times the object of satire, perhaps because of the
unattainable moral standards they established. Horace Sermones 1.3, 2.3,
and 2.7 criticizes those which he finds extreme and incompatible with
sensible living. D. and E. Henry, 13, cite paradox as one of the most
important elements of Seneca's tragedies. G.K. Hunter, "Seneca and
English Tragedy," in Seneca, ed. C. D. N. Costa (London and Boston:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974), 166-204, primarily examines Seneca's
influence on Elizabethan drama, but often comments on his importance for
continental drama as well.
386

J. R. G. Wright, 39, remarks on "the straining for 'point' and
rhetorical effect" in Seneca's writings. R. Pfennig, De librorum guos
scripsit Seneca de ira compositione et origine (diss. Greifswald, 1887),
attempts to be a comprehensive survey of Seneca's stylistic "flaws."
11.28. 7 provides a typical epigram: " ... et fidei acerrimus exactor est
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itself possesses both a physical and a moral dimension, the recognition
that law may as easily contribute to vice or virtue and is not onedimensional forms the central theme of the De Ira. Paradox thus lies as
much at the core of the effective parody as at the heart of tragedy. The
end result is also similar: a serious idea arrived at from different
directions--the one tragic, the other comic. Seneca's legal examination of

ira combines with a moral analysis of iniuria to diminish the dignity of
Roman law and emphasize its moral bankruptcy. That he uses the idiom
of the law to mock the solemn and portentous auctoritas (authority) behind
the jurist's own medium--the responsum--only intensifies the incongruities
of the law as well as maximizing the satiric effect.
Parody and paradox, the operative form and principal figure of the
De Ira, offer but a general sense of Seneca's purpose and intended
meaning.

In order to appreciate the overall effect, it is necessary to

examine his imitation of a responsum as well as the legal paradox he
constructs in more detail. As discussed earlier, Seneca clearly sets iniuria
in a legal context, a tactic which substantially alters the nucleus of his
design; particularly so when one appraises the importance of the concept
in relation to his definition of ira and the regularity with which iniuria

perfidus ... " (... the strictest enforcer of loyalty is the traitor ... )

223
appears throughout. 387

Likewise, the fact that Seneca devotes large

portions of the De Ira to iniuria seems odd.
Despite his stated topic, analysis of what does or does not constitute
the delict of iniuria and of the various acts which fall within its compass
comprises a large proportion of a work supposedly devoted to ira. 388
Additional emphasis also results from the numerous exempla which serve
as much to illustrate iniuria or represent a court proceeding as to promote
a Stoic ethic. 389 However out of keeping or tangential Seneca's concern
with iniuria may initially appear, his preoccupation with the delict is
paramount for understanding ira, and without it, neither the parody nor
the paradox can prevail.
Precise and impressive legal analysis is perhaps the central feature
of Seneca's treatment of iniuria, but a feature his examination of ira
shares. He refers to anger as a delictum animi (delict of the mind) and
387

See above, Chap. 2.

388

Busa and Zampolli, 648-9, list seventy occurrences of the word in the
De Ira. Iniuria appears with any frequency only in the De Ira, De
Constantia Sapientis, De Beneficiis, and Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales.
References to the delict are both explicit, as at II.1-5 and 25-33, and
implicit. The frequent and obviously legal use of the term in these works
(particularly in the De Ira), coupled with Seneca's characterization of ira
as the desire for revenge (Il.1.4), underscore the Senecan influence on
Nero's promise "to bring neither outrages nor a desire for revenge" (nullas
iniurias nee cupidinem ultionis adferre) on the occasion of his initial speech
to the Roman senate (Tacitus Annales 13.4).
389

See II.32-33 and III.14-24.
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evaluates it accordingly by applying all the rigor one would expect of a
jurist interested in every conceivable side of a problem and hopeful of
composing the definitive and comprehensive responsum on the question.
As a consequence, Seneca makes the same sort of investigation of ira that
he does in his exploration of iniuria: what it is, what distinguishes it or
sets it apart, what its effects are, and what can be done to curtail it are
taken up in turn and explored. But more than this, it becomes apparent
that Seneca does not castigate the delict in the same manner in which he
addresses and faults the justification and expression of anger; he must of
necessity grapple with iniuria as the social outlet of ira and a widely
abused legal safeguard originally conceived in order to offer protection
against very basic antisocial behavior, such as assault, battery, libel, and
defamation. 390 It is clear, however, from Seneca's intermittent diatribes
on the courts that iniuria, driven by ira, had become a pretext rather than
a

protection--a

dissatisfactions. 391
390

convenient

resource

for

avenging

even

trivial

If Seneca's portrait of the courts and their irate

That there should be legal redress for these basic violations to one's
person developed early in Roman law and continued throughout Roman
legal history. See Warmington, 474·77, and Digest 47.10-25; also Frier,
177-200, and Nicholas, 215-17. As such, Seneca's plea for restraint in
resorting to litigation for iniuria constituted a radical departure from
accepted practice.
391

E.g., 11.6-9.
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denizens are any guide, the anger resulting could even be worse than the
acts that purportedly warranted the anger to begin with. The De Ira,
modelled on the epistolary responsum, could most effectively convey this
insight--and with all the sharpness and force of which parody is capable.
Point by point, Seneca considers ira as a delict--its nature, its
characteristics, and its consequences--using the language of the law and
the art of legal reasoning. Immediately prior to identifying the processes
of anger and litigation cited earlier, Seneca begins by questioning the
nature of anger as a Roman jurist would question what would constitute
violation of a delict. 392
(1) quaerimus enim ira utrum iudicio an impetu in-

cipiat, id est utrum sua sponte moveatur an
quemadmodum pleraque, quae intra nos <non> 1nsciis nobis oriuntur.
(11.1.1)
(...for the question is whether anger originates
from choice or impulse, that is, whether it is
aroused of its own accord, or whether, like much
else that goes on within us, it does not arise
without our knowledge.)
(2) Iram quin species oblata ini uriae moveat non est
dubium; sed utrum speciem ipsa statim sequatur
et non accedente animo excurrat, an illo adsentiente moveatur quaerimus. Nobis placet nihil
illam per se audere sed animo adprobante; nam
speciem capere acceptae iniuriae et ultionem eius
concupiscere et utrumque coniungere, nee laedi se
392

See Il.1.4-5, where Seneca identifies the two processes.
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debuisse et vindicari debere, non est eius impetus,
qui sine voluntate nostra concitatur.
(Il.1.3-4)
(There can be no doubt that anger is aroused by
the direct impression of injury; but the question
is whether it follows immediately upon the impression and springs up without assistance from the
mind, or whether it is aroused only with the assent
of the mind. Our opinion is that it ventures nothing by itself, but acts only with the approval of
the mind. For to form the impression of having received an injury and to long to avenge it, and then
to couple together the two propositions that one
ought to be avenged--this is not a mere impulse of
the mind acting without volition.)
The significance of quaerimus ("we inquire" or, better, "for the
question is") as a key legal term in the responsa, and of iniuria
("injury/outrage") as an important delictal classification are by now
apparent from our earlier analyses. 393 The passages are still more useful
with respect to the Senecan paradox that ira is a delict. On the surface,
his inquiry may easily be taken for a standard ethical query, since a
common method of determining the moral basis of an action consists in
evaluating the part played by knowledge and the will. Seneca's approach
and position here are more in keeping with a presumption of wrong than
a neutral investigation of the nature of anger. The alternate indirect
questions in which sua sponte (of its own accord) and insciis nobis (without
393

See above, Chaps. 2 and 4.
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our knowledge) occur in the first section and non accedente animo (without
assistance of the mind) appear in the second section, particularly followed
by voluntate (volition) in the final sentence, provide a structure which more
closely parallels a legal question posed for the purpose of establishing
innocence or guilt. In fact, Seneca's concern with knowledge and volition
as the necessary conditions for anger anticipate the formula "knowingly
and willfully" in a common-law verdict of guilt. 394 This is precisely the
ruling he passes on ira, and, with great irony, as a reaction to iniuria,
since his criteria for assessing a violation of the delict are the same. Later
in the second book, Seneca discusses what cannot constitute iniuria and
why it cannot.
(1)

lrascimur aut iis a quibus ne aecipere quidem
potuimus iniuriam, aut iis a quibus accipere iniuriam potuimus. Ex prioribus quaedam sine sensu
sunt, ut Uber quem minutioribus litteris scriptum saepe proiecimus et mendosum laceravimus, ut
vestimenta quae, quia displicebant, scidimus....
(II.26.1-2)

(Our anger is stirred either by those from whom we
could not have received any injury at all, or by
those from whom we nright have reeeived one. To the
former class belong certain inanimate things, such
as the manuscript which we onen hurl from us because it is written in too small a seript or tear
up because it is full of mistakes, or the articles
of clothing which we pull to pieces because we do
not like them....)
394

Black's Law Dictionary, 3d ed., s.v. "Knowingly and willfully."
"This phrase, in reference to violation of a statute, means consciously and
intentionally. United States v. Lehigh Valley R. Co. (C.C.A.) 204 F.705,
708."
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(2) Atqui ut his irasci dementis est quae anima carent,
sic mutis animalibus, quae nullam iniuriam nobis faciunt, quia velle non possunt; non est enim iniuria
nisi a consilio profecta. Nocere itaque nobis possunt
ut ferrum aut lapis, iniuriam quidem facere non possunt.
(11.26.4)
(But as it is the act of a madman to become angry at
things without life, it is not less mad to be angry
at dumb animals, which do us no injury because they
cannot will to do so; for there can be no injury unless it arises from design. Therefore they can harm
us just as the sword or stone may do, but they cannot
injure us.)

Seneca's analysis of iniuria in these passages culminates in the same
judgment that he passes on anger.

The two key words that mean to

decide, velle (to intend) and consilio (by design), parallel his use of

voluntate (in accord) and animo adprobante (with the approval of the mind)
in the previous passages. 395 And as considered earlier, the distinction
Seneca makes between nocere (to harm) and iniuriam facere (to cause an
injury) makes it plain that he is differentiating legal culpability from
harm caused by no human agent and outside the purview of the law. 396
Overall, comparison of the two passages emphasizes the close link between

ira and iniuria by providing examples for which the same standards are
applied.
395
396

Seneca concludes (II.1.4) that anger cannot occur without

See II.1.1-4.

Daube, Forms of Roman Legislation, 5, 38-9, 45, and 73, examines
the legal sense of facere (OLD, entries 21a and b: "To do, perform <an
action> ... " and "to commit <a erjme > "). Iniuria as the direct object of
facere occurs throughout the De Ira in a clear-cut legal context. See I.3.1
and 18.6; II.26.4, 28.5, and 32.2; IIl.8.4.
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knowledge and volition and later (II.26.4) establishes that iniuria requires
recognition and intent: in other words, he evaluates anger on legal
grounds and subsequently clarifies the legal scope of the deli ct on the legal
grounds that one would expect. For Novatus or, for that matter, any
jurist, to characterize anger as a delict would be shocking, since according
to the legal texts, as well as the De Ira, the commission of iniuria is
actionable for redress. 397

From the very beginning, however, Seneca

refers to ira as an affectus (passionfemotion), a determination outside the
scope of the law. 398 Nonetheless, he pursues this approach throughout,
397

E.g., Gaius Inst. 3.220: "Iniuria autem committitur non solum cum
quis pugno puta aut fuste percussus vel etiam verberatus erit, sed... "
(Outrage is committed not only when someone is struck with a fist or a
club, or even flogged, but ...) Cf. II.32.2: "M. Catonem ignorans in balineo
quidam percussit imprudens; quis enim illi sciens faceret iniuriam? Postea
satis facienti Cato: "Non memini," inquit? "me percussum." Melius putavit
non agnoscere quam vindicare. " (Once when Marcus Cato was in the public
bath, a certain man, not knowing him, struck him; for who would
knowingly have committed outrage against that man? Later, when the
man was making an apology, Cato said, "I do not recall that I was struck."
He thought it better to ignore the incident than take it to court.)
398

At I.1.1, Seneca calls ira "... hunc... adfectum... maxime taetrum ac
rabidum... " (...this ...most hideous and frenzied ... of emotions ... ). Although
generally translated "emotions" (Basore, passim), affectus (OLD, entry 8)
can also signify an intention or purpose (based on emotional not rational
grounds), thus implying a close connection between emotion and a
disposition toward action. Affectus is, in fact, used in the legal sources to
mean "intent;" so, Digest 47.10.3.1: "Cum enim iniuria ex affectu facientis
consistat... " (For since outrage arises from the offender's intent ... ). Cf.
Gaius Inst. 4.178: "calumnia enim in adfectu est, sicut crimen furti ... " (for
calumny, like the crime of theft, lies in the intention ... ). Seneca uses
motum animi (II.3.4), agitatio animi (II.3.5), and concitatio animi (II.3.5) as
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and refines the legal nuances even more, as the following passage
illustrates.
Nam si quis poenam exigit non ipsius poenae avidus
sed quia oportet, non est adnumerandus iratis.
(I.9.4)
(For if someone exacts punishment, not because he
desires punishment for its own sake, but because it
is proper to exact it, he ought not to be counted
as an angry man.)
Perhaps the most striking feature of this sentence is its remarkable
resemblance to the language of the statutes. Nam si quis (for if someone)
is a familiar introduction in any number of sections from the Institutes of
Gaius or Justinian's Digest. 399 In context, the phrase normally occurs
immediately prior to stating the conditions which constitute a violation of
the law, or an exception constituting compliance, as this excerpt shows.
Si quis alienum vinum vel frumentum consumpserit,
non videtur damnum iniuria dare ideoque utilis danda
est actio.
(D. 9.2.30.2)
(If someone consumes another's wine or grain, he is not

understood to cause a wrongful loss, and so the analogous
equivalent to the noun "affect" as meaning visible emotion, which he
carefully distinguishes from adfectus animi (11.3-4). It is clear in both
chapters that by adfectus Seneca means a state of mind intent upon action.
399

See Berger, 707, and Digest 50.16.1 on the use of the indefinite
pronoun in the protasis of conditional statements in the legal sources.

231
action should be given.) 400
Seneca's phraseology plainly approximates this passage from the Digest,
but with an important difference: the Digest segment unequivocally
pertains to liability under the Lex Aquilia. 401 The sentence from the De
Ira (I.9.4) relates to anger, but in the familiar formulaic language of
Roman jurisprudence. The former states a condition under which wrongful
loss does not occur, but under which another course of action applies; the
latter states a condition under which a penalty may be exacted and one in
which it may not. Seneca makes the same distinction elsewhere, insisting
that duty (oportet) or expedience (utile) are the only appropriate intentions
whereby the exacting of punishment is acceptable. 402

The structural

400

Cf. the use of actionem dare (to grant the right of process/ an action)
in the De Ira at II.29.3: "De parvola summa iudicaturo tibi res sine teste
non probaretur, testis sine iureiurando non valeret, utrique parti dares
actionem, dare tempus, non semel audires... " (If the question of even a
small sum should come before you to be judged, you would require a
witness to prove the claim, the witness would have no weight except on
oath, you would grant to both parties the right of process, you would allow
them time, you would give more than one hearing... ). The legal context
here is plain, yet Seneca begins the chapter by recommending a remedy
(remedium) for ira, as though it were a legal offence.
401

Frier devotes much of his Casebook to a detailed and systematic
examination of the Lex Aquilia, the statute enacted in the 3d century B.C.
to set broad rules of liability for damage to property. Cf. Nicholas, 218-33,
and Buckland, 585-89.
402

See above, n.377, on the legal use of oportet (it is right/necessary) to
advise necessity or obligation by some principle or standard in various
circumstances(OLD, entry la). At Il.33.1, Seneca sets the condition under
which iniuria may be justifiably vindicated at law: "Si tamquam ad
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parallels between these passages and legal terms they contain reveal a
surprisingly juristic spirit and tone in the De Ira, a spirit and tone which
appear frequently, and regarding a topic, ira, not generally considered
legally problematic.
Seneca's parody of the form of the responsum, while requiring this
extraordinary view of ira as a delict, still depends heavily on a satiric
censure of iniuria which is inspired by ira for the paradox to succeed. As
a consequence, it is no accident that, just as his reflections on ira imitate
the idiom of the law, Seneca's more detailed analyses of iniuria resemble
sections of the Digest excerpted from various jurists. His insistence in
book two that knowledge and volition are necessary for iniuria to have
occurred precede a passage in which he argues against resorting to legal
recourse for the delict, even when it may in fact have been committed.
Cogitemus, inquam, alios non facere iniuriam sed
reponere, alios pro nobis facere, alios coactos
facere, alios ignorantes, etiam eos, qui volentes
scientesque faciunt, ex iniuria nostra non ipsam
iniuriam petere; aut dulcedine urbanitatis prolapsus est, aut fecit aliquid, non ut nobis obesset,
sed quia consequi ipse non poterat, nisi nos repulisset ....

remedium venimus, sine ira veniamus, non quasi dulce sit vindicari, sed
quasi utile... 11 (If we resort to a remedy (for outrage), let us do so without
anger--not with the view that revenge is sweet, but that it is expedient ... ).
See above, n. 317, on vindicare. Berger, 756, gives the concise legal sense
of utilis: 11 U sed of legal acts, transactions, and procedural steps which have
been, or can be, successfully accomplished in a given situation. 11
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(11.28.5)

(Let us consider, I say, that some are not doing us
an injury but repaying one, that others are acting
for our good, that some are acting under compulsion,
others in ignorance, that even those who are acting
intentionally and wittingly do not, while injuring
us, aim only at the injury; one slipped into it allured
by his wit, another did something, not to obstruct us,
but because he could not reach his own goal without
pushing us back ....
Although he cites instances where the delict iniuria has admittedly
been commited according to criteria--volentes scientesque(intentionally and
wittingly)--which he has already established, Seneca plays devil's advocate
here, cautioning against too strict or legalistic a judgment when a prima

facie case exists, a position certainly consistent with his criticism of the
courts and his numerous anecdotes depicting historical figures--such as
Cato--who ignored flagrant offenses. 403

Appearing in the middle of a

long chapter whose purpose is primarily to advise, Seneca's recommends
leniency and extols the superior authority of pietas (duty) and fides
(integrity) "quae omnia extra publicas tabulas sunt" (all of which lie
outside the statute books). 404

Oddly enough, however, and with an

amusing irony, there is a decidedly legal ring to his counsel here as well
403

Cf. 11.32 for the Cato anecdote, and llI.22-24 for other instances of
restraint or clemency.
404

See II.28.2.
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as in the passage quoted earlier in which he discusses the conditions
essential to iniuria. A similar tone is discernible in the following excerpt
from the Digest.
Illud relatum peraeque est eos, qui iniuriam pati
possunt, et facere posse. (1) Sane sunt quidam,
qui facere non possunt, ut puta furiosus et inpubes, qui doli capax non est: namque hi pati ini uriam solent, non facere. cum enim iniuria ex affectu
facientis consistat, consequens erit dicere hos,
sive pulsent sive convicium dicant, iniuriam fecisse non videri. (2) ltaque pati quis iniuriam, etiamsi non sentiat, potest, facere nemo, nisi qui
scit se iniuriam facere, etiarnsi nesciat cui faciat.
(3) Quare si quis per iocum percutiat aut dum certat,
ini uriarum non tenetur.
(D. 47.10.3 pr.-3)
(It is equally held that those who can suffer iniuria

can also inflict it. (1) To be sure, there are some
who cannot inflict it, e.g., a lunatic and a minor
not capable of dolus; for these persons may suffer iniuria, not inflict it. For since iniuria arises from
the offender's intent (affoctus), the logical consequence is that they (lunatics and minors) are not held
to inflict iniuria, whether they strike (another) or
raise a clamor. (2) And so a person can suffer iniuria
even if he does not feel it, but no one can do it except a person who knows that he inflicts iniuria, even
if the one to whom it is done is unaware. (3) Therefore if someone strikes (another) as a joke or during
a contest, he is not liable for iniuria.)405
Many comparable excerpts from the Digest on the full range of the
405

The translation is that of Frier, Casebook, 192. By dolus the
classical lawyers meant "fraud" or "bad faith" (Nicholas, 170), evidence of
which established liability in contractual law (Nicholas, 176) and the law
of delicts (Nicholas, 223).
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Roman law of delicts would only add to the impression of the similarity
between a typical legal discussion and Seneca's discourse on ira and

iniuria. The above passage is of more than passing interest, however,
since its theme is iniuria. The obvious parallels to previously quoted
sections from the De Ira are noteworthy in that they accurately
demonstrate not only the legal nuances of the De Ira, but reveal how
precisely Seneca parodies the substance and tone of Roman legal writing
in his criticism of a moral failing, an achievement which is noticeable only
on comparison with the literature of the law. 406

The Digest excerpt

offers the exact conditions or requirements under which iniuria applies by
law, as do the aforementioned passages from the De Ira. 407 Although
Seneca concurs with the later opinion of Ulpian on iniuria, his method of
determining ira is also in harmony with Ulpian's (and his own) position on

iniuria. 408 As the Digest shows, the offender's intent (ex affectu facientis)
and knowledge that he has committed iniuria (nisi qui scit se iniuriam

facere) are the necessary conditions which determine violation of the
406

Cf. 11.1-4, 26.1-2, and 28.5.

407

Ibid.

408

Digest 47.10.3 pr.-3 is selected from Ulpian, Libro quinquagesimo
sexto ad Edictum (the fifty-sixth book on the Edict).
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delict. 409 Likewise, Seneca stipulates decision (velle) and design (nisi a

consilio profecta) as requirements for iniuria, in agreement with the
general legal opinion as expressed by Ulpian and the editors of the
Digest. 410 However, the crucial elements in Seneca's analysis of ira are
the legal methods or criteria used to distinguish it. The will (voluntate)
and the approval of the mind (animo adprobante) are the standards to be
employed in determining ira, the identical standards he uses to establish

iniuria. 411

The moral criteria which Seneca recommends not only

supersede the particular measures of legal analysis mentioned above, but
even the most general or universally accepted principles of law (iuris
409

See nn. 398 and 396 on adfectus (intent) and iniuriam facere (to
commit outrage/insult). That Seneca uses affectus to describe ira (I.1.1)
rather than the neutral sensus (feeling) is noteworthy, as is the distinction
he makes between what is called "affect," or the visible sign of an emotion,
and intent (11.3.2-5 and 4.1), which he discusses unequivocally in legal
terms: "Et ut scias quemadmodum incipiant adfectus aut crescant aut
efferantur, est primus mot us non. voluntarius, quasi praeparatio adfectus...;
alter cum voluntate non contumaci, tamquam oporteat me vindicari, cum
laesus sim, aut oporteat hun.c poen.as dare, cum scelus fecerit." (That you
may know, further, how intentions begin or become stronger or
uncontrollable, the first prompting is involuntary, as though a preparation
for an intention ... ; the next is combined with an act of volition, not
unyielding, which assumes that it is right for me to seek legal action
because I have been offended, or that he ought to pay a penalty, since he
has committed a crime.)
41

°Cf. Digest 47.10.3.

411

Cf. 11.1.3-4. and 11.28.5.
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regula). 412 Thus, Seneca's incisive comparison between the ideal
virtues--duty (pietas), humanity (humanitas), generosity (liberalitas),justice

(iustitia), integrity (/ides)--and the impoverished statutes of Roman law--the
very lifeblood of Roman civilization--best summarizes the aim of the De Ira
and marks the culmination of his juristic analysis.
The contrast between Roman ideals and Roman law is clear and
straightforward for the short stretchj ust mentioned, but this is as close as
Seneca comes to a straightforward statement of his position. Elsewhere,
he consistently applies the methodology of legal analysis recognizable from
the primary sources of Roman law to ira as delictum animi (delict of the
mind). To support this view, Seneca even seems to draw on areas of law
completely separate from the law of delicts--a regular practice in both
Roman and modern legal systems--in order to find the metaphors adequate
to demonstrate the severity of anger. For example:
Primum facilius est excludere perniciosa quam regere et non admittere quam admissa moderari; nam
cum se in possessione posuerunt, potentiora rectore
sunt nee recidi se minui ve pati untur.
(I.7.2)
(In the first place, it is easier to exclude harmful
passions than to rule them, and to deny them admittance than, after they have been admitted, to control
them; for when they have established themselves in
412

See 11.28.2-3.

238
possession, they are stronger than their ruler and do
not permit themselves to be restrained or reduced.)
In what might seem a casual or offhanded analogy to illustrate the
harmfulness of anger, Seneca resorts to a practice familiar to anyone
acquainted with legal argument: reasoning by example, or from case to
case. 413

In this instance, he alludes to a commonplace of Roman

property law--the distinction between ownership and possession--to
underpin his case, even though the law of delicts and property law at first
glance appear to be quite unconnected and dissimilar. 414

Seneca's

example and, more specifically, his use of possessione (possession)
introduces a basic legal concept: namely, that possession is the foundation
of ownership and has both a privileged and protected status. 415

By

appropriating the concept of possessio (possession) from property law for his
analysis of ira, Seneca merely follows the usual process whereby similarity
is observed between cases, the rule of law inherent in the first case is
413

Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1948; rep. Phoenix Books, 1961), 1-8,
discusses the mechanics of legal argument, which is based on reasoning by
example.
414

Nicholas, 107-115, notes the differences between the concepts of
ownership and possession and their applications in Roman law. Cf.
Buckland, 180-208.
415

Ibid., 107.
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cited, and this legal ruling is made suitable for the second case. 416
So here Seneca applies the leading principle of the "delict" of ira.
Just as adverse possession by one party may defeat a claim of ownership
by a second party, so anger denies a claim to self-rule or the undisputed
claim to control of one's actions. Seneca notes the similarities, refers to
precedent, and extends the precedent to ira to establish a legal basis for
his position, an end he pursues by availing himself of still another
province of the law. At various times he speaks of potestas (legal authority
or control) in the context of anger .417 For example:
Commota enim semel et excussa mens ei servit quo
impellitur. Quarundam rerum initia in nostra
potestate sunt, ulteriora nos vi sua rapiunt nee
regressum relinquunt.
(I.7.3-4)
(For when once the mind has been aroused and shaken,
416

Levi, 2, describes this process, as valid in Roman law as in the
historical development of modern liability law which he meticulously
traces in succeeding chapters. The practice is most apparent in analogous
actions (actiones utiles) or actions based on the facts (actiones in factum),
whereby modifications of an existing formula are employed "to cover legal
situations and transactions for which the original formula did not suffice,"
as Berger, 347, maintains. Cf. Frier, 3. Such case analysis becomes
necessary because the general language of legal statutes precludes
mention of every conceivable situation which may arise.
417

Berger, 640, maintains that in "its broadest sense potestas means
either physical ability (=facultas) or the legal capacity, the right (=ius) to
do something." More narrowly, it referred to magisterial power in public
law and power over a family or things in private law. Cf. Digest 1.12 and
OLD, entries le and 3.
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it becomes the slave of the disturbing agent.
There are certain things which at the start are
under our authority, but later hurry us away by
their force and leave us no retreat.)
And in the final book, Seneca once again makes reference to potestas (legal
authority or control), but on this occasion while providing a distinctively
Roman and legal interpretation to remarks made by Plato, who refused to
exercise domestic rule when angry.
ltaque abstulit sibi in suos potestatem et ob peccatum quoddam commotior: "Tu," inquit "Speusippe,
servulum istum verberibus obiurga; nam ego irascor."
Ob hoc non cecidit, propter quod alius cecidisset.
"Irascor" inquit; "plus faciam quam oportet, libenti us faciam: non sit iste servus in eius potestate
qui in sua non est."
111.12.6-7
(He therefor denied himself all authority over his
own household, and once, when he was deeply provoked at some fault, he said, "Do you, Speusippus,
punish this young slave with a whip, for I am angry."
His reason for not striking was the very reason that
would have caused another to strike. "I am angry,"
said he; "I should do more than I ought, and with
too much satisfaction; this slave should not be under the authority of a master who is not master of
himself.")
In both passages Seneca resorts to the terminology of the law to
strengthen his position, but this time he uses servus (slave) and potestate
(legal authority or control)--terms included in the law of persons--to argue

241
by example. 418 Referring chiefly to the rights and privileges enjoyed by
the senior male in the Roman family, the paterfamilias, potestas (legal
authority or control) represented the highest ordinary legal status as
compared to the servus (slave), for whom there were no legal rights. 419
In the first selection Seneca describes the initial disturbances of the mind
which may result in anger as enslaving (servit), although control (potestate)
is still retained. 420 In the subsequent passage he employs the same legal
nomenclature to characterize Plato's refusal to discipline a slave while
angry. Quite cleverly, Seneca utilizes both paranomasia and anachronism
to embellish the anecdote, thereby providing a Roman twist to the tale.
The idea of "control" (continentia, moderatio, or dictio) would have sufficed
for the point Plato intended, but Seneca further adorns the incident not
only by introducing a Roman legal term unfamiliar to Plato (thus the
418

Joh. Frid. Gronovius apud Justus Lipsius, 114, cites Xenocrates,
Diogenes, Stobaeus, and Plutarch for other instances of this anecdote. As
in other anecdotes which originally occur in the works of Greek authors,
Seneca cleverly alters the tale to suit his legal purpose and his Roman
audience, using a legal vocabulary consistent with the Roman law of
persons as it applies to masters and slaves. He confers on Plato the
benefits of Roman legal status, that of patria potestas, which Plato could
not have enjoyed.
419

Nicholas, 60-75, surveys these legal categories. Cf. Gaius Inst. 1.48-

54.
420

See above, nn. 398 and 409, on Seneca's distinction between an
initial reaction to an event, which is involuntary, and an intention, which
is voluntary and involves interpretation of the event.
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anachronism), but also by using this term to suggest the double
significance of potestate: as legal authority and as self-control.
In short, both excerpts contain status designations from the law of
persons, yet display them in a new context, much as the notions of
ownership and possession.

Despite belonging to separate domains of

Roman law, however, possessio (possession) and potestas (legal authority)
share a logical kinship which in turn connects them with Seneca's
denunciation of ira. Each in its own fashion denotes control, whether of
property or family and slaves, and each consequently forms a partial basis
for Seneca's case against iraas deli ct. It is clear that possessio(possession)
constitutes a claim of ownership just as potestas (legal authority or control)
establishes a claim of status; both confer legal governance of either things
or persons, a principle that enables Seneca to infer a certain similarity
between such precedents and his legal treatment of ira. The irate man,
having knowingly and voluntarily decided upon a vindictive course of
action, relinquishes his self-possession and status to ira, thereby violating
the principle of self-control inherent in Roman property law as well as the
law of persons or status.
A number of observations can be made about Seneca's line of
reasoning, the first being that he gives legal precedents for his delictal
analysis of ira. Secondly, the methodological consistency of Roman legal
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analysis and Stoic moral analysis allows us to comprehend why the latter,
stripped of legal nuance, could conceal the former, especially since
autonomy and personal liberty, the idealized goals of Stoic moral
philosophy, are themes expected of a Stoic philosopher. These ideals,
however, have their counterparts in autonomous ownership of property and
the full citizen rights of the paterfamilias(oldest male), important features
of the Roman legal landscape in which Seneca's mention of possessio
(possession) and potestas (legal authority or control) are set. Finally, and
most significant of all, these terms and the case-to-case arguments in
which they occur contribute further evidence that the De Ira parodies a
jurist's responsum.
One further parallel between the De Ira and the legal texts
underscores his parody of the responsum and needs to be examined: the
comparison between citations of certain philosphers in the De Ira and the
opinions of notable jurists regularly invoked in the primary legal sources,
including those who antedate Seneca.

References to jurists from the

classical age of Roman law--the period extending from Augustus to
Diocletian--are abundant in the Digest, especially those jurists renowned
for

noteworthy

or

innovative

contributions,

such

as

Labeo

or

244
Pomponius. 421

Mention of classical jurists does, in fact, appear to be

typical of Roman legal writing and functions not unlike the case to case
reasoning just discussed. 422 Judicial thought no less than case precedent
serves to either reinforce and refine an issue or differentiate opposing
views, as this sample on conuicium (clamor) indicates.
Convicium iniuriam esse Labeo ait ... (5) Sed quod adicitur a Praetore "adversus bonos mores" ostendit non
omnem in unum collatam vociferationem Praetorem notare,
sed earn, quae bonis moribus improbatur quaeque ad infamiam vel invidiam alicuius spectaret. (6) Idem ait
'adversus bonos mores' sic accipiendum non eius qui
fecit, sed generaliter accipiendum adversus bonos mores huius civitatis ... (8) Fecisse convicium non tantum
is videtur, qui vociferatus est, verum is quoque, qui
concitavit ad vociferationem alios vel qui summisit
ut vociferentur ... (11) Ex his apparet non omne maledict um convicium est ....
(D. 47.10.15.3, 5-6, 8, 11.)
(Labeo says that a clamor is an iniuria ...(5) But the
Praetor's qualification "contrary to good morals" shows
that the Praetor does not censure every outcry directed
at a person, but (only) one that offends against good
morals and looks to someone's disgrace or odium. (6)
He (Labeo) also says that "contrary to good morals"
should be interpreted not with respect to (the morals
of) the offender, but generally: contrary to the morals
of this community ... (8) Not just the person who cried
out is held to have raised a clamor, but also a person
421

Schulz, Roman Legal Science, 99 and n.2, provides these terminal
points and surveys a number of differing scholarly opinions on the dating
of this period, the most generous of which includes both the entire
republican and imperial ages.
422

See above, n. 416.
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who roused others to cry out, or who brought about the
outcry ... (11) From this it is clear that not all abusive
language is clamor.)
Ulpian systematically lays out the problem of convicium (clamor)
here as a category of iniuria by summoning the testimony of the late
Republican jurist, Labeo, who no doubt significantly advanced legal
thought regarding the matter by proposing more prescribed and carefully
distinguished conditions. 423 Ulpian thus gives due credit in mentioning
the earlier jurist's views by name, first of all, and inserting the familiar
and formulaic ait (he says), before briefly citing Labeo's additions to the
legal scope of the delict. 424
In much the same spirit, Seneca pays tribute to the philosophers,
most notably Aristotle and Plato, but chiefly the former, since he presents
a contrary opinion of ira.
Atqui, ut in prioribus libris dixi, stat Aristoteles
defensor irae et vetat illam nobis exsecrari: calcar
ait esse virtutis, hac erepta inermem animum et ad
conatus magnos pigrum inertemque fieri.
42

3The Digest selection is taken from the 57th book of Ulpian's
commentary on the edict (Ulpian.us~ Libro quinquagesimo septimo ad

Edictum).
424

See above, Chap. 4, on the regular and formulaic use of ait in the
legal literature. Horace Sermones 2.1.4-6, in an imaginary dialogue with
the jurist Trebatius, parodies a legal dialogue: "Trebati, quid faciam,

praescribe. "Quiescas." Ne faciam, inquis, omnino versus? "Aio."
(Trebatius, give me counsel. What am I to do? "Be quiet. I am not to
write verses at all, you say'?" "That is what I say.
11

11

11

)
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(IIl.3.1)
(And yet, as I said in earlier books, Aristotle stands
forth as the defender of anger, and forbids us to
cut it out; it is, he claims, a spur to virtue, and
if the mind is robbed of it, it becomes defenseless and grows sluggish and indifferent to high endeavor .)425
And toward the very beginning of the De Ira, Seneca provides a similar
commentary.
Primum diximus cupiditatem esse poenae exigendae,
non facultatem; concupiscunt autem homines et quae
non possunt. Deinde nemo tam humilis est qui poenam vel summi hominis sperare non possit; ad nocendum < omnes > potentes sumus. Aristotelis finitio
non multum a nostra abest; ait enim iram esse cupiditatem doloris reponendi.
(1.3.2-3)
(In the first place, I gave my opinion on the desire
to exact punishment, not of the power to do so; moreover, men do desire even what they cannot attain. In
the second place, no one is so lowly that he cannot
hope to punish even the loftiest of men; we all have
power to do harm. Aristotle's definition differs
little from mine; for he says that anger is the desire to repay suffering. 426
The most obvious parallels between the passage from the Digest and
these selections from the De Ira are the naming of those whose viewpoints
are either at variance with or useful for clarifying the problem at hand, in
425

1.3.2, 9.2, 17.1, and II.13.1. are the other chapters in which the
authority of Aristotle is introduced as an outside or contrary opinion.
426

Cf. De Anima, 403 a 30.
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particular using the formulaic ait (he says) to set off the officially noted
opinion by another expert on the issue. More to the point, however, this
pattern introduces a decidedly casuistic analysis of ira which bears
immediate resemblance to Ulpian's comments on convicium (clamor) into
which Labeo's thoughts on the delict are admitted.

Aristotle's name

likewise occurs as a quasi-legal authority whose advocacy of ira is
markedly opposed to Seneca's condemnation. In the first excerpt, which
appears rather late in the De Ira, Seneca recalls his fundamental
opposition to Aristotle's position on ira as initially cited in Book One. 427
The sequence in each case is remarkably formulaic and closely follows the
pattern in the Digest selection: either a definition or further distinction of
a previous definition takes place.428

In this case, Seneca carefully

427

1.3.2 contains Seneca's introductory statement of the two views. For
discussion of the legal nature of Seneca's definition, see above, Chap. 2.
428

Digest 47.10.15.3, 5-6, 8, 11 is quite typical of the style and tone of
the work and evokes comparable passages in the De Ira. Digest
47.10.13.3-4, also on iniuria, is an equally representative passage: Si quis

per iniuriam ad tribunal alicuius me interpellaverit vexandi mei causa,
potero iniuriarum experiri. (4) Si quis de honoribus decernendis alicuius
passus non sit decerni ut puta imaginem alicui vel quid aliud tale: an
iniuriarum teneatur? et ait Labeo non teneri, quamvis hoc contumeliae
causa faciet: etenim multum interest, inquit, contumeliae causa quid fiat an
vero fieri quid in honorem alicuius quis non patiatur. ("If, to obstruct me,
a person outrageously interrupts me before someone's tribunal, I will be
able to sue on iniuria. (4) If, with regard to decreeing honors for someone,
a person did not allow that, for instance, a statue or something similar be
decreed in someone's honor, should he be liable for iniuria? Labeo says he
is not liable, even though he did this to be insulting. For, he says, there
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distinguishes between exacting punishment (poenae exigendae) and
repayment of suffering (doloris reponendi), considering the former an
eagerness for the legal action that a penalty or punishment (poena)
requires and a foundation on which to build his vehement objections to the
crowded dockets (II. 7-9) and his thoroughgoing denunciation of capricious
and arbitrary claims of iniuria. 429
Perhaps just as significant, however, in light of the similarities
noted above and the scholarship on the responsa, is the use of the perfect
tense with dixi and diximus (I have said=ruled/given an opinion) rather
than dico or dicimus (I say=rule/give an opinion) as evidence of a

responsum. His use of the perfect tense in an already familiar legal
context is sufficient proof that a jurist is responding to a formal legal
question in a responsum, as Schulz has mentioned, since "it would have
been affectation for a jurist to use the past tense in reference to an opinion
which he was reaching at the moment of writing. "430 Although dixi (I
have ruled/given an opinion) in the first passage (111.3.1) clearly refers to
an earlier section of the De Ira, diximus (I have ruled/given an opinion) as
is a great difference between what is done to insult and what someone does
not allow to be done to honor another.")
429

See above, Chaps. 1 and 2, for more detailed analyses of these
passages.
430

Schulz, Roman Legal Scince, 224-25.
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it initially appears (1.3.2-3) has no prior reference in the work itself, and
precisely exemplifies Schulz's observation. 431 The legal vocabulary and
tone of the work becomes increasingly obvious by comparison with fairly
typical samples from the Digest, and therefore adds yet another element
common to the De Ira and the responsa.
In closing, then, Seneca's remarkable assertion that anger is a delict
of the mind (delictum animi) is neither a rhetorical exaggeration nor a
casual metaphor. To the contrary, this assertion directs and informs the
entire work and is the key to Seneca's legal design. Without such an
overtly legal statement, this most comprehensive of the Dialogi would
remain, as critics of Seneca have complained, a long-winded moral treatise
undeserving of serious regard, if only because it propounds what to many
is an untenable and unattainable moral ideal. 432 The evidence, however,
suggests quite another conclusion and a Senecan purpose quite different
from what is usually supposed. From the very beginning he has associated

ira with iniuria and leaves no doubt thereafter that he has been referring
to the delict iniuria as the Digest or the Institutes of Gaius have
431

0ther examples of diximus and dixi (I have ruled/given an opinion)
in a similar context occur at 1.5.3. and 8.3; II.4.2, 27.3, and 31.1; 111.6.6.
432

See Pfennig, passim, for one of the most critical evaluations of
Senecan style generally, and the De Ira in particular.
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characterized it. 433 Furthermore, Seneca surveys and evaluates the two
notions on the same grounds, denouncing ira in all its manifestations
while grudgingly offering assent to the process for iniuria only in cases
where expedience is the determining issue. 434

Add to these factors a

remarkable frequency of legal terms, numerous parallels to legal formulae
and discourse, or the many anecdotes which do the work of legal
precedents, and the De Ira begins to assume an unexpected intent and
significance.
The extent to which elements of Roman law recur in the work
should come as no surprise, given what we know of Roman education
among the aristocracy, Seneca's rhetorician father, and more relevant still,
the careers of both Novatus and Seneca. 435 Though the occasion of the
De Ira remains open for conjecture, the rationale for the presence of these
legal features in it has not been suspected--and for good reason. 436 Stoic
433

See Digest 47.10-25, Gaius Inst. 3.220-25, and Justinian Inst. 4.4.

434

While conceding an acceptable vindication for iniuria at 11.33.1,
Seneca uses utile in the legal sense, meaning "actionable" or "valid" (OLD,
entry 6). Although generally translated "expedience" (Basore, 239), the
legal emphasis and terminology in the chapter would support "actionable"
or "valid" as more appropriate to the context.
435

See above, nn. 78and144 on the legal character of Roman education
and the careers of Novatus and Seneca.
436

Aside from the obvious desire to present a detailed Stoic position on

ira, speculation on what prompted Seneca to write the De Ira has
inevitably accompanied attempts to interpret the work. His criticisms of
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ideas still prevail throughout the De Ira, to be sure, yet they obscure a
formal design available only by close comparison with the primary sources
of Roman law and whatever general characteristics legal scholars have
been able to assemble from the fragments and testimonia of responsa.
Once the comparison is made, however, Seneca's intent becomes clear: the
De Ira is an epistolary responsum underneath it all, and appears out of the
fog of philosophical assumptions to match the descriptions of responsa
provided by commentators and scholars of Roman jurisprudence. Seneca's
judicial recommendations, case narratives, and his treatment of ira as
delict comprise three of the most salient features known to have marked
a responsum in its original form.
Taken alone, the structural correspondences between the De Ira and
attested responsafail to account for Seneca's condemnation of anger in his
highly peculiar reworking of a legal genre. That he introduces a moral
failing into the list of actionable delicts in much the same way Ulpian or
Labeo discourse on clear-cut offences to public order leads, finally, to
several observations or conclusions as to the intended meaning of the De
Ira. Whereas no Roman of Seneca's education or standing could have
Caligula (II.33 and III. 18-19) have suggested (Sorensen, 98) that it was
written as a denunciation of that emperor's conduct and the character of
his regime. Griffin, 319 n.5 points to Seneca's mention of Novatus' fear
of anger (Naturales Quaestiones 4, pref. 10 ff.) as a likely pretext for
making Novatus his addressee.
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seriously construed anger as an actual delict, this is the Seneca who later
parodies elements of Roman law in the Apocolocyntosis: Seneca the
satirist. And it is the satirist, exiled and impatient, who could attempt
what no jurist would do: an obloquy on the vice of iniuria, the principal
remedy protecting Roman dignity from the time of the Twelve Tables to
Justinian's Digest, in a legal genre appropriated for a clever parody of the
law itself.

CONCLUSION
Despite the insights of scholars during the past century that the De
Ira possessed features of the Hellenistic diatribe and that the work lacks
important formal elements which distinguished the philosophical dialogue,
students of Seneca's prose works and philosophical positions have
continued to view the De Ira as a Stoic condemnation of anger added to a
tradition of similar dialogues on the subject which are known only from

testimonia and have passed into obscurity. Flawed though it may be
compared to earlier specimens of the genre, the De Ira nonetheless
includes a sufficient enough moral and philosophical emphasis to be
considered a philosophical essay, if not a poorly crafted dialogue, by many
students of Seneca's works. However inelegant in execution and radical
in viewpoint as some have regarded it, the De Ira proceeds by way of
argument, rebuttal, and recommendation toward the aim which Seneca
directly announces at the outset: the reduction or elimination of anger.
Seneca's goal presupposes that anger as generally defined is morally
unacceptable and must be categorically disallowed, a task that requires a
thorough rejection of any effort to mitigate its harmfulness or to propose
that anger may have some ethical value relative to circumstances. As in
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the philosophical dialogues of earlier writers, the case develops largely
through the systematic refutation of objections raised by one of the
characters; unlike earlier dialogues, however, there are no named
characters and Seneca's interlocutor remains anonymous throughout.
Added to these exceptional departures from the lex operis of a dialogue, the
De Ira contains no prologue or setting and, therefore, no occasion for the
dramatic exchange of conversation which allows for the transition from
small talk to the discussion of a philosophical problem. 437 Instead, the
work opens atypically: Seneca quickly cites the request of his addressee for
advice as a pretext for what is to follow. Furthermore, Seneca does not
avail himself of a famous figure to present his views, an odd omission
which also breaks with convention. Marcus Cato, whom Seneca extols in
the De Constantia as a worthy example of someone who consistently
remained unaffected by injury and insult, would have been a natural
candidate for such a role. In fact, Seneca represents his own positions, an
expected epistolary convention, but one foreign to the dialogue tradition.
Whereas the De Ira, however classified, omits important elements
of the philosophical dialogue, the work does, however, include far too
numerous an array of devices common to the satiric monologues and
437

Cf. Plato's Symposium and Cicero's De Amicitia. Discussions of the
central topics, love and friendship, begin after several chapters of casual
conversation.
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epistles of Horace to dismiss. As we have seen, the De Ira is in fact a sort
of epistle--the judicial responsum. In any case, despite its prose medium,
the De Ira adheres to both ancient and modern standards of what
constitutes a satiric programme. Seneca denounces a specific vice, offers
exaggerated descriptions of angry men, and presents horrifying accounts
of cruel autocrats; in short, he casts ira in the worst possible light by
employing the sustained hyperbole typical of satire. Also in the satiric
mode, Seneca proposes a radical ideal of restraint in counterpoint to his
criticism of anger.

Satire demands vivid comparisons and contrasts

between virtue and vice, not just the progressive series of objections and
rebuttals characteristic of philosophy, for which the argument is all that
matters.

For Seneca, anger must be avoided not only because it is

logically indefensible, but because it is ugly.
A survey of the elements of satire in the De Ira still does not explain
the structural irregularity of the work; in point of fact, the presence of
these elements complicates the problem. At various intervals in the work,
Seneca very carefully defines his terms. He describes anger as the desire
to exact punishment (poenae exigendae cupiditas) and maintains that it
originates with the appearance of injury (species iniuriae).

However

generic Seneca's use of these phrases may appear at first glance, closer
inspection reveals a more technical significance: iniuria happens to be the
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term under which a number of legal offenses are classified in the Roman
law of delicts. More importantly, Seneca continually refers to iniuria in
his discussion of anger, and in each instance the legal case is clear.
Furthermore, the legal context of Seneca's remarks widens once it becomes
plain that by iniuria he means the delict and by poena the assignment of
a legal penalty. Thus, it becomes increasingly apparent that the De Ira
was written to address legal issues with which Seneca considered anger to
be inseparably connected, and a more detailed analysis of the structure
and vocabulary of the work support this conclusion.
Enough evidence is supplied by the primary sources and the work
of modern scholars of Roman law to substantiate the legal meaning of
many of the terms which Seneca uses and the anecdotes he presents for
Novatus' benefit. Moreover, the instances of these legal terms in the
Senecan corpus often occur only or predominantly in the De Ira. 438 The
pattern which now emerges in the work discloses a criticism of and a
satiric approach to iniuria and litigation which parallels the denunciation
of ira from start to finish. Seneca's satiric treatment of anger doubles as
a satire of the legal machinery that enables the easily affronted Roman
438

Conviciator (OLD, entry 1: "one who utters abuse") and advocatio
(OLD, entries 2 and 3: "pleading in the courts" and "postponement [of a
trial]") are two such instances of legal terms used only in the De Ira. At
the same time, there are seventy occurrences of forms of iniuria in the
work, far more than in any other of Seneca's works.
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citizen to justify his ire. The intent of Seneca's diatribe on the crowded
courts, the base lawsuits, and baser attorneys contributes to the overall
design and is not the aimless and exaggerated digression of which it
initially appears to consist. So also his numerous anecdotes and advisory
comments on the appropriate conduct for judicial magistrates: the former
not only describe contrasting approaches to anger, but contrasting styles
of judicial conduct; the latter refer to the elimination of anger Seneca
advocates throughout, but especially its elimination in anyone who
dispenses justice.
Although some have noted legal aspects of the work, such as the
judicial recommendationsjust cited, the overall emphasis on law in the De
Ira discloses a legal agenda of perhaps as great a significance as Seneca's
moral agenda. If so, the usual format in which to exhaustively argue a
point of law would be a legal genre such as the epistolary responsum, not
a philosophical dialogue.

Inasmuch as the De Ira lacks many of the

conventions of the dialogue, it does possess enough of the formal features
of the epistolary responsum to conclude that this was the genre on which
Seneca relied for making his case against ira and iniuria. Furthermore,
since nothing more than fragments of the responsa have survived, the De
Ira may be of inestimable value for both Seneca's apologist's and Roman
legal historians: first, as a piece more carefully and deliberately crafted
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than considered by detractors of the work; second, as the only complete
example of this type of legal analysis which survives; and last, as an
important source of evidence for the prominence of iniuria during Seneca's
age.
Finally, the De Ira provokes further interest as a literary work,
since it unites the formality and seriousness of the responsum with the less
weighty features of satire: an uncommon combination, but one that reveals
an unsuspected originality and a more subtle purpose than has been
supposed. Passages from the satires of Horace and the attested circulation
of parodies of legal formulae in the early empire support a tradition of
legal parody, and Seneca's masterful parody of legal formulae in the
Apocolocyntosis demonstrates his participation in that

tradition.

Nonetheless, Seneca's use of the responsum as a model for the De Ira still
fails to explain elements of satire present in the work; the elements of an
epistolary satire, however, may account for his use of the equally
epistolary responsum. As a genre typically employed by jurists to discuss
issues of law, Seneca's purpose throughout is to criticize a legitimate deli ct
and a vice--hardly aims one would expect to find in such a genre. He
parodies the format of the responsum so closely that one might assume his
purpose to be legal, yet everywhere he censures the law and its role in the
justification of ira. The moral ideals of the satirist are unmistakable:
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Quanto latius officiorum patet quam iuris regula!
Quam multa pietas, humanitas, liberalitas, iustitia,
fl.des exigunt, quam omnia extra publicas tabulas sunt!

APPENDIX
SENECAN LEGAL VOCABULARY
[Note: The following is an alphabetical list of the legal vocabulary
identified in the De Ira. The definition, one or two citations representing
the legal use of the term, and the listing from the Oxford Latin Dictionary
(OLD) or Justinian's Digest corresponding to the definition follows each
word.]
absolvo: acquit (3.29.2 and 1.14.3) OLD 2.
accedo: assent to (2.1.3) OLD 8.
accusator: an informer, prosecutor (2.29.3) OLD 2b.
accuso: bring a charge, accusation (2.7 .3 and 3.5.3) OLD 2a.
actio: legal action (1.8.4 and 2.29.3) OLD 2c.
affectus: an intention, motive (1.12.3) OLD 8.
adprobare: to assent to (2.1.4) OLD lb.
advocatio: pleading in the law-courts (3.9.3) OLD 2; postponement of a trial (1.18.1)
OLD3.
advocatus: one who advises a party to a lawsuit (2.7.3 and 2.13.1) OLD 1.
aestimatio: the assessment of a penalty, damages (3.12.3) OLD 2.
aestimo: assess, judge (2.27.4 and 3.32.2) OLD 4.
aio: prescribe, lay down (1.17 .1) OLD 7 and Digest 23.2.45.5.
caedes: the crime of murder (1.2.1and1.12.2) OLD 1.
causa: case (1.2.5 and 2.22.4) OLD 1.
causam agere: to conduct a case (1.38.2) OLD 3a.
condemrw: pass sentence on (2.29.3) OLD 1.
consilium: deliberate or rational action, choice (2.26.4) OLD 6.
contemrw: treat with contempt in word or action (2.26.5) OLD le.
contendo: contend in a lawsuit (2.34.1) OLD 8c.
contumelia: insulting language or behavior (3.8.4 and 3.38.1) OLD 1
contumeliosus: insulting (3.20.2) OLD 1.
conviciator: one who utters abuse (3.24.1) OLD 1.
convicium : insulting talk, abuse (2 .25 .4) OLD 2.
crimen: an indictment, charge (3.29.3) OLD 1.
criminari: to make charges against (2.22.3) OLD 1.
damrw: pass judgment against (2.1.5 and 2. 7.3) OLD 1.
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damnum: sum to be paid in retribution or as a penalty (3.43.4) OLD 4.
delator: an informer, accuser (2.7.3) OLD 1.
delictum: misdeed, offense (2.6.4) OLD 1.
delinquo: commit an offense (3.24.4) OLD 3a.
dico: declare, prescribe, state a rule (1.3 .2) OLD lOa.
dignitas: rank, status (2.6.2) OLD 3.
excusatio: the action of excusing or pardoning (2.26.3) OLD 4 and Digest 4 7.4.2.
facio: commit (a crime) (2.26.4 and 2.28.5) OLD 21b.
fitriosus: lunatic, raving mad (2.34.4) OLD 1.
fitrio: rage with anger, hatred, or similar passions (1.16.5) OLD 3.
fitror: hostile rage, fury, anger (1.13.3) OLD 2b.
indignor: take offense at (2.1.5) OLD 1.
infamia: official disgrace (3.41.3) OLD 2b.
iniuria: any act, insulting in kind and intention, calculated to injure a person's
reputation or outrage his feelings (ranging from physical assault to
defamation of character). (2.1.3.and 3.26.1; used 70 times) OLD 4.
inquam: say (used in presenting a real or imaginary objection (1.3.1) OLD la
and band Digest 47.2.21.
intellego: grasp mentally, understand (2.1.5) OLD 1.
iudex: a judge (1.12.3 and 2.26.6)
iudicium: legal proceedings before a iudex (3.12.4) OLD 1.
iudico: judge a case (3.29.2) OLD 1.
ius: a legal code, oath (2.28.2) OLD 2.
iusiuro: swear to a binding formula (2.29.3) OLD 5.
laedo: offend (3.32.3) OLD 2b.
latro: a robber (1.16.1 and 2.17.2) OLD 2
lex: law (1.16.1) OLD 1.
(st)lis: a dispute at law (2.27.4 and 3.32.2) OLD 1.
litigo: go to law (3.23.3) OLD 1.
magistratus: an officer of the state (1.16.5) OLD 2.
maledictum: an insult (1.19.1) OLD 1.
mancipium: a slave (3.14.3) OLD 3.
manifestus: detected in the act, flagrant, plain (2.7.3) OLD 2.
obiurgatio: the act of reproving (1.16 .2) OLD 1.
obiurgator: one who reproves or rebukes (3.14.2) OLD 1.
obiurgo: find fault with, censure (2.28.4) OLD lb.
offendo: offend against, wrong (2.25.4 and 2.26.3) OLD 6.
offensum: offense committed against a person, injury (2.33.3 and 2.34.2) OLD 4a.
oportet: it is demanded by some principle or standard (1.16.1) OLD 1.
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percussus, -us: a blow (2.32.2) OLD 1.
percutio: land a blow on, strike forcibly (2.32.2) OLD 1.
poena: the penalty paid in satisfaction for an offence (2.3.4) OLD la.
poenam dare: to pay the penalty (2.4.1 and 3.40.1) OLD lb.
possessio: occupancy (1. 7 .2) OLD 1.
potestas: possession or control (3.12.7) OLD le.
probo: give official approval to accuser, plaintiff (2.29.3) OLD le.
quaero: hold a judicial inquiry into (1.16.1) OLD 10.
quaestio: a judicial investigation (2.2.1) OLD 3.
remedium: legal remedy (2.33.1) Digest 12.6.23.1.
reus: a defendant (1.18.2 and 2.7.3) OLD 2.
scelus: a crime (2.4.1) OLD 2a.
scire: to be aware of a fact stated (2 .2.1) OLD 6a and c.
servus: a slave (2.31.4) OLD 1.
species: a specific legal situation or case (2.1.3 and 2.28.6) OLD 11.
sui iuris: one's own master, independent (2.12.3) OLD 13c.
supplicium: the extreme penalty, death (3.32.2) OLD 3b.
talio: exaction of compensation in kind (2.32.1) OLD 1.
testis: a witness (2.29.3) OLD 1.
ulciscor: exact retribution for (2.3.4 and 2.4.1.) OLD lb.
ultio: the act of taking vengeance, revenge, retribution (2.32.1) OLD 1.
utilis: (of legal processes) applicable (2.33.1) OLD 2b.
velle: to take voluntary action (2.26.4) OLD 5c.
veneficus: a poisoner (1.16.1) OLD 2.
vindico: exact reparation for an offense (1.12.1 and 3.33.3) OLD 5a.
vindicta: revenge, punishment (3.30.4) OLD 2.
voluntas: one's decision or intention (2.1.4 and 2.2.1) OLD 5.
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